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Abstract
Chapter one explores the role of endogenous costly attention allocation in politics. I
show that voters may choose to pay too much attention to politicians’ actions, and
this induces too much political pandering. Moreover, when attention to the action and
to the state of the world are both endogenous, voters may not pay enough attention
the state. This model can be a demand-driven explanation of the under-provision of
analytical contents by news channels.
Chapter two looks at the role of the media market structure in keeping outlets free to
publish their findings. Building on the literature on media capture, the model highlights
that high competition in the media market can make capture easier. Moreover, it
highlights conditions on the parameters where the effect of competition on capture is
non-monotonic. The model is motivated by empirical analysis of the digitization of
terrestrial television in Europe.
Chapter three shows that it is not necessarily true that competition in the modern
digital environment is pushing media outlets towards early release of less accurate
information. More competitive environments may be more conducive to reputation
building. Therefore, it is possible to have better reporting in a more competitive
world. However, we show that the audience may be worse-off due to outlets’ better
initial information. Finally, we show how a source may exploit the speed-accuracy
trade-off.
Chapter four studies the effect of institutions on economic outcomes looking at the his-
torical case of Medieval England. The leader of medieval Benedictine monasteries was
elected by the monks. At the same time, monasteries were feudal landlords, alongside
secular noblemen. This chapter shows that holdings governed by Benedictine monas-
teries were more productive than those controlled by secular landlords. We explore





ASO: Analogue switch off
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on Treated
CFE County Fixed Effect
DDB: Domesday Book
DID: Difference-in-difference
DTT: Digital Terrestrial Television




GDP: Gross Domestic Product
HFE: Hundred Fixed Effects
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
SATT: Sample Average Treatment Effect on Treated
TV: television
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
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Introduction
If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilisation, it expects what
never was and never will be. The functionaries of every government have propensities
to command at will the liberty and property of their constituents. There is no safe
deposit for these but with the people themselves; nor can they be safe with them
without information. Where the press is free and every man able to read, all is safe.
Thomas Jefferson to Charles Yancey, 6 January 1816
This thesis collects together four essays linked by their common belonging to the field
of political economy. They all make use of economic tools to answer questions on the
edge between politics and economics.
The first three chapters are, generally speaking, about information. They contribute
to the frontier of political economy and media economics answering to three different
and important questions. Are voters allocating attention to politics efficiently? Is
competition in the media market reducing the ability of politicians to influence the
content published by news outlets? Is competition reducing the quality of journalism?
The importance of voters’ information for an effective democracy has been highlighted
by many, including Thomas Jefferson in the opening quote. However, it is worth trying
to understand deeply what incentives are at play, so that policies can be implemented
taking them into account. The main contribution of those three chapters, in particular,
is to highlight conditions where the “wisdom of the crowd” (or of the existing literature)
does not work, suggesting some alternative channels.
In particular, chapter one qualifies Jefferson’s statement showing that, even when the
press is free and everyone is able to read, something may go wrong. More in details,
it shows that voters may be allocating a sub-optimally high amount of attention to
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politicians’ actions and a sub-optimally low amount of attention to the context in
which those actions are taken. This induces politicians to increase their pandering to
the voters’ opinion, with negative effect on voters’ welfare.
Chapter two looks at the role of the media market structure in keeping outlets free to
publish their findings and, as a consequence, Governments accountable to their citizens.
In particular, it shows that competition in the media market is not always a good
deterrent against media capture, i.e. against the ability of bad politicians to influence
the content published by media outlets. As highlighted by the existing literature on
media capture, competition increases the number of outlets that the politician has to
capture. But there is a trade off induced by the fact that competition may reduce the
outside option of captured outlets, making it cheaper to buy them out.
Chapter three goes beyond media freedom to focus on a different aspect: the quality
of the information provided and, as a consequence, its impact on people’s choices. It
shows that increased competition in the media market does not necessarily lead to
more “speed driven journalism”, i.e. earlier release of less accurate information. On
the contrary, it may allow high quality outlets to better signal their ability to check
facts, hence increasing their willingness to do so, if reputation matters, despite the
increased pre-emption concern. On the other hand, however, better “first rumours”
may discourage additional investigation, reducing reader’s welfare.
The fourth one has a different focus, but still in the realm of political economy, as it
uses the historical case of land ownership in Medieval England to study the role of
institutions, and in particular of democratic selection, on economic outcomes, even in
absence of (or with very reduced) accountability tools.
Chapter 1
When 24 hour news channels and social media provide constant access to political
news, what is the role of voters’ attention in shaping political decisions? Are voters
paying the right amount of attention to politics? And are they paying attention to the
right elements?
At first, it seems obvious that voters should pay as much attention as possible to
xiv
politics, so that they make better choices and elect better politicians. Moreover, tools
that make attention “cheaper” should have an unambiguously positive impact. I show
in this chapter that reality is more complex: the decision about how much attention
to pay to politics and how to allocate this attention is non trivial, with equilibrium
incentives that can motivate voters to pay too much attention to what politicians do
and too little attention to what politicians should do. This is consistent with the media
studies literature that looks at the increasingly important news channels and finds that
“80-85 per cent of news stories on the news channels contain no context or analytical
content at all”.1
Voters’ attention equilibrium allocation may motivate politicians to do what voters
want, irrespective of what would be more appropriate, and voters may be paying too
much attention to some aspects of the political process and too little to others. Given
that these allocations might be suboptimal, policies intended to improve citizen’s at-
tention to politics could be making things worse.
This is the first work in political economy to look at the effects of voters’ rational
inattention on pandering in a political agency framework. The model builds on the
literature on pandering, under which the politician chooses the action that guarantees
his re-election, rather than the optimal one, e.g. Fox (2007), Maskin and Tirole (2004).
In that context, this paper endogenizes voters’ level of attention to politics, following
the recent and growing literature on the political consequences of rational inattention
(Matejka and Tabellini 2017, Prato and Wolton 2016 and 2018). On top of that, it
takes into account that attention to politics is a manifold concept. Therefore, this paper
endogenizes both the overall amount of attention to politics and the way attention is
distributed between actions and the state of the world, studying the interaction between
the two.
The model shows that voters’ equilibrium allocation of attention is generically sub-
optimal. First of all, when only endogenous attention to the action is considered, I
show that it increases pandering and that the equilibrium level of attention chosen
by the voter is higher than the ex ante optimal level. This is because, when choos-
ing the equilibrium level of attention, the voters are concerned about the selection of
1Lewis et al. (2005), p. 470.
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good politicians for the next period, and observing the action is useful to that purpose.
However, they are not taking into account the fact that higher attention increases the
incentive to pander: after all, pandering is effective as long as it is observed by vot-
ers. This has a negative effect on both period one voters’ welfare and the ability to
discriminate between types of politicians.
I then look at how voters allocate attention between action and the state of the world,
showing that, in equilibrium, we tend to pay too much attention to what politicians are
doing and too little to what they should do. In particular I show that, in equilibrium,
there is always under-attention to the state of the world and I find sufficient conditions
for over-attention to action. When selection is the only thing that matters, knowing
the state of the world on top of the action buys nothing to the voter, in expectation.
This is because learning the state of the world is never going to strictly change the
voter’s re-election strategy, and as a consequence there is no incentive to invest any
costly attention there. On the other hand, knowing the action is useful for the voting
choice.
From an ex ante perspective, however, attention to the state of the world can be useful
in reducing pandering, leading to a higher first period utility, but the equilibrium
choice ignores the disciplining effect of this type of attention, because the politician’s
decision is sunk. Moreover, I show that, since attention to the state reduces only the
“bad pandering” (i.e. politicians choosing an action different than the state in order
to be re-elected) but not the “good pandering” (i.e. a dissonant politician choosing
the voter’s preferred action in order to be re-elected), while attention to the action
increases both, this model exhibits an interesting complementarity between the two
types of attention, that is ignored in the equilibrium choice.
As a result of this inefficient equilibrium allocation politicians have incentives to pander
too much, reducing the voters’ welfare. Importantly, an exogenous reduction in the
total cost of attention is likely to make things worse, overall, because it induces an
even higher level of over-attention to action and rewards more pandering, without
improving the level of attention to the state.
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Chapter 2
A free media has been seen as a powerful guarantor of political accountability, both
theoretically (e.g. Besley 2006) and empirically (e.g. Ferraz and Finan 2008, Snyder
and Stromberg 2010). However, the media may be powerful enough to determine an
electoral outcome and to promote a bad candidate, even when voters are fully rational
and “Bayesian” (Prat 2014, Anderson and McLaren 2012, Enikolopov et al. 2011). As
a consequence, an incumbent politician may be interested in controlling what media
outlets report, to present a positive image to voters and to stay in power. This chapter
looks at the effect of competition in influencing the incentives towards media capture,
with novel results.
The current literature stresses the positive effect of competition on media freedom:
increasing the number of outlets means that the bad politician has more publishers to
deal with, so capture is more costly. However, there is a more subtle effect, because the
competitive pressure decreases profits, and firms with smaller financial margins may
be more willing to sacrifice editorial independence for political money2. Hence, they
are cheaper to capture.
Overall, the direction of this trade off is not trivial: the “positive” view of the role of
competition in deterring capture can be questioned if more competition means smaller
(and financially weaker) media outlets, less able to inform the public opinion and
to resist to political pressure. Media outlets may be more numerous, but do they
have more freedom? Under some conditions, more competition can actually harm the
media’s independence from political influence, as the empirical section of this paper
suggests. This highlights the need for a deeper understanding of the forces behind this
trade off.
This chapter makes two contributions: on the empirical side, it is the first to point out
the existence of a robust negative relationship between competition in the media market
and media freedom from political influence. On the theoretical side, the model provides
an explanation for the counter-intuitive empirical results, showing that potential risks
to media independence from the political power are high not only when competition
2Although in a different context (i.e. advertisement driven media bias), this is consistent with the
results of Beattie et al. (2017), where they show that online competition for advertisement increases
media bias
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is too little, but also when it is too much. Moreover, the model highlights that the
standard “positive” result of competition and capture relies on restrictive assumptions
about voters’ behaviour and media outlets’ profits. From a policy perspective, both the
empirics and the theory stress the risk, in terms of editorial independence, of excessive
competition in the media sector.
More specifically, the empirical section of this chapter suggests that high competition
in the mass media market reduces media freedom from political influence. I exploit
the staggered digitization of terrestrial television in Europe: a technological change
that allowed for a more efficient use of the spectrum and, hence, for the entry of new
players in the market. In an event study analysis, this chapter shows that the sign of
the relationship between digitization (and hence competition) and the freedom of the
media from political influence is negative and strongly significant. And this happens
precisely in countries with high level of pre-treatment competition, suggesting that
media capture is easier in those places.
The theoretical model is motivated by those findings. It is a natural extension of the
seminal contribution by Besley and Prat (2006). It shows that, relaxing some of the
assumptions in a fairly natural way, high competition can actually be bad for media
freedom, as the cost of media capture is driven to zero as the number of outlets goes
to infinity. Moreover, the relationship can be non-monotonic, overall, meaning that
media capture occurs when competition is either very weak or very strong. Intuitively,
increasing the number of media outlets can make capture overall more expensive for
the politician, as long as the number of outlets that need to be silenced increases in
the same way, and the politician pays monopoly profits to every captured outlet. But
competition has a decreasing effect on the influence that each individual outlet has on
voters: basically, with more competition every outlet is able to inform a smaller fraction
of the electorate. In fact, even established media outlets have limits in their ability
to inform voters, as the recent spreading of fake news highlights. Hence, when there
are enough outlets, the politician may be willing to allow for some free media outlets,
since they will not be powerful enough to change electoral outcomes. This decreases
the profits that captured outlet would make by rejecting the bribe from the politician,
hence they are cheaper. The overall effect of this trade off induced by competition
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(more outlets to be silenced, but each of the is cheaper) depends on the relationship
between readership and profits. When it is convex (e.g. because the media market is
modelled as a two sided one) then high competition makes capture cheaper, overall.
Chapter 3
In the past decade there has been a growing concern that competition induced by
lower entry barriers in the media market due to the Internet is eroding the incentives to
conduct investigations (e.g. Cairncross 2019), or even to check the facts properly before
publication. Conventional wisdom and relevant contributions in the media studies
literature suggest that more competition for the same scoop has driven media outlets
towards early release of less accurate information. In this chapter we argue that this
is not necessarily the case. Moreover, we highlight a counter-intuitive non-monotonic
effect of better rumours on readers’ welfare, as more reliable rumours may discourage
further investigation from high quality outlets.
We argue that in the face of competition the resolution of speed-accuracy tradeoff, or
simply “the newsroom dilemma”, is determined by two opposing forces. Competing
media outlets not only care about being pre-empted on stories they are working on,
but also about their reputation. While the risk of pre-emption pushes them towards
early release of less developed stories, i.e., towards speed, reputation concerns may
allay such fears pushing towards later release of well-researched stories, i.e., towards
accuracy. This motivates us to build a model of a pre-emption game with career-
concerned players in a natural setting.
Our model makes two fundamental observations. In a model of media competition
and career concerns, we identify conditions in which an equilibrium where the higher
quality firm investigates the rumours can be more easily sustained in the presence of
competition. This counter-intuitive result is consistent with the surprising findings
of Knobel (2018), who points out how the space dedicated to “deep accountability
journalism” has increased over time in a sample of US based newspapers. Second, we
show that an improvement in the quality of an initial rumour may hurt the readers.
This is so because it makes the aforementioned equilibrium less likely as the high quality
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firm views lower informational gain from conducting the investigation, thereby making
pre-emption concerns more salient. Thus, improving the technology through which
initial information is generated may make the final information received by the end
consumers worse. Finally, we show how parameters of the model affect the behaviour
of a strategic source who owns the rumour and has preferences over speed (i.e. that
the news goes out as soon as possible) and accuracy (i.e. that the piece of information
is carefully verified).
These observations help us disentangle what effects different types of technological
advancements may have on the media market. Improvements that lift barriers to entry
and induce more competition need not to lead to reduced consumer welfare. Competing
firms, driven by reputational concerns, may fuel more investigative journalism and more
fact checking. This incentive, as we discuss later, is greater for higher quality firms
when faced with more competition. However, any technology driven improvement in
the precision of the initial rumours may make readers worse off.
Chapter 4
This chapter uses the historical case of Benedictine Monasteries in Medieval England to
study the effect of institutional differences in non-democratic societies. More in details,
monasteries where part of the feudal organisation of the society, playing an important
role as landlords in a time where ownership and political power were overlapping (As-
ton 1958). Quite often, monasteries where controlling not only the land where the
monastery was, but also other holdings located in different places. Moreover, this role
as big landlords, alongside secular noblemen and bishops, remained salient after the
Norman conquest, and the revolutionary reshuffling of land possessions that followed
(Knowles 1966, Finn 1963).
Benedictine monasteries were following the “Rule” established by Benedict of Nursia in
529 AD. This vast and comprehensive document was (and still is) supposed to regulate
monastic life including, of course, its governance. And it did so in a way that scholars
defined “monastic democracy” (Moulin 2016): the abbot was an elective office, elected
for life by the community of monks, and he had an obligation to consult with the
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community on important decisions. However, the ultimate decision making power was
in his own hands. This was happening at a time where secular landlords, appointed by
the King (or heirs of appointed landlords) had full discretionary power on their own
land.
Were those institutional differences having an impact on economic performance? Or,
in other words, was “monastic democracy” a better way of governance than hereditary
secular landownership? The answer to this question is not obvious, ex ante. Different
contributions highlight a higher (e.g. Rost 2017, Ekelund et al. 1996, Postan 1973)
or a lower (e.g. Heldring et al. 2017) level of efficiency in monastic management
of lands, with various potential channels. In our analysis we combine data from the
Domesday book, the English Monastic Archive and various sources for geographic and
historical controls and we compare the productive capacity of holdings controlled by
Benedictine monasteries with holdings controlled by secular landlords. To reduce the
concerns related with selection into treatment, we exploit the massive re-shuffling of
land ownership that followed the Norman conquest.
We obtain a consistently positive and significant effect of being governed by a Bene-
dictine monastery on economic performance. This may be due to several channels, but
we argue that the institutional structure, and in particular the possibility of selecting
a leader (even though the lifelong nomination reduces its accountability to the elec-
torate) played an important role. Moreover, we rule out channels that are not related
with that. In particular, we control for the historicity of the holdings, the presence of
economies of scale (the number of holdings of the same landlord and their geographic
dispersion), a range of geographic factors (terrain suitability to pasture and agricul-
ture, altitude, distance to markets and boroughs etc). On top of that, we show that
bishops (i.e. ecclesiastic figures, usually well educated, that were not constrained by
the Rule) are not statistically different from secular landlords. Moreover, monastic
holdings are not statistically different from secular holdings in terms of technology or
population; the physical distance to a monastery does not explain our effect; we can
exclude holdings closer than 5km to a Monastery, so that we compare only holdings
where monks were not working directly: the result holds in this specification as well,
that excludes an effect coming from the monks’ famous “hard work ethic”. Finally,
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we show that Monastic holdings were better managed not only when compared with
Norman holdings (i.e. relatively newly arrived landlords), but also when compared
with Anglo-Saxon holdings, and that more ancient monasteries were not better than
more recent ones, ruling out the effect of expertise. In our interpretation, these results
suggest that unaccountable elected leaders, like the abbots, are able to make better
decisions than unaccountable, non elected leaders like secular landlords or bishops.
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Chapter 1




Are voters paying attention to the right elements when judging, for example, the politi-
cal implications of a wall on the USA-Mexico border? Despite concrete doubts over the
effectiveness of the wall, both in terms of reducing illegal immigration and fighting drug
cartels,1 President Donald Trump seems to insist on this political choice. One possible
explanation is that it strengthens in voters the idea of a President aligned with Amer-
ica’s interests, something that the voters would notice and appreciate. At the same
time, maybe, those voters are not paying too much attention to the effectiveness of the
wall itself.
When 24 hr news channels and social media provide constant access to political news,
what is the role of voters’ attention in shaping political decisions? Are voters paying
the right amount of attention to politics? And are they paying attention to the right
elements? What are the consequences of inefficient allocation of attention?
At first, it seems obvious that voters should be motivated to pay as much attention
1See, for example, Driver (2018).
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as possible to politics, so that they make better choices and elect better politicians.
Moreover, tools that make attention “cheaper” should have an unambiguously positive
impact. I show that reality is more complex: the decision about how much attention
to pay to politics and how to allocate this attention is non trivial, with equilibrium
incentives that can motivate voters to pay too much attention to what politicians do
(e.g., building a wall on the USA-Mexico border) and too little attention to what
politicians should do (e.g., given the way illegal immigration and drug dealing work,
is a wall the most effective way to achieve the objective?). This is consistent with the
media studies literature that looks at the increasingly important news channels and
finds that “80-85 per cent of news stories on the news channels contain no context or
analytical content at all”.2
Voters’ attention equilibrium allocation may motivate politicians to do what voters
want, irrespective of what would be more appropriate, and voters may be paying too
much attention to some aspects of the political process and too little to others. Given
that these allocations might be suboptimal, policies intended to improve citizen’s at-
tention to politics could be making things worse.
This is the first paper in political economy to look at the effects of voters’ rational
inattention on pandering in a political agency framework. The model builds on the
literature on pandering, under which the politician chooses the action that guarantees
his re-election, rather than the optimal one, for example, Fox (2007), Maskin and Tirole
(2004).3 My definition of pandering borrows directly from Besley (2006, ch. 3, footnote
35): pandering occurs when a politician “fails to follow information about the optimal
action for fear of its electoral consequences”. That is, when the politician chooses the
action that gives him higher re-election chances over the one that he favours given the
state of the world.4
In that context, this paper endogenizes voters’ level of attention to politics, following
the recent and growing literature on the political consequences of rational inattention
(Matejka and Tabellini 2017, Prato and Wolton 2016 and 2018). On top of that, it
2Lewis et al. (2005), p. 470.
3The idea that political delegation may imply suboptimal choices is also, for example, in Laussel
and Van Long (2020), although with a different focus (optimality of ex-ante constraints to politicians’
actions).
4Pandering can be a good theoretical approximation of the basic essence of populism. This inter-
pretation is not new in economics, for example, Frisell (2009).
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takes into account that attention to politics is a manifold concept. Therefore, this paper
endogenizes both the overall amount of attention to politics and the way attention is
distributed between actions and the state of the world, studying the interaction between
the two.
I find novel results based on the fact that the inability to precommit to a certain level
of attention, together with the direction of the relationship between different types of
attention and the politicians’ actions, can create important and unexplored trade-offs.
The model shows that voters’ equilibrium allocation of attention is generically sub-
optimal. First of all, when only endogenous attention to the action is considered, I
show that it increases pandering and that the equilibrium level of attention chosen
by the voter is higher than the ex ante optimal level. This is because, when choos-
ing the equilibrium level of attention, the voters are concerned about the selection of
good politicians for the next period, and observing the action is useful to that purpose.
However, they are not taking into account the fact that higher attention increases the
incentive to pander, and this has a negative effect on both period one voters’ welfare
and the ability to discriminate between types of politicians.
I then look at how voters allocate attention between action and the state of the world,
showing that, in equilibrium, we tend to pay too much attention to what politicians are
doing and too little to what they should do. In particular I show that, in equilibrium,
there is always under-attention to the state of the world and I find sufficient conditions
for over-attention to action.
In this model, when selection is the only thing that matters, knowing the state of the
world on top of the action buys nothing to the voter, in expectation. This is because
learning the state of the world is never going to strictly change the voter’s re-election
strategy, and as a consequence there is no incentive to invest any costly attention there.
In contrast, knowing the action is useful for the voting choice.
From an ex ante perspective, however, attention to the state of the world can be useful
in reducing pandering, leading to a higher first period utility (I use also the term “policy
welfare” for this part of the voter’s objective function), but the equilibrium choice
ignores the disciplining effect of this type of attention, because the politician’s decision
is sunk. Moreover, I show that, since attention to the state reduces only the “bad
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pandering” (i.e., politicians choosing an action different than the state in order to be re-
elected) but not the “good pandering” (i.e., a dissonant politician choosing the voter’s
preferred action in order to be re-elected),5 while attention to the action increases both,
this model exhibits an interesting complementarity between the two types of attention,
that is ignored in the equilibrium choice. From an ex ante perspective, more attention
to the action makes attention to the state more desirable: reducing bad pandering is
more important when pandering is an issue, that is, when attention to the action is
high.
Attention to the action works in the opposite way: it makes pandering more desirable
for the politician. The whole point of choosing a sub-optimal action is the electoral
reward, which only happens if this action is observed. In equilibrium the voter does
not take into account this negative effect6 and as a consequence she tends to allocate
too much attention to the action.7 As a result of this inefficient equilibrium allocation
politicians have incentives to pander too much, reducing the voters’ welfare. Impor-
tantly, an exogenous reduction in the total cost of attention is likely to make things
worse, overall, because it induces an even higher level of over-attention to action and
rewards more pandering, without improving the level of attention to the state.
Those results help to explain the relationship between social media and populism. Inter-
estingly, politicians advocating populist policies are over-represented on social media;8
social media usage is highly correlated with political engagement,9 political attention
and consumption of political news,10 and journalists are asking whether social media
is “empowering populism”.11 In the framework of this paper, social media reduces the
5“Good” and “bad” are to be interpreted with respect to policy welfare only. This is different from
the total welfare of the voter, that comes from the selection part as well, that is, from the ability to
select a good politician in period 2.
6While the result of no attention to the state is specific of this model, the equilibrium tendency
to under-evaluate the disciplining effect of attention to the state and under-consider the downsides of
attention to the action is more general, as shown in Appendix F1.
7This is always the case, at least weakly, when the voter has to allocate a certain amount of attention
between action and state, as in Appendix D1. When the level of the two attentions is endogenous and
the cost function is additively separable there is always under-attention to the state. Over-attention
to the action depends on the strength of the ex ante complementarity between the two.
8Extreme Tweeting, The Economist, November 19, 2015.
9Wihbey (2015) and Barberá (2018) for a review, although evidence is somehow mixed.
10Both Mosquera et al. (2019) and Allcott et al. (2019) show that, among the causal effects of
Facebook deactivation, there is reduced news consumption, reduced ability to recognize politically-
skewed stories, reduced news knowledge and attention to politics.
11“Is social media empowering Dutch populism?”, Financial Times, March 14, 2017.
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cost of paying attention to politics and politicians, generating more attention12 but
also inducing more pandering (which has a negative effect on voters’ welfare), that can
be seen as a good proxy for populism. The overall welfare effect depends on how dam-
aging pandering is, but there are parameters where a decrease in the cost of attention
has negative welfare consequences overall. Hence, social media can lead to too much
attention to what politicians do, too little analysis of the state of the world, and too
much populism.13
This paper contributes to the growing political economy literature on the effects of
voters’ cognitive biases and limitations on decision making and political outcomes.
This is the first to look at the effect of rational inattention on pandering. As such, it
is at the intercept of several different branches of the political economy literature.
First, it is related to the literature on pandering and political agency (Canes-Wrone et
al. 2001, Maskin and Tirole 2004, Fox 2007, Besley 2006, Ashworth and Shotts 2010,
Morelli and van Weelden 2013), from which it borrows the basic structure of the model.
Second, it is related to the growing literature on the consequences of behavioural biases
and cognitive limitations on political choice (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2014,
Levy and Razin 2015, Ortoleva and Snowberg 2015, Alesina and Passarelli 2019, Glaeser
and Ponzetto 2017, Lockwood 2016, Lockwood and Rockey 2018).
Third, it relates to the small but growing literature on rational inattention (Sims 2003)
and its interaction with political economy (Matejka and Tabellini 2017). In particular,
Prato and Wolton (2016) and (2018) look at rational inattention in a political agency
set up.
Of these, the closest is Prato and Wolton (2016) who highlight the importance of vot-
ers’ attention choice in determining political behaviour in a model of competition and
reforms. This paper is different in three important aspects: first of all, their main focus
is on the distinction between interest (exogenous) and attention to the action (endoge-
12According to the Pew Research Center, the 2016 US presidential campaign was characterized by
very high levels of interest, across parties and age groups (Pew Research Center 2016).
13As one of the referees correctly pointed out, social media provides political information but also a
lot of entertainment unrelated to politics. Hence, if the effect of social media is to increase the cost of
attention to politics, rather than to reduce it, then it may increase welfare. In the logic of this model,
it all depends on the direction of the relationship between social media penetration and the cost of
attention parameter.
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nous), and their voter does not choose “over-attention” as an equilibrium behaviour.14
Here I show that, in models of pandering, the level of attention to the action can ex-
ceed the level that is (ex ante) welfare maximising. Second, this paper endogenizes
attention and its allocation between actions and the state of the world, with important
additional implications in terms of optimality. Finally, theirs is a model of pre-electoral
political competition, while this is the first one to look at rational inattention in the
framework of standard principal-agent literature on pandering. A consequence of this
are some interesting implications for the relationship between attention and populism
that I discuss in Section 1.5.
The mechanics of the paper are similar to Lockwood (2016). Both papers look at
consequences of cognitive constraints in a set up of political agency and pandering.
However, Lockwood (2016) studies confirmation bias and I study rational inattention.
Finally, attention is of course related to transparency (e.g., Prat 2005; recent work by
Wolton 2019 and Andreottola 2018 highlights the potentially welfare depressing effect
of “too informative” media). My focus is on the attention choice from the voter’s side
of the problem, hence highlighting a different and unexplored channel.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: section 1.2 introduces the model in its most
generic form. Section 1.3 presents the different results endogenizing attention to the
action in 1.3.1 and to both action and state in 1.3.2. Section 1.4 explores inefficiencies in
the allocation of attention when information about the state and the action is bundled
together. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Set up
I use the models of pandering from Fox (2007) and Besley (2006). The game is a
standard two periods political agency model with two players: an incumbent politician
P (he) and a representative voter V (she). There is a binary state of the world st =
{A,B}, known ex ante by P but not by V (she can decide to pay attention, learning
14When the voter would like to pay too much attention, the candidates respond by choosing similar
platforms, hence reducing the scope for attention.
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it with some probability), with common prior Pr(st = A) =
1
2 .
15 The action space for
the politician is binary as well, with xt ∈ {A,B}. The action is observed by V with
some probability, which I am going to endogenize using the choice of attention.
The politician can be of two types, Consonant (C) and Dissonant (D); formally, θ ∈
{C,D} with Pr(θ = C) = π. The type is private information of the politician, while
the prior is common knowledge. In terms of payoff, every type of politician derives
some utility E from being in office. Moreover, the Consonant incumbent gains ut when
he matches the action with the state of the world. Formally, when in office, a type C
incumbent gets ut +E if xt = st, E if xt 6= st. A dissonant incumbent is biased toward
a particular action (I assume it is A without loss of generality), irrespective of the state
of the world. Formally, when in office, D gets ut + E if xt = A and E if xt 6= A. It is
assumed that both types get 0 when out of office and the challenger is drawn from the
same distribution of the incumbent.16
The part of P’s utility defined by ut is private information of the politician. Ex ante, it
is distributed according to a cumulative density function Ft with support [0, ūt]. Ft is
continuous and strictly increasing in the whole interval; its probability density function
is ft.
Assumption 1.1 Ft is uniform, hence E[ut] = ūt2 .
The uniformity assumption is for convenience17 as it simplifies the concavity conditions
of the ex ante objective function and it does not require to keep track (and impose
conditions on) derivatives of the pdf. Moreover, consistent with Fox (2007) and Besley





. Finally, V gets a utility of 1 if xt = st and
0 otherwise, and there is a common discount factor δ.
So far, the model is unchanged with respect to the standard political agency and pan-
15The flat prior guarantees that there is not an ex ante popular state of the world. Appendix C1
considers the case of a generic prior probability on the state space finding sufficient conditions for the
same results to go through.
16Potentially, voters can derive information on the incumbent from the challenger’s decision on
whether to run or not, as shown, for example, in McCannon and Pruitt (2018) in the specific context
of prosecutor elections. However, I abstain from this channel to focus on the information deriving from
the voter’s attention allocation.
17Assumption 1.1 would be more problematic if combined with a time independent upper bound of
the support of ut, since the combination of the two would imply that the only ex ante optimal attention
choice is 0,0, as it will be clear from case 1 of the proof of Proposition 1.5. This can be avoided either
by dropping the uniformity assumption and fixing a sufficiently small f1(0) or with a time varying
upper bound, and I opted for the latter.
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dering literature. I build on this framework by endogenizing the choice of attention.
As in Prato and Wolton (2016 and 2018),18 I model rational inattention as the proba-
bility q and β that the voter observes the action of the politician and the state of the
world before casting her vote. In particular, q ∈ [0, 1] (β ∈ [0, 1]) is the amount of
attention that the voter pays to the incumbent’s action (state of the world) and hence
the probability of observing the actual action (state).
Formally the voter does not observe xt or st directly, but rather x̃t and s̃t, and she
chooses q and β at a cost τC(q, β), where Pr(x̃t = xt) = q, Pr(x̃t = ∅) = 1 − q,
Pr(s̃t = st) = β, Pr(s̃t = ∅) = 1 − β, τ ≥ 18 . In other words, the higher the (costly)
attention q (β), the greater the likelihood that the voter will observe the action chosen
by the politician (state of the world), and use this information in updating her belief.19
The cost of attention function is strictly increasing, convex and additively separable20
and satisfies the following conditions, useful for ensuring concavity of the maximiza-
tions. Formally, C(q, β) = c(q) + c(β) where c
′
(0) = 0, c
′
(1) = 1, c
′
(j) > 0 ∀j ∈ (0, 1]
and c
′′
(j) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ [0, 1].21
1.2.2 Timing
I assume that the voter chooses the attention level after the incumbent’s action, but
obviously without knowing the action itself.22 Hence, the timing used to derive the
equilibrium attention choice is as follows:
1. Nature chooses θ, u1, s1 (private info of P);
2. P chooses x1;
3. V chooses q and β at a cost τC(q, β) ≥ 0;
4. V observes x̃1, s̃1 and votes;
18They have attention to the action only.
19The lower bound on τ ensures that full attention is sufficiently costly so that we can focus mainly
on interior solutions, and I do not have to impose too many conditions on the parameters when I
compare equilibrium and ex ante optimal attention. However, everything would go through without
this lower bound, just with some extra conditions to take into account the corner solutions.
20Additive separability is sufficient, but not necessary, for the results in section 1.3.2, and it makes
that part tractable.
21I impose additional restrictions whenever they are be necessary for the tractability of the problem.
22Formally, it is the same as letting them choose at the same time. It basically assumes that the
voter cannot commit ex ante to a certain level of attention.
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5. Period 1 ends and payoffs are paid;
6. Degenerate Period 2 (there is no draw of a new θ if the incumbent has been
re-elected) but no elections;23
Payoffs are paid after the elections.
This timing is consistent with the literature (e.g., Prato and Wolton 2016) and with
the idea that voters tend to acquire information close to elections.24 Moreover, it does
not require additional assumptions about the existence of commitment devices that the
voters could use.25 Ex ante optimal welfare is calculated assuming that the voter could
commit to a certain level of attention, known to the politician. The solution concept I
use is the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE).
1.3 Results
To better understand the effect of different types of attention on the political equilib-
rium, their interaction and the role of attention allocation, I present the results step
by step. In particular, Section 1.3.1 considers the benchmark case where V can decide
how much attention to pay to the incumbent’s action only, that is, she cannot learn
the state. In section 1.3.2 both the total amount of attention and the allocation are
endogenous.26 In all these cases, I compare the equilibrium level of attention with the
ex ante optimal one.
1.3.1 Benchmark: attention to actions only
Features of the equilibrium
In this subsection, I assume β = 0 and only look at the optimal allocation of q. The
case of exogenously given β ∈ [0, 1] and endogenous q is considered in Appendix B1.
23It is important to assume that a new state of the world is drawn in period 2. Otherwise, having a
bad incumbent when the state is A would be different to having a bad incumbent when the state is B.
24For example, Google Trends results for “Republican Party” and “Democratic Party” in 2018 in
the United States show a big increase in the few weeks before the mid-terms, with a spike on the
election day and flat results during the rest of the year (both pre and post elections).
25In equilibrium, they would like to be able to precommit to a lower level of attention to the action,
hence to acquire less information about something that has already happened and that is now a useful
signal in terms of selection.
26In Appendix D1 I study the optimality of attention allocation by allowing V to choose attention
to the state as well, but with the constraint that the sum of q and β has to be equal to a given constant.
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The game is solved by backward induction. Proposition 1.1 summarizes some features
of the essentially unique equilibrium that arises, noting that this does not depend on
whether precommitment to a certain level of attention is possible.27
Proposition 1.1 In every PBNE of this game, irrespective of the possibility of com-
mitment,
1. Pr(re− elect|x̃ = A) = 0 and Pr(re− elect|x̃ = B) = 1;
2. C incumbent chooses x = B when s = B with probability 1 and x = B when












4. Pr(re− elect|x̃ = ∅) can be anything;
To understand this result, note that the dissonant incumbent is comparatively more
likely to choose action A than the consonant one, and as a consequence the voter
rewards the choice of action B. This re-election strategy gives incentives to pander,
that is, to choose an action that is different from the one the politician prefers in the
short term.28 There are multiple equilibria but they are payoff-equivalent. This set
of equilibria is very similar to the one derived in models without rational inattention,
but Proposition 1.1 is useful because it leads to the following corollary (whose proof is
obvious, hence omitted).










cumbent chooses the period 1 action that is suboptimal from his point of view.
Corollary 1.1 Irrespective of the availability of commitment, an increase in attention
to the action increases the probability of pandering.
This result is intuitive, since the point of pandering is to guarantee re-election, choosing
the “popular” action rather than the right one. Therefore it is crucial that the voter
observes this action.
27Proofs are in Appendix A1.
28In case of a consonant politician, this is always bad for the voters.
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Equilibrium attention choice
Define VC = δ and VD = δ
1
2 as the continuation payoff from having a C and a D
politician in period 2. Moreover, define Γ = πVC + (1 − π)VD as the expected payoff
in period 2 from electing the challenger, while γ is defined as in Corollary 1.1.
V uses the re-election strategy outlined in Proposition 1.1 and solves maxq∈[0,1]W ,
where
W = q{[Pr(x = B)](π̂BVC + (1− π̂B)VD) + [Pr(x = A)]Γ}+ (1− q)Γ− τc(q) (1.1)
and π̂B = Pr(θ = C|x̃ = B).29
The logic behind Equation (1.1) is simple: the voter observes the actual action with
probability q. Upon observing action B, she re-elects the incumbent, and her expected
utility is given by π̂BVC + (1 − π̂B)VD. She elects the challenger when she observes
x̃ = A. With probability 1−q the voter observes ∅ and hence she is indifferent between
re-electing or not.









, where qe is the conjectured value
of q chosen by the voter. In equilibrium, of course, qe = q∗, where q∗ is the chosen
level of attention that emerges as an equilibrium outcome in this version of the game.
Proposition 1.2 defines this formally.
















Note that, if attention is costless (i.e., τ = 0), then q∗ = 1. This is because, in this
case, the voter does not take into account the fact that q increases the probability of
pandering. Hence, she is just considering the informative value of attention, and in an
attention-for-free world she would choose the highest possible amount of attention.
29W includes only future expected payoffs from P’s actions. The full welfare function includes also
present expected payoffs, but they do not matter for the determination of the equilibrium level of
attention, given that they are “sunk” when attention plays its role.
11
Equilibrium Comparative Statics
In terms of comparative statics:
Corollary 1.2 The equilibrium attention level is increasing in the uncertainty over
the type of incumbent (var(θ)) and decreasing in the office rent (E).
The trade off here is just between the informational value of q and its cost. Uncertainty
over θ increases the value of knowing the chosen action while E, leaving everything else
equal, boosts the probability of pandering, making the chosen action a poorer signal
of the incumbent’s type.
I also consider comparative statics on the equilibrium probability of pandering. Given










Corollary 1.3 follows directly from Proposition 1.2.
Corollary 1.3 The equilibrium level of pandering is increasing in the uncertainty over
the incumbent’s type and in the office rent.
The point of Corollary 1.3 is that uncertainty over θ increases the equilibrium level of
attention, making pandering more profitable. E has a negative effect on q∗, hence a
negative indirect effect on the probability of pandering and a positive direct effect on
γ∗, making being in office more attractive, and the second one always dominates.
Ex ante optimal attention




[π(1− γ) + (1− π)(1− γ)] + 1
2
[π + (1− π)γ] (1.3)
+ q{[Pr(x = B)](π̂BVC + (1− π̂B)VD) + [Pr(x = A)]Γ}+ (1− q)Γ− τc(q)
The second part of the equation above is just W , that is, the “future” part of the voter’s
welfare, given by the ability to select a good P for period 2. The first part is the present
utility, given by period 1 policy choice, that is fixed in the equilibrium maximization
but is relevant now. If the state is A both types of incumbent may choose x1 = B
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with probability γ, hence V gets 1 in period 1 with probability (1− γ). If the state is
B, the consonant politician always chooses x1 = B in equilibrium, and the voter gets
a payoff of 1 when the dissonant politician chooses action B in state B (this happens
with probability γ).
To find the optimal level of attention, the voter solves solves maxq∈[0,1]W
ex. Lemma
1.1 establishes that W ex is strictly concave in q, therefore it is possible to look directly
at the first order conditions.
Lemma 1.1 When β = 0, the ex ante voter’s welfare function is strictly concave in q.
Solving for the ex ante optimal level of attention and comparing it with the equilibrium
level, I can highlight the first important result of the paper.
Proposition 1.3 The ex ante optimal choice of attention exists and it is unique.
Moreover, it is strictly smaller than the equilibrium choice q∗.
Intuitively when the voter chooses ex post she over-evaluates q, because she does not
take into account the effect of q on welfare-depressing pandering. In particular, the
effect of q on ex ante welfare can be decomposed in three parts. A positive effect
on selection welfare, due to the fact that observing the action is useful in terms of
discriminating between politicians; a negative effect again on selection welfare due to
the fact that an increase in pandering makes the bad incumbent more similar to the
good one, hence the selection process is more difficult, and finally a negative effect on
policy welfare, given by the mismatch between the first period state and the chosen
policy.30 In equilibrium, however, only the first effect is relevant for the voter’s choice,
hence the over-attention result. In contrast the ex ante welfare calculation takes this
into account as well, leading to a lower level of q.
A first consequence is that attention precommitment can help the voter to obtain a
better political outcome. The second is a natural question: is it possible that a decrease
in the cost of attention (captured by a decrease in τ) is overall welfare depressing when
30This effect can be decomposed further distinguishing between bad pandering, that is, both types
of incumbent choosing B in state A, and good pandering, that is, the dissonant incumbent choosing B
in state B. When β is small the former dominates the latter, hence the negative sign. A more detailed
discussion is left to Section 1.3.2.
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no precommitment is available? In this set up, it is possible to find conditions on the
parameters where a decrease in τ reduces the welfare of the voter. This has important
policy consequences, since it implies that cheaper access to politicians actions is not
necessarily better for the voter. Interestingly, the channel through which this happens
is pandering, that is, a proxy for populism, boosted by the increased level of attention
to what politicians do. This result implies that, if social media is a tool that reduces
τ ,31 making political information cheaper, then its diffusion may bring over-attention
to politics and populism, reducing the welfare of the voters.
1.3.2 Endogenous attention to action and state
In this section I allow the voter to determine endogenously both types of attention,
that is, q and β are chosen at a cost τC(q, β).32 Before looking at the allocation of
attention, I summarize some generic features of the equilibrium. In particular, defining
rx̃,s̃ = Pr(re− elect|x̃, s̃), γCs = Pr(x = B|s, θ = C) and γDs = Pr(x = B|s, θ = D), all
the PBNE of the game can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1.4 In every equilibrium with two types of attention:





















q(1− β + β(rB,A − rA,A))
]
.
3. rB,∅ = 1, rA,∅ = 0, rB,B = 1, rA,B = 0. rB,A, rA,A and r∅,s̃ are unconstrained
because of indifference (or because they are off-path).
Proposition 1.4 contains several insights. First, there are multiple equilibria, depending
on the randomization chosen when the voter observes state A and the action. Second,




A ) is the same as before: more
31As one of the referees correctly pointed out, social media may shift attention away from politics,
providing access to different content and increasing the opportunity cost of political attention. If so,
in the logic of this model, it may increase the welfare of the voter. A detailed theoretical analysis
of the direction of this effect is left for further research, but it is worth mentioning that two very
recent empirical contributions (Mosquera et al. 2019 and Allcott et al. 2019) are consistent with social
media reducing the cost of attention to politics. Both papers look at the causal effect of Facebook
de-activation finding, among other things, that it reduces news knowledge and attention to politics.
32Appendix D1 explores what happens when the voter has to allocate a given amount of attention
between action and state. The result is again equilibrium (weak) over-attention to the action and
(weak) under-attention to the state of the world.
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attention to the action makes pandering more desirable, for the politician. Finally, β
has either no effect or a negative effect on the equilibrium level of pandering. Irrespec-




∂β ≤ 0. Note that β reduces the
bad pandering in terms of period 1 welfare (i.e., politicians choosing an action that is
suboptimal from the point of view of the voter, but that increases re-election chances)
without affecting the good pandering (i.e., the dissonant incumbent choosing the right
action in period 1).
To understand Proposition 1.4 it is useful to start from the fact that, in state A, the
incentives of the two types of incumbent are perfectly aligned, hence they behave in
the same way. Given this, when the voter learns that the state is A she becomes
indifferent between keeping or not the incumbent, and as a consequence rB,A and rA,A
are unconstrained. Looking back at the incentives for the politician, they compare their
re-election chances of choosing action B vis-a-vis A depending on what they expect
the voter to observe. When s is unobserved by the voter, the difference in re-election
chances is 1 (rB,∅ = 1 and rA,∅ = 0), and it becomes rB,A− rA,A when s is observed by
V. Hence, unless rB,A − rA,A = 1, a higher conjectured β reduces the electoral reward
of choosing B in state A. In state B, instead, observing or not s does not change
the re-election strategy of the voter, because the dissonant incumbent has a stronger
incentive to choose action A than the consonant one. Hence, the conjectured level of
β does not enter in γCB and γ
D
B .
For tractability33 I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1.2 When indifferent or off path the voter re-elects the incumbent with
the same probability in every information set, hence, rB,A = rA,A.
With two types of attention, the equilibrium objective function maximized by the voter
33Assumption 1.2 is useful in avoiding kinks in γDA and γ
C
A (they could become 0 for sufficiently
high β if I assume a different randomization), so that I can use calculus everywhere in the ex ante
maximization. It does not change the overall negative effect of β on those probabilities, but it is
important to point out that, in the extreme case where rB,A = 1 and rA,A = 0, attention to the state
simply disappears from the equilibrium. In this case, then, setting β = 0 would be optimal not only in
equilibrium but also in the ex ante optimal allocation, and the rest of the results would be analogous to
section 1.3.1. Finally, in terms of off path beliefs, it assumes that the off path posterior is equal to the
prior. Note that this makes intuitive sense because the only off path case is, sometimes, x = B, s = A,




W̃ = qβ{Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD) + Pr(x = A, s = B)Γ
+ Pr(x = A, s = A)(rA,A(π̂A,AVC + (1− π̂A,A)VD) + (1− rA,A)Γ)
+ Pr(x = B, s = A)(rB,A(π̂B,AVC + (1− π̂B,A)VD) + (1− rB,A)Γ)
+ q(1− β){Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC + (1− π̂B,∅)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ}
+ (1− q)Γ− τC(q, β)
Substituting the equilibrium re-election probabilities of Proposition 1.4, I obtain
W̃ = qβ{Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD)
+ (1− Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ}
+ q(1− β){Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC + (1− π̂B,∅)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ}
+ (1− q)Γ− τC(q, β)
The first part of W̃ is the expected second period utility, conditional on observing
action and state, multiplied by the probability that this happens (qβ). In this case,
the voter definitely re-elects when x = B and s = B, and gets an expected payoff
of Γ in all other cases (either because she chooses a new politician or because she is
indifferent after observing x and s). The second part is the expected second period
utility conditional on observing only the action (V re-elects only if the action is B), the
third part is the expected utility conditional on observing no action, both weighted by
the respective probability. Finally, the last part is the cost of attention.
The next lemma further simplifies W̃ , showing that, from an equilibrium perspective,
knowing the state is useless for the voter.
Lemma 1.2 In equilibrium, Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC +(1− π̂B,B)VD)+(1−Pr(x =
B, s = B))Γ = Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC + (1− π̂B,∅)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ.
Lemma 1.2 is a consequence of the fact that observing the state on top of the action does
not change the voter’s re-election choice, hence it does not provide useful information
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for the decision.34 Using lemma 1.2 I can rewrite W̃ as
W̃ = q{Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC +(1− π̂B,∅)VD)+Pr(x = A)Γ}+Γ(1−q)− τC(q, β) (1.4)
Equation (1.4) makes it clear that attention to the state is not going to play any role
in the positive part of the objective function, and it enters only as a cost. Applying








q + Γ− τC(q, β)
As the ex ante maximization problem is quite complex, it is necessary to impose addi-
tional conditions to guarantee the concavity of the ex ante objective function. I make
some simplifying assumptions, and I discuss ways to relax them in Appendix E1. I
assume the following:
Assumption 1.3 C(q, β) = q2 + β2.
This assumption makes a closed form solution possible, and highlights the conditions
for concavity of the ex ante maximization (it is not an issue in the equilibrium one).





Assumption 1.4 is sufficient to ensure that the Hessian matrix of the ex ante maxi-
mization problem is negative semidefinite. However, as shown in Appendix E1, it is






, 35 noticing that δK is the ex ante probability that the first period
utility of P from doing his favourite action is smaller than the discounted expected
utility of being in office in period 2. The following lemma describes the equilibrium
attention choice.
Lemma 1.3 The allocation of attention in equilibrium is unique and is given by β∗∗ =
0 and q∗∗ = π(1−π)δ
8τ+π(1−π)δ2K .
34I thank one referee for helping me clarifying the mechanism.
35By construction δK < 1.
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The particular closed form of q∗∗ is of course a feature of the assumptions. In general














the equilibrium level of attention to the state is zero and all the attention is put on the
action of the politician.














q + Γ− τC(q, β) (1.5)




A . Now γ̃A and γ
D




1− γ̃A + π + (1− π)γDB
]
is period 1 expected utility, taking into account that in
state A both types of incumbent choose the “wrong” (from the voter’s period 1 per-
spective) action with probability γ̃A and if the state is B the consonant type always
chooses x = B, while the dissonant type does so with probability γDB . The second part
of Equation (1.5) is the selection welfare, coming from the ability to choose a better P
in period 2.
Note that q has a negative indirect effect on (1.5) through γ̃A, that is, the probability
that both types choose B when the state is A, and through the γDB that enters in the
selection welfare, because the dissonant type choosing B when the state is B very often
makes it harder to distinguish him from a consonant type. Moreover, it has a positive
indirect effect through the γDB that enters in the policy welfare: the good pandering of
the dissonant type behaving better in period 1. β instead has just one positive effect:
it reduces the period one bad pandering. This effect is what drives the possibility of a
positive amount of attention to the state in the ex ante optimal allocation.
As anticipated,
Lemma 1.4 If Assumptions 1.3 and 1.4 are true, then the Hessian matrix of the ex
ante maximization is negative semidefinite.
Thanks to Lemma 1.4, the ex ante optimal allocation of attention is given by the system
of the two partial derivatives, looking at conditions for interior solutions. The main
results are as follows:
Proposition 1.5 Comparing the ex ante optimal and the equilibrium level of attention:
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1. The ex ante optimal level of attention to the state is always weakly higher than
the equilibrium. If 1 − π − 2K > 0 then the ex ante optimal β is strictly higher
than the equilibrium;
2. If 2τδ2π(1− π)2 > δ2K(1− π)(1− 4τπ)− 32τ2 then the ex ante optimal level of
attention to the action is strictly smaller than the equilibrium;
Proposition 1.5 makes a very straightforward point about the optimal β: as long as
parameters do not produce a corner solution where both q and β are zero (note that
if the ex ante optimal q is zero then the ex ante optimal β is zero as well), then the
equilibrium level of attention to the state is too small. The situation would not improve
with a reduction in τ , as the allocation of attention would still be unbalanced toward
attention to the action. To understand the proposition, it is worth pointing out that,
from an ex ante perspective, β plays an important role, despite being useless in terms
of selection. In particular, it decreases γ̃A, that is, the probability that the incumbent
(irrespective of his type) chooses action B in state A. As a consequence, unless the ex
ante optimum is in 0,0, it is useful to pay a positive amount of attention to the state
of the world. This is ignored in equilibrium, where the politician’s choices are taken as
given. Importantly, β has no effect on selection welfare, in this set up.
The ex ante role of attention to the action is more complicated. In terms of future
welfare (i.e., what is captured by the W̃ part of Equation (1.5)), it is of course directly
useful for selection (as captured by the equilibrium optimization) but it also increases
γDB , and this is bad for the voter’s expected utility from selection, as it makes the
dissonant type’s behaviour more similar to the behaviour of the consonant type. As a
consequence, the indirect effect of q on selection welfare is always negative, hence the
the commitment problem exists also in terms of pure selection effect.36
Looking now at the policy welfare, if β = 0, attention to the state has a decreasing
effect on it as well and, as long as β < π, this is true in general.37 However, from an ex
ante perspective, the two types of attention are complements: a higher β makes q more
desirable. If β > π, the derivative of present welfare with respect to q is positive.38
36I thank one of the referee for pointing out this interesting feature.
37To see this, note that ∂
∂q
[
1− γ̃A + π + (1− π)γDB
]
= δK(β − π). Intuitively, in terms of policy
welfare attention to the state increases both bad and good pandering. However, when β is sufficiently
low, the (negative) effect of the bad pandering is stronger, as both types may choose it.
38Clearly, this holds with additively separable cost.
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In this case the bad pandering is reduced by the high β, and as a consequence the
positive effect of q on policy welfare due to good pandering dominates the negative
effect. The ex ante optimal q may be higher or lower than the equilibrium, depending
on whether the complementarity effect is sufficiently strong to overcome the negative
effect of higher bad pandering.
Finally, note that obviously the complementarity works for β as well. The higher the ex
ante optimal q, the higher the ex ante optimal β, as its welfare increasing role crucially
depends on the probability that the action is observed, and hence that pandering is an
issue.39 But since this complementarity plays a role in period 1 welfare only, it is not
taken into account by the voter when choosing the equilibrium level of attention.
In terms of parameters, the condition on K being sufficiently small is what determines
whether the ex ante optimal q is strictly positive or not.40 The second condition is
just a comparison between the ex ante optimal q and the equilibrium q, taking into
account that a higher ex ante optimal β can have cross effects on the optimal q, hence
it is not always smaller than the equilibrium q. However, the condition for equilibrium
over-attention to the action is easily met: 4τπ > 1 would be sufficient.
As explored in Appendix F1, the result of equilibrium under-attention to the state
of the world and over-attention to the action of the politician is not a feature of this
specific political agency model, at least when the cross effects are constrained by the
fixed amount of attention to be allocated (or more generally when they are not too big).
What is driven by this model is the β∗∗ = 0 result, as it relies on the fact that different
types of politician have aligned interests in one of the two states, and hence learning
s on top of x does not change the re-election decision of the voter. In Appendix F1,
using a model loosely based on Prat (2005) and Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), I show
that there is an equilibrium with nonzero attention to the state, but this level is still
smaller than what is optimal ex ante.
39To see this, note that γ̃A = qδK(1− β).
40Its effect on the pandering probability is linear and multiplied by K because of the uniform
assumption on F1. If the slope is very steep V prefers to commit ex ante to zero attention at all, as
this drives pandering to zero as well. Note that, if q = 0, it is pointless to invest in β.
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1.3.3 Discussion and suggestive evidence
My results are consistent with the in-depth content analysis of 24-hr news channels
in Lewis et al. (2005). They show that “the news channels do not use the enormous
time available to them to provide the viewer with a deeper understanding of the news
world”.41 One of their case studies is particularly important in terms of attention to the
action vs to the state of the world: “all three news channels covered the Government’s
Defence Review on 21 July, and yet none did so in the context of a broader analysis
of the changing rationale behind military spending, or even by clarifying what that
rationale might be.”42 Consistent with the point I make here, all the attention was
focused on the Government’s action (the Defence Review) and none on the state of
the world, that is, the “rationale behind military spending”. Lewis et al. (2005) find
an effect on the supply side, but it may be driven by the demand side allocation of
attention by voters, which follows the inefficiencies highlighted in the present paper.
1.4 Extension: Bundling Action and State
So far information about the action of the politician and the state has been considered
unbundled. However this is not always the case: it could be that information about
what the politician has done and about whether it was correct or not come together,43
so it is interesting to analyse the implications for the optimal allocation of attention.
The set up is the same as in section 1.2, but I model attention differently. In particular,
the voter does not observe xt or st directly, but instead he observes a signal ζ where
Pr(ζ = xt, st) = η, Pr(ζ = ∅) = 1 − η. η is chosen by V at a cost τC(η), where the
assumptions on C(η) are the same as in section 1.2.
Reminding that rζ is the probability of re-election conditional on the realization of ζ,






the equilibrium of this version of the game in Lemma 1.5.
Lemma 1.5 In every equilibrium of this game:
41Lewis et al. (2005), p. 473
42Lewis et al. (2005), p. 471.
43I thank one referee for pointing this out.
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3. rB,B = 1, rA,B = 0, rB,A, rA,A and r∅ are unconstrained because of indifference
or off path.
Note that Assumption 1.2 plays a more important role in this extension. In fact, it
implies that γCA = γ
D
A = 0, hence attention to politics increases the good pandering
only, that is, the dissonant politician choosing B in state B, without increasing the
bad pandering, that is, γCA and γ
D
A . This would still be true under the assumption that
rA,A > rB,A, but if rB,A > rA,A then η would increase the bad pandering as well, with
implications for the ex ante welfare calculation. However, as shown in Lemma A1.1 in
Appendix A1, the result is unchanged unless I assume fairly ad-hoc randomizations.44
Given Lemma 1.5, V chooses η in order to maximize Wb, where
Wb =η (Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD) + (1− Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ) +
+ (1− η)Γ− τC(η) (1.6)
The solution is summarized by Lemma 1.6.




π(1− π)δ(1− δKη∗) = τC ′(η∗)
In this set up attention only increases good pandering. In terms of ex ante welfare, a
high γDB is good for discipline and bad for selection but overall the first effect prevails,
as stated in Proposition 1.6.
Proposition 1.6 The ex ante optimal level of attention, η∗∗, is strictly larger than the
equilibrium level.
44Lemma A1.1 in Appendix A1 relaxes Assumption 1.2 showing that the result of this section, that









As a result, attention to bundled political information is too small with respect to the
ex ante optimal level, which is consistent with the under-attention to the state of the
world derived in Section 1.3.
1.5 Conclusion
Are voters allocating attention to politics optimally? I endogenize the attention choice
in an otherwise standard model of pandering, highlighting two points of inefficiency.
The equilibrium level of attention to politicians’ actions can be too high, making pan-
dering too attractive. Conversely, attention to the state (i.e., to what politicians should
do) is too low as its effect on selection is limited, even though it could improve the
incumbent’s behaviour.
The results suggest that trying to increase attention to the state by reducing the
cost of attention to politics is likely to make things worse, as it does not change the
allocation of attention. It would just make attention to the action even more extreme.
Moreover, results highlight the importance of accounting for allocation of attention
and its general equilibrium effect on political behaviour. In terms of applications, if
populism is a form of pandering and social media is a technological innovation that
reduces the cost of attention, this paper gives a rationale for the observed correlation
between populism and social media. Moreover, it highlights a general tendency to pay
too much attention to what politicians are doing and too little to what they should do.
Looking at the relationship between this paper and Prato and Wolton (2016), it is
worth mentioning that attention can be bad for the voter in both frameworks, but
the implications of the relationship between equilibrium attention and populism are
different: the correlation is positive in this paper, and negative in Prato and Wolton
(2016). It would be interesting to explore these results empirically.45 One way would be
to look at the response to exogenous shocks to the cost of attention (e.g., through better
mobile phone signals, access to internet where there was none or reduced/increased
access to social media) by voters and politicians. Are the voters paying more attention
to politics? Are more politicians choosing more populist platforms?
45I thank one of the referees for pointing this out.
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The current very tractable set up is open to different extensions, suggesting many
directions for future research. One would be a model with a multidimensional state
of the world. Dimensions that are more salient for voters are likely to invite more
pandering from the politician, something that the optimal attention allocation should
take into account.
Another option is to microfound voters’ attention in a different way, for example with
a model of media entry where each outlet can decide whether to provide political news,
sports or documentaries. If competition increases the provision of entertainment (where
it is easier to differentiate the product), this would shift voters’ attention away from
hard news (or, equivalently, makes attention to politics more costly). The overall effect
of this is ambiguous, as the model highlights: it reduces the politician’s incentives to




Proof of Proposition 1.1.
In terms of existence, sequential rationality requires that π̂A ≤ π and π̂B ≥ π, where π̂x̃
is the posterior probability of the incumbent being consonant when the voter observes
x̃.
Define rx̃ = Pr(re−elect|x̃), γCs = Pr(C plays B in state s) and γDs = Pr(D plays B in state s).


















(0.5γ + 0.5)π + γ(1− π)
> π
hence, from the point of view of V, it is sequentially rational to re-elect after observing
B and to vote for the challenger after observing A.
Given this, one needs to check optimality from the point of view of P. Starting from
the D type, and given the voter’s re-election rules stated above, the expected utility
of the dissonant incumbent when he chooses action A, irrespective of the state of the
world, is

























Hence, given the fact that in equilibrium rA = 0 and rB = 1 the D incumbent chooses






Moving now to the C incumbent, note first of all that, when s = B, all the incentives
are aligned and hence he always chooses action B. When s = A, instead, the expected
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utilities are as follows:































q. This completes the existence proof. In terms of uniqueness, note
that there are actually multiple equilibria, given that π̂∅ = π, hence V is indifferent in
that case. However, r∅ does not affect P’s equilibrium strategies, hence all the equilibria
are identical in terms of outcomes (and strategies, with the obvious exception of r∅).
What needs to be shown, now, is that there are no other PBNE with different re-election
probabilities after observing A or B or different strategies for P. By contradiction, sup-
pose there is a PBNE where rA > 0 and rB < 1. This is sequentially rational iff
π̂(x̃ = A) ≥ π ⇒ γDA + γDB ≥ γCA + γCB and π̂(x̃ = B) ≤ π ⇒ γDA + γDB ≥ γCA + γCB .




























































(rB − rA)] ≥ 1, which is impossible because F is strictly increasing,


































Hence, there are no equilibria where rA > 0 and rB < 1. Applying the same logic, it
is possible to also rule out equilibria where rA = 0 and rB < 1 and where rA > 0 and
rB = 1.
Hence, the sole re-election strategy in a SPNE of this game is rA = 0 and rB = 1 and
as a consequence the sole equilibrium strategy for the incumbent is the one described
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in Proposition 1.1.
Proof of Proposition 1.2.
As stated in the main body of the paper, the part of the welfare function relevant
for the voter’s maximization is W = q{[Pr(x = B)](π̂BVC + (1 − π̂B)VD) + [Pr(x =
A)]Γ} + (1 − q)Γ − τC(q). It follows from the law of iterated expectations: with
probability q the action is observed. If it is B, then the incumbent (consonant with
probability π̂B) is confirmed and π̂BVC + (1 − π̂B)VD is the second period expected
utility. If x = A or if x̃ = ∅ the incumbent is replaced by a challenger, consonant with
probability π. As a consequence, the expected period 2 utility is given by Γ. Note that












































































π(1− π)δ(1− γ)q + Γ− τc(q)
Where the first equality is just application of Bayes’ rule, the second is based on
substitution of the equilibrium strategies, the third uses the definition of Γ, the fourth
is just collection of terms and the fifth one uses the fact that, in equilibrium γCA = γ
D
B =
γDA = γ. A similar approach is used throughout the paper to simplify the equilibrium
objective function.
Since γ has already been decided (i.e., it is a function of qe), the solution, conjecturing
an interior one, is obtained differentiating only with respect to q and setting the first
order conditions equal to 0. Note that, given the assumptions about C(q), the problem
is concave. Finally, Equation (1.2) is obtained by setting the equilibrium condition
qe = q∗.
27















Uniqueness follows from the fact that the LHS is strictly decreasing in q, the RHS is
strictly increasing in q. The interior solution follows from LHS(q = 0) > RHS(q = 0)
and LHS(q = 1) < RHS(q = 1). For the last inequality, τ ≥ 18 is a sufficient condition,
noticing that the LHS is never above π(1− π), whose maximum is 14 .
Proof of Corollary 1.2.
Recalling that the variance of the incumbent’s type is var(θ) = π(1 − π), the im-




















































Proof of Corollary 1.3.

















































which is always true.
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Proof of Lemma 1.1.









[π(1− γ) + (1− π)(1− γ)] + 1
2
[π + (1− π)γ]
+ q{[Pr(x = B)](π̂BVC + (1− π̂B)VD) + [Pr(x = A)]Γ}+ (1− q)Γ− τc(q)
where the first line is period 1 expected utility and period 2 is the same as W . Note
that, given the equilibrium strategy for the politician, if the state is A then both types
choose the sub-optimal action with probability γ (hence V gets 1 with probability 1−γ)
and if the state is B then the consonant type always chooses the voter’s preferred action,
while the dissonant type chooses it with probability γ.




[1− π − πδKq] + 1
4
π(1− π)δ(1− δKq)q − τc(q)





π(1− π)δ2K − τc′′(q)
which is negative in the whole interval.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.
The (ex ante) optimal level of attention, if interior, is implicitly defined by its first
order conditions as
π(1− π)δ(1− δKq) = 2δπK + (1− π)πδ2Kq + 4τc′(q) (A1.1)
Note that the LHS of (A1.1) and (1.2) is exactly the same. However, the RHS of
(A1.1) is above the RHS of (1.2) for every interior q. Moreover, a corner solution at
1 is excluded by the lower bound on τ , while a corner solution at 0 would also imply
29
equilibrium over-attention to the action.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.
As a reminder, γCs = Pr(C plays B in state s) and γ
D
s = Pr(D plays B in state s).
Moreover, rx̃,s̃ = Pr(re− elect|x̃, s̃).
First of all, the voter re-elects the incumbent if π̂x̃,s̃ > π, chooses the challenger if
π̂x̃,s̃ < π and is indifferent otherwise.
For given γDs and γ
C
s , it is easy to see that
π̂∅,s̃ = π
hence r∅,s̃ ∈ [0, 1].






















































1 if γDA > γ
C
A
[0, 1] if γDA = γ
C
A
0 if γDA < γ
C
A





0 if γDB > γ
C
B
[0, 1] if γDB = γ
C
B
1 if γDB < γ
C
B




1 if γDB > γ
C
B
[0, 1] if γDB = γ
C
B
0 if γDB < γ
C
B




0 if γDA > γ
C
A
[0, 1] if γDA = γ
C
A
1 if γDA < γ
C
A
Moving to the best response correspondences of P, for conjectured levels of attention
















































Clearly, in equilibrium γDA = γ
C
A , hence rA,A and rB,A are unconstrained because of
indifference. The same is true for r∅,s̃ since no relevant information is transmitted.
I claim that, in every equilibrium, it must be that rB,B = 1, rA,B = 0, rB,∅ = 1 and




A , those are sequentially rational voting strategies if
γCB > γ
D
B . Replacing them in Equations (A1.5) and (A1.3) the result, as required, is






















qe(1− βe + βe(rB,A − rA,A))
]
To show that there are no other equilibria I use contradiction. First, suppose that
there exists an equilibrium where γCB < γ
D
B , and as a consequence rB,B = 0, rA,B = 1,









> 0 = γDB
hence a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that γCB = γ
D







(1− βe)(rB,∅ − rA,∅) + βe(rB,B − rA,B)
]
:=
D, this requires Pr(u1 ≤ D) = Pr(u1 ≥ −D), which never holds.





hence observing x = B, s = A is off path. Note that there are no off path beliefs (and
consequential randomizations) that are consistent with being off path and that would




A = 0 and
γCB = 1 and there is no rB,A that changes this (hence every off path belief works).
In case of β ≥ 11−rB,A+rA,A , then either off path beliefs and randomizations are such
that rB,A > rA,A, and as a consequence there is no feasible β such that x = B, s = A




Proof of Lemma 1.2.
First, note that









+ (1− Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ
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Moreover,

















(1− π)VD + Pr(x = A)Γ













(1− π)VD + Pr(x = A)Γ




γ̃A (πVC + (1− π)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ
= Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD)+
+ Pr(x = B, s = A)Γ + Pr(x = A)Γ
= Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD)+
+ (1− Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ
Where the first equality is just a straightforward application of Bayes’ rule. The sec-








= Pr(x = B, s =
B)(π̂B,BVC + (1 − π̂B,B)VD). The third from the fact that, γCA = γDA , we can de-
fine both of them γ̃A. The fourth from the fact that
1
2 γ̃A = Pr(x = B, s = A) and
πVC + (1 − π)VD = Γ. The last from the fact that Pr(x = B, s = A) + Pr(x = A) =
1− Pr(x = B, s = B).
Proof of Lemma 1.3.
The voter chooses to maximize W̃ with respect to q and β, taking as given the pandering









πδ + (1− π)δ1
2
)
− τ(q2 + β2) (A1.7)
From Equation (A1.7), β enters only negatively in the objective function, and hence its
solution is β∗∗ = 0. Replacing above, noticing the concavity of the objective function





π(1− π)δ(1− γDB )
)
= 2τq
Combing this with γDB = δKq
e and the equilibrium condition qe = q∗∗, it turns out







As the LHS is decreasing in q and the RHS is increasing in q, the solution is unique.
It is interior as long as LHS(q = 1) ≤ RHS(q = 1), noticing that of course LHS(q =
0) > RHS(q = 0).
This happens when τ ≥ π(1−π)(1−δK)δ8 . Note that again τ ≥
1
8 is sufficient to guarantee
an interior solution.
Proof of Lemma 1.4.














πδ + (1− π)δ1
2
)
− τ(q2 + β2)
where the first part is period 1 expected utility, the second and the third is period 2
expected utility and the last is the cost of attention.





π(1− π)δ2K − 2τ < 0
∂2W̃ ex
∂β2
















are both negative, the remaining condition for the negative
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π(1− π)δ2Kτ + (4τ)2 ≥ (δK)2
As a consequence, 4τ ≥ δK is a sufficient condition for this to be true.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.
Thanks to Lemma 1.4 and the fact that the constraints are all linear, Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are necessary and sufficient for a maximum.
Hence, the Lagrangian function is
L = W̃ ex + λ1(1− q) + λ2(1− β)
The conditions are
q ≥ 0 q ∂L∂q = 0 q ≤ 1
∂L
∂q ≤ 0
β ≥ 0 β ∂L∂β = 0 β ≤ 1
∂L
∂β ≤ 0
λ1 ≥ 0 λ2 ≥ 0
λ1(1− q) = 0 λ2(1− β) = 0
and there are multiple cases to be considered.
Case 1: β = 0 and q = 0.
This requires λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. To be a maximum, it must be that
∂L
∂q ≤ 0 that
requires, after substitution, 1− π − 2K ≤ 0.
Case 2: β and q both interior, hence λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. The solution is given by the
system of ∂L∂q = 0 and
∂L
∂β = 0. The solution is given by
q =
2τπδ(1− π − 2K)





δ2Kπ(1− π − 2K)
4π(1− π)δ2Kτ + 16τ2 − (δK)2
which requires 1 − π − 2K ≥ 0. Note that 2τπδ(1−π−2K)
4τπ(1−π)δ2K+16τ2−(δK)2 < 1 implies 16τ
2 −
(δK)2 > 2τπδ [1− π − 2K − 2K(1− π)δ].
Case 3: q interior and β = 1.
This requires λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0. Note that, whatever q < 1 can be found, when
substituting into ∂L∂β = 0 the latter requires 2λ2 = δKq−4τ < 0, hence a contradiction.
Case 4: q = 1 and β interior.
This requires λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. The solution for β is
δK
4τ however, when replacing





2K − 2τ + 14π(1 − π)δ −
1
2δKπ,
which is greater than zero whenever 16τ2 − (δK)2 < 2τπδ [1− π − 2K − 2K(1− π)δ].
Case 5: q = β = 1.
This requires λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0. When substituting into
∂L
∂β = 0 the latter requires
2λ2 = δK − 4τ < 0, hence a contradiction.
Case 6: q = 0 and β interior.
This requires λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. When replacing, however, the solution for β is only
0, hence a contradiction.
Case 7: q interior and β = 0.
This requires λ2 = 0. However,
∂L
∂β ≤ 0 only if q = 0, hence a contradiction.
Case 8: q = 0 and β = 1.
Then, ∂L∂β = 0 implies a negative λ2, hence a contradiction.
Case 9: q = 1 and β = 0.
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This requires λ2 = 0 and
∂L





0, hence a contradiction.
To sum up, the ex ante maximization problem has just three solutions. q = β = 0 if
1− π − 2δK ≤ 0.
q =
2τπδ(1− π − 2K)




δ2Kπ(1− π − 2K)
4π(1− π)δ2Kτ + 16τ2 − (δK)2





if 1− π − 2K > 0 and 16τ2 − (δK)2 ≤ 2τπδ [1− π − 2K − 2K(1− π)δ].
As the equilibrium level of β is always 0, 1−π−2K > 0 guarantees equilibrium (strict)
under-attention to the state of the world.
The last part of Proposition 1.5 is a simple comparison between q∗∗ = π(1−π)δ
8τ+π(1−π)δ2K
and the interior ex ante optimal q, looking for parameters where the latter is smaller.
Note that it is possible to find a sufficient condition for equilibrium over-attention to
the action, that is, 4τπ > 1.
Proof of Lemma 1.5.
In terms of re-election strategy, note that we can use the same comparisons as in the
proof of Lemma 1.3. For any given conjectured η and generic re-election strategies,
γDA = Pr
[


















and for the same logic
γDB = Pr
(





















Note that, as γCA = γ
D
A , π̂A,A = π̂B,A = π. Moreover, π̂∅ = π, so rB,A, rA,A and r∅ are
unconstrained. Using Assumption 1.2, I set them equal.




B , so that rB,B =
1 and rA,B = 0. Plugging into the above equations, those re-election probabilities bring









< 1. Hence, the lemma defines an equilibrium.
To show uniqueness (up to the indifference-related randomizations), note that if rB,B =
rA,B then γ
C
B = 1 and γ
D




B , hence a contra-
diction. Finally, suppose that there is an equilibrium where rB,B < rA,B. As a conse-
quence, rB,B = 0, rA,B = 1, γ
D









> 0, which is again
a contradiction.
Finally, note that if η = 0 or if rB,A ≤ rA,A x = B, s = A is off path, hence Bayes’ Rule
cannot be used to define rB,A. I claim that there are no off path beliefs that change
the equilibrium structure outlined above. If beliefs (and the re-election strategy that
follows) are such that rB,A ≤ rA,A, then choosing γCA = γDA = 0 is optimal. Off path
beliefs and the consequent re-election strategy such that rB,A > rA,A are inconsistent
with the fact of being off path, because in that case γCA = γ
D
A > 0. Finally, if η = 0
then there is no value of rB,A that changes the equilibrium strategies in that case.
Proof of Lemma 1.6.
V chooses η ∈ [0, 1] to maximize Wb, where
Wb = η (Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD) + (1− Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ)+(1−η)Γ−τC(η)
Replacing the equilibrium probabilities established by Lemma 1.5 and re-arranging,
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π(1− π)δ(1− γDB )η + Γ− τC(η)
Noticing that the maximization is concave, the equilibrium value of η, if interior, sets
∂Wb
∂η = 0 keeping γ
D
B fixed and then imposing the rationality condition η
e = η∗.
Looking at the implicit equation defining η∗, it is clear that the LHS is strictly de-
creasing in η (because γDB is increasing in η) and the RHS is strictly increasing, hence
there is a unique solution. Moreover, LHS(η = 0) > 0 = RHS(η = 0). Finally, the
assumption on τ guarantees an interior solution, as the LHS of the implicit equation






Proof of Proposition 1.6.




[1 + π + (1− π)δKη] +Wb
where the first part is just period 1 expected welfare. Looking at the first order condi-
tion, the ex ante optimal attention solves
1
4
π(1− π)δ(1− δKη) + 1
2
(1− π)δK − 1
4
π(1− π)δ2Kη = τC ′(η)
The RHS is the same as the condition for the equilibrium level of attention. The LHS
is the same plus 12(1− π)δK −
1
4π(1− π)δ
2Kη. Note that, however, we can re-arrange




> 0 ∀η ∈ [0, 1].
As a consequence, the LHS of the ex ante condition is strictly above the LHS of the
equilibrium condition, hence η∗∗ > η∗, that is, we have equilibrium under-attention.
Lemma A1.1 If Assumption 1.2 does not hold, then a sufficient condition for equi-





Proof of Lemma A1.1.
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If Assumption 1.2 does not apply, then rB,A and rA,A are unconstrained. Define ε =
rB,A−rA,A, and as a consequence γDA = γCA = δKηε. Nothing changes in the derivation
of the equilibrium attention η∗. In terms of ex ante attention, instead, it is easy to
show that it solves
1
4











because period 1 expected utility is now 12 [1− δKηε+ π + (1− π)δKη].
A sufficient condition for η∗∗ > η∗ is 12δK
[
1− π − ε− 12π(1− π)δη
]
> 0 ∀η ∈ [0, 1],





B1 Endogenous attention to actions, exogenous state revelation
This appendix considers the case where only q is allocated endogenously by V, but I
allow β ∈ [0, 1]. I am assuming that the voter has to allocate attention if she wants
to learn the action of the politician, but there is a positive, exogenous probability β
that the period 1 state is learned before the election. As only q is endogenous, the
cost structure is simply c(q). Trivially, the results of Proposition 1.4 apply to this
case as well, with the difference that β is a parameter known by all the players. For
tractability, I keep Assumption 1.2 and the result stated in Lemma 1.2 applies in this
case as well. In equilibrium the voter’s problem is
maxq∈[0,1]W
β








q + Γ− τc(q) (B1.1)
Equation (B1.1) is already instructive. First of all, for the same logic as in Section
1.3.2, β does not enter in this maximization and also it does not affect γDB , hence it has
no effect on the equilibrium attention to the action. The following lemma summarizes
the equilibrium attention.
Lemma B1.1 The allocation of attention to the action in equilibrium qβ,∗ is unique,
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The proof of Lemma B1.1 is the same as the one of Proposition 1.2.
When I look at the ex ante optimal attention allocation, however, things are different





1− γ̃A + π + (1− π)γDB
]
+W β (B1.2)



















δKq are endogenous in the maximization. As in the body of the paper, the first part
of Equation (B1.2) is the present part of the voter’s welfare, that is, the one given by
the policy choice in period one, and the second part is the selection part. Note that
β does not enter in the selection part, but it plays a role in the present welfare. In
particular, as in Section 1.3.2, from the point of view of period 1 welfare β reduces the
bad pandering γ̃A, that is, the probability that P chooses action B in state A, with-
out affecting the good pandering, that is, the probability that the dissonant politician
chooses B in state B.
This effect of q has important consequences for the ex ante optimal allocation of q. In
terms of selection welfare, a higher q is always bad because it increases γDB , making the
dissonant incumbent more similar to the consonant type and hence making selection
harder. Hence, if we look only at the selection welfare, in equilibrium V always tends
to put too much attention with respect to the ex ante optimal level. However, in
terms of present welfare, things may be different, because γDB enters positively. As a
consequence, the effect of q on period 1 welfare is in principle ambiguous, as it enters
positively with γDB and negatively with γ̃A. As long as β is not too high, the same
dynamic as in Section 1.3.1 applies, but a sufficiently high β can make the effect of q on
present ex ante welfare positive, and this can even be stronger than the negative effect
of q on selection welfare, implying that there could be equilibrium under-attention.
Proposition B1.1 Define qβ,∗∗ the ex ante optimal attention to the action when β is
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exogenous. If β < π then qβ,∗ > qβ,∗∗, that is, there is equilibrium over-attention to the
action.
Proof of Proposition B1.1.













where the first and second element are the same of the equilibrium maximization, the
third element is the additional (negative) effect of q on selection welfare that enters
through γDB , the fourth part is the (positive) effect of q on first period welfare again
through γDB and the last part is the (negative) additional effect of q on present welfare
coming through γ̃A.




π(1− π)δ (1− δKq)− 1
4
π(1− π)δ2Kq + 1
2
(1− π)δK − 1
2
δK(1− β) = τc′(q)
it is easy to see that the LHS is strictly decreasing in q and the RHS is strictly increasing
in q, hence there will be a unique solution (it may be a corner of course).
A sufficient condition for equilibrium over-attention is that, ∀q,
−1
4
π(1− π)δ2Kq + 1
2
(1− π)δK − 1
2
δK(1− β) < 0
As it must hold for every q, I replace q = 0 and simplify the terms, obtaining β < π.
C1 Generic prior on the state
The main body of the paper assumes a flat prior on the state. In this appendix we
show how the conditions are modified when we allow for a generic prior Pr(st = A) =
p ∈ (0, 1). The rest of the set up is the same as in the body of the paper.
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First of all, starting from the framework of Section 1.3.2, I show that most of the basic
results are unchanged. I consider separately the two cases from Section 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.
General results
Proposition C1.1 In every equilibrium with two types of attention:





















q(1− β + β(rB,A − rA,A))
]
.
3. rB,∅ = 1, rA,∅ = 0, rB,B = 1, rA,B = 0. rB,A, rA,A and r∅,s̃ are unconstrained
because of indifference (or because off-path).
Proof of Proposition C1.1.
As a reminder, γCs = Pr(C plays B in state s) and γ
D
s = Pr(D plays B in state s).
Moreover, rx̃,s̃ = Pr(re− elect|x̃, s̃).
First of all, the voter re-elects the incumbent if π̂x̃,s̃ > π, chooses the challenger if
π̂x̃,s̃ < π and is indifferent otherwise.
For given γDs and γ
C
s , it is easy to see that
π̂∅,s̃ = π
hence r∅,s̃ ∈ [0, 1].




0 if pγDA + (1− p)γDB < pγCA + (1− p)γCB
[0, 1] if pγDA + (1− p)γDB = pγCA + (1− p)γCB
1 if pγDA + (1− p)γDB > pγCA + (1− p)γCB





1 if pγDA + (1− p)γDB < pγCA + (1− p)γCB
[0, 1] if pγDA + (1− p)γDB = pγCA + (1− p)γCB
0 if pγDA + (1− p)γDB > pγCA + (1− p)γCB




1 if γDA > γ
C
A
[0, 1] if γDA = γ
C
A
0 if γDA < γ
C
A




0 if γDB > γ
C
B
[0, 1] if γDB = γ
C
B
1 if γDB < γ
C
B




1 if γDB > γ
C
B
[0, 1] if γDB = γ
C
B
0 if γDB < γ
C
B




0 if γDA > γ
C
A
[0, 1] if γDA = γ
C
A
1 if γDA < γ
C
A
Moving to the best response correspondences of P, for conjectured levels of attention
βe and qe, he compares EUθ(x = B, s) with EUθ(x = A, s). This is not affected by p
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Clearly, in equilibrium γDA = γ
C
A , hence rA,A and rB,A are unconstrained because of
indifference. The same is true for r∅,s̃ since no relevant information is transmitted.
I claim that in every equilibrium it must be that rB,B = 1, rA,B = 0, rB,∅ = 1 and




A , those are sequentially rational voting strategies if
γCB > γ
D
B . Replacing them in Equations (C1.4) and (C1.2) the result is





















qe(1− βe + βe(rB,A − rA,A))
]
To show that there are no other equilibria I use contradiction. First, suppose that
there exists an equilibrium where γCB < γ
D
B , and as a consequence rB,B = 0, rA,B = 1,









> 0 = γDB
hence a contradiction.










(1− βe)(rB,∅ − rA,∅) + βe(rB,B − rA,B)
]
:= D
this requires Pr(u1 ≤ D) = Pr(u1 ≥ −D), which never holds.
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For the last point of the Proposition, note that, if q = 0 or if β ≥ 11−rB,A+rA,A then
γDA = γ
C
A = 0, hence observing x = B, s = A is off path. Note that there are no
off path beliefs (and consequential randomizations) that are consistent with being off





A = 0 and γ
C
B = 1 and there is no rB,A that changes this (hence every
off path belief works). In case of β ≥ 11−rB,A+rA,A , then either off path beliefs and
randomizations are such that rB,A > rA,A, and as a consequence there is no feasible β
such that x = B, s = A is off path, or rB,A ≤ rA,A and hence it is optimal, for that
value of β, to choose γDA = γ
C
A = 0.
Lemma 1.2 has its equivalent in this section as well, and I keep Assumption 1.2.
Lemma C1.1 In equilibrium, for any prior p on the state, Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC+
(1−π̂B,B)VD)+(1−Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ = Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC+(1−π̂B,∅)VD)+Pr(x =
A)Γ.
Proof of Lemma C1.1.
First, note that







+ (1− Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ
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Moreover,
Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC + (1− π̂B,∅)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ = (C1.5)
=
(





pγDA + (1− p)γDB
)
(1− π)VD + Pr(x = A)Γ









(1− π)VD + Pr(x = A)Γ
= Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD)+
+ pγ̃A (πVC + (1− π)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ
= Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD)+
+ Pr(x = B, s = A)Γ + Pr(x = A)Γ
= Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD)+
+ (1− Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ
Where the first equality is just a straightforward application of Bayes’ rule. The sec-







B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1 − π̂B,B)VD). The third from the fact that, γCA = γDA , we can
define both of them γ̃A. The fourth from the fact that pγ̃A = Pr(x = B, s = A) and
πVC + (1 − π)VD = Γ. The last from the fact that Pr(x = B, s = A) + Pr(x = A) =
1− Pr(x = B, s = B).
As a consequence, the objective function maximized in equilibrium is
W p = q{Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC + (1− π̂B,∅)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ}+ Γ(1− q)− τC(q, β)
(C1.6)
= q(1− p)2π(1− π)(1− γDB )δ + Γ− τC(q, β)
where the second line of C1.6 is just straightforward substitution and rearrangement.
The objective function of the ex ante maximization is also only slightly different, and
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it is now given by
W p,ex =
[
p (1− γ̃A) + (1− p)
(
π + (1− π)γDB
)]
+W p (C1.7)
Endogenous q with β = 0
It is useful to assume that τ ≥ δ4 , so that the equilibrium level of attention is interior.






e. The next proposition shows that, for p not too small, there is
equilibrium over-attention to the action.
Proposition C1.2 For every p > p̄, with p̄ < 12 , there is equilibrium over-attention to
the action
Proof of Proposition C1.2.
First, note that the equilibrium level of attention qp,∗ is unique, interior and implicitly
given by
(1− p)2π(1− π)(1− δKqp,∗)δ = c′ (qp,∗)
This follows from the differentiation of (C1.6) with respect to q, keeping γDB exogenous
and noticing that the second order conditions are trivially satisfied, and then imposing
the rationality condition.
The equilibrium is interior because LHS(q = 0) > 0 = RHS(q = 0) and LHS(q =
1) < RHS(q = 0) and it is unique because the LHS is strictly decreasing in q while
the RHS is strictly increasing.
Looking now at Equation (C1.7), note that the effect of q on the policy part of the
welfare function is now given by −δKp+ (1− p)(1− π)δK. Overall, the result of the
derivative of (C1.7) treating everything as endogenous is given by
(1− p)2π(1− π)(1− δKq)δ − δKp+ (1− p)(1− π)δK − q(1− p)2π(1− π)δ2K = c′ (q)
A sufficient condition for equilibrium over-attention is that, for every q,
−δKp+ (1− p)(1− π)δK − q(1− p)2π(1− π)δ2K < 0
48







Intuitively, a very small p means that state A is unlikely, that is, that bad pandering is
something V should not worry about too much. As a consequence, the positive effect of
q in increasing the good pandering becomes predominant, and it could even dominate
the (unchanged) negative effect on selection of the good pandering.
Endogenous q and β
For this set of results I use again Assumption 1.3 and, instead of Assumption 1.4,
I now assume the following (for the same reasons of global concavity of the ex ante
maximization problem):
Assumption C1.1 2τ ≥ pδK
In terms of results,
Lemma C1.2 The allocation of attention in equilibrium is unique and is given by
βp,∗∗ = 0 and qp,∗∗ = (1−p)
2π(1−π)δ
2τ+(1−p)2π(1−π)δ2K .
Proof of Lemma C1.2.
From Equation (C1.6), β enters only negatively in the objective function, and hence its
solution is βp,∗∗ = 0. Replacing above, noticing the concavity of the objective function
and differentiating with respect to q, the solution (conjecturing an interior one) is given
by
(1− p)2π(1− π)δ(1− γDB ) = 2τq
Combing this with γDB = δKq
e and the equilibrium condition qe = qp,∗∗, it turns out
that qp,∗∗ is the fixed point of
(1− p)2π(1− π)δ(1− δKqp,∗∗) = 2τqp,∗∗
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As the LHS is decreasing in q and the RHS is increasing in q, the solution is unique. It
is interior as long as LHS(q = 1) ≤ RHS(q = 1), noting that LHS(q = 0) > RHS(q =
0). This happens when τ ≥ (1−p)
2π(1−π)(1−δK)δ
2 . Note that again τ ≥
δ
4 is sufficient to
guarantee an interior solution.
The result of Lemma C1.2 is just the adaptation of what stated in Lemma 1.3. In
terms of comparative statics, the following corollary summarizes the additional result:
Corollary C1.1 The equilibrium level of attention to the state is decreasing in p.
Proof of Corollary C1.1.
Straightforward differentiation of qp,∗∗ with respect to p.
Intuitively the result makes sense: if state A is very likely, then there is nothing to
learn from the actions of P, because both C and D types behave in the same way.
Proposition C1.3 Comparing the ex ante optimal and the equilibrium level of atten-
tion:
1. The ex ante optimal level of attention to the state is always weakly higher than
the equilibrium. If K [(1− p)(1− π)− p] + (1− p)2π(1− π) > 0 then the ex ante
optimal β is strictly higher than the equilibrium;





then the ex ante optimal level of attention to the action
is strictly smaller than the equilibrium;
Proof of Proposition C1.3.
First, I show that Assumption C1.1 is sufficient for the global concavity of the objective
function (C1.7).
To determine the Hessian matrix, note that
∂2W p,ex
∂q2

















are both negative, the remaining condition for the negative













(1− p)2π(1− π)δ2K4τ + (2τ)2 ≥ (pδK)2
As a consequence, 2τ ≥ pδK is a sufficient condition for this to be true.
Given the above, Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient for a maximum.
Hence, the Lagrangian function is
L = W p,ex + λ1(1− q) + λ2(1− β)
The conditions are
q ≥ 0 q ∂L∂q = 0 q ≤ 1
∂L
∂q ≤ 0
β ≥ 0 β ∂L∂β = 0 β ≤ 1
∂L
∂β ≤ 0
λ1 ≥ 0 λ2 ≥ 0
λ1(1− q) = 0 λ2(1− β) = 0
and there are multiple cases to be considered.
Case 1: β = 0 and q = 0.
This requires λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. To be a maximum, it must be that
∂L
∂q ≤ 0 that
requires, after substitution, K [(1− p)(1− π)− p] + (1− p)2π(1− π) ≤ 0.
Case 2: β and q both interior, hence λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. The solution is given by the
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system of ∂L∂q = 0 and
∂L




K [(1− p)(1− π)− p] + (1− p)2π(1− π)
]




K [(1− p)(1− π)− p] + (1− p)2π(1− π)
]
4τ(1− p)2π(1− π)δ2K + 4τ2 − (pδK)2
which requires K [(1− p)(1− π)− p] + (1− p)2π(1− π) > 0.
Case 3: q interior and β = 1.
This requires λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0. Note that, whatever q < 1 can be found, when
substituting into ∂L∂β = 0 the latter requires λ2 = pδKq−2τ < 0, hence a contradiction.
Case 4: q = 1 and β interior.
This requires λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. The solution for β is
pδK
2τ however, when replacing
into ∂L∂q = 0 it simplifies into λ1 = −pδK +
(pδK)2
2τ + (1− p)(1− π)δK + (1− p)
2π(1−
π)δ(1− 2δK)− 2τ , hence this is possible when the RHS is greater than 0.
Case 5: q = β = 1.
This requires λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0. When substituting into
∂L
∂β = 0 the latter requires
2λ2 = pδK − 2τ < 0, hence a contradiction.
Case 6: q = 0 and β interior.
This requires λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0. When replacing, however, the solution for β is only
0, hence a contradiction.
Case 7: q interior and β = 0.
This requires λ2 = 0. However,
∂L
∂β ≤ 0 only if q = 0, hence a contradiction.
Case 8: q = 0 and β = 1.
Then, ∂L∂β = 0 implies a negative λ2, hence a contradiction.
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Case 9: q = 1 and β = 0.
This requires λ2 = 0 and
∂L
∂β ≤ 0. However, when substituting, we obtain
∂L
∂β = pδK >
0, hence a contradiction.
To sum up, the ex ante maximization problem has just three solutions. q = β = 0 if




K [(1− p)(1− π)− p] + (1− p)2π(1− π)
]




K [(1− p)(1− π)− p] + (1− p)2π(1− π)
]
4τ(1− p)2π(1− π)δ2K + 4τ2 − (pδK)2
if K [(1− p)(1− π)− p]+(1−p)2π(1−π) > 0 and −pδK+ (pδK)
2
2τ +(1−p)(1−π)δK+





if K [(1− p)(1− π)− p]+(1−p)2π(1−π) > 0 and −pδK+ (pδK)
2
2τ +(1−p)(1−π)δK+
(1− p)2π(1− π)δ(1− 2δK)− 2τ > 0.
As the equilibrium level of β is always 0, K [(1− p)(1− π)− p] + (1− p)2π(1− π) > 0
guarantees equilibrium (strict) under-attention to the state of the world.
The last part of the proposition is a simple comparison between qp,∗∗ and the interior
ex ante optimal q, looking for parameters where the latter is smaller.
Proposition C1.3 is just the equivalent of Proposition 1.5 for generic p.
D1 Fixed total level of attention
In this appendix the voter is allowed to allocate attention between the action and the
state. I assume that the total amount of attention is fixed, exogenous and equal to α.
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Hence, the voter is now allowed to choose q and β with the constraint that q + β = α.
Clearly, the main features of the equilibrium are those summarized by Proposition 1.4,
and I keep Assumption 1.2.
The voter’s problem is now to maxq,β
˜̃W subject to q + β = α ≤ 1, where
˜̃W = qβ{Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD) + Pr(x = A, s = B)Γ
+ Pr(x = A, s = A)(rA,A(π̂A,AVC + (1− π̂A,A)VD) + (1− rA,A)Γ)
+ Pr(x = B, s = A)(rB,A(π̂B,AVC + (1− π̂B,A)VD) + (1− rB,A)Γ)
+ q(1− β){Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC + (1− π̂B,∅)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ}
+ (1− q)Γ
In equilibrium π̂A,A = π̂B,A = π so, substituting the constraint, this can be rewritten
as
˜̃W = q(α− q){Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1− π̂B,B)VD) (D1.1)
+ (1− Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ}
+ q(1− (α− q)){Pr(x = B)(π̂B,∅VC + (1− π̂B,∅)VD) + Pr(x = A)Γ}
+ (1− q)Γ
Proposition D1.1 clarifies how attention is allocated, in equilibrium.
Proposition D1.1 In equilibrium, the voter chooses q∗∗∗ = α and β∗∗∗ = 0.
Proof of Proposition D1.1.
While choosing the equilibrium level of attention, the voter differentiates (D1.1) keep-
ing as a constant the pandering probabilities of the incumbent. Noticing that, once





Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVC + (1 − π̂B,B)VD) + (1 − Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ = Pr(x =










π(1− π)δ(1− γDB )q
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and as a consequence, differentiating with respect to q,
1
4
π(1− π)δ(1− γDB ) = 0
which leads to a corner solution where q∗∗∗ is as big as possible, that is, equal to α. As
a consequence, β∗∗∗ = 0.
Basically, the point is the same as in Section 1.3.2. As attention to the state does
nothing for the voter in terms of selection, then for every conjectured γDB she best
responds allocating all the attention to the action (i.e., choosing q = α), and the
politician is conjecturing this correctly in equilibrium.












q (1− (α− q))
)











where the first part of the equation is simply the present part of the welfare function,
given by the policy choices of the current incumbent. Lemma D1.1 establishes that the
objective function is concave in q.




Proof of Lemma D1.1.
First note that (D1.2) can be simplified to
1
2
[1− δKq(1− (α− q)) + π + (1− π)δKq] + 1
4
π(1− π)(1− δKq) + Γ (D1.3)
Its second derivative with respect to q is given by
−δK − 1
2
π(1− π)δ2K < 0
as required.
From this I solve the optimization problem, giving the following result:
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Proposition D1.2 If K > π(1−π)2(α+π+απ(1−π)δ) then the ex ante optimal allocation of
attention is such that βex > 0 and qex < α.
Proof of Proposition D1.2.
Using lemma D1.1, it is sufficient to look at the first order conditions of (D1.3) for
maxima. Hence, the ex ante optimal q solves
−1
2
δK(1− α+ 2q) + 1
2
(1− π)δK + 1
4
π(1− π)δ(1− 2δKq)
This can be written as:
1
2
δK(α− π) + 1
4







As the RHS is strictly increasing in q and the RHS is strictly decreasing in q, the
maximum is unique.
To have equilibrium misallocation of attention, it is enough that the maximum is below
α, and this happens whenever LHS(q = α) < RHS(q = α). Replacing values from
above and writing solving for K, the condition simplifies to
K >
π(1− π)
2 (α+ π + απ(1− π)δ)
Intuitively, it may be that - even ex ante - it is optimal to allocate all the attention
to the action. However, Proposition D1.2 establishes that while the extreme allocation
always occurs in equilibrium, this may not be the case ex ante, if the positive effect of
β in reducing pandering is taken into account and sufficiently big.
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E1 Relaxing the assumptions of Section 1.3.2
If the explicit functional form assumed in 1.3 is replaced with a generic τC(q, β), the
condition for the negative semidefiniteness of the Hessian becomes
1
4








δK − τC ′′βq
)2
≥ 0
which holds as long as the second derivative of C(q, β) is sufficiently big everywhere.
Obviously, it is not possible to characterize closed form solutions for a generic cost
function.
Assumption 1.4 is a sufficiency one: it can be relaxed without losing the concavity.
Note that concavity is violated for sufficiently small values of τ . In this case, even
though the full analysis is complicated, it seems likely that the solution would move
toward β = q = 1.
F1 Attention, pandering and competence
Set up
This appendix tests the robustness of my result to a different class of political agency
models, where politicians differ in their level of competence rather than in their align-
ment with the interests of the voters. The set up I use is similar to Prat (2005)
and loosely based on Canes-Wrone et al (2001). In this appendix, st ∈ {A,B} with
Pr(st = A) = p >
1
2 , hence state A is the ex ante most likely state.
Politicians can be of two types: θ ∈ {H,L} where Pr(θ = H) = π. Both types have the
same utility as the consonant politician of the main body of the paper. The difference
here is that type H politicians are highly competent and they observe perfectly st
before taking the action. As a further simplification, I assume that H types always
choose xt = yt.
46. If θ = L, instead, the knowledge of the state is not perfect. Formally,
I assume that, rather than observing st, the politician observes a signal yt ∈ {A,B}
46This is equivalent to assuming that their distribution of u1 has a sufficiently high lower bound.
It simplifies a lot the equilibrium structure in the present set up, where the utility from matching the
state is random from the point of view of the voters. I cannot use a set up closer to Prat (2005) or
Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), where u is common knowledge, because the equilibrium with pandering
involves a mixed strategy where attention does not enter in the politician’s randomization.
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such that Pr(yt = st|θ = L) = g ∈ (p, 1) and Pr(yt = st|θ = H) = 1. Hence, yt is,
for the low type, informative about the true state and stronger than the prior (hence
Pr(st = B|yt = B) > Pr(st = A|yt = B)). Without re-election concerns, the low type
politician should just follow the signal. However, as noticed by Ashowrth and Shotts
(2010), the asymmetric burden of proofs implied by choosing the ex ante popular action
vis-a-vis the other one creates pandering incentives. Everything else is the same as in
the main body of the paper.
An equilibrium with pandering
Defining for simplicity the second period utility of a low quality politician V L2 =
gE(u2) + E and as γHy = Pr(x1 = A|θ = H, y1) and γLy = Pr(x1 = A|θ = L, y1),
I first derive sufficient conditions for an equilibrium with pandering.
Proposition F1.1 If γHA = 1, γ
H





(g+p−2pg)2 , there is a “pan-
dering equilibrium” where rA,∅ = 1, rB,∅ = 0, rA,A = 1, rB,A = 0, rB,B = 1 and
rA,B = 0, with γ
L
A = 1 and γ
L
B ∈ [0, 1).
Proof of Proposition F1.1.
First of all, note that as usual the voter keeps the incumbent if π̂x̃,s̃ > π. Moreover, by
Bayes’ rule,
π̂A,∅ ≥ π ⇒ pγHA + (1− p)γHB ≥ p(gγLA + (1− g)γLB) + (1− p)(gγLB + (1− g)γLA)
π̂B,∅ ≥ π ⇒ pγHA + (1− p)γHB ≤ p(gγLA + (1− g)γLB) + (1− p)(gγLB + (1− g)γLA)
π̂A,A ≥ π ⇒ γHA ≥ gγLA + (1− g)γLB
π̂B,A ≥ π ⇒ γHA ≤ gγLA + (1− g)γLB
π̂B,B ≥ π ⇒ γHB ≤ gγLB + (1− g)γLA
π̂A,B ≥ π ⇒ γHB ≥ gγLB + (1− g)γLA
Assuming that γHA = 1 and γ
H
B = 0, and hence focusing on the incentives of the low
type, define p̂y = Pr(s = A|y), that is, the updated beliefs on the state being A after
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signal realization y. Note that, as before, for generic values of q and β conjectured by
P,
γLA = Pr(EUP (x = A, y = A, θ = L) ≥ EUP (x = B, y = A, θ = L))
= Pr((2p̂A − 1)u1 ≥ V L2 [qβp̂A(rB,A − rA,A) + qβ(1− p̂A)(rB,B − rA,B)] +
+ V L2
[
q(1− β)(rB,∅ − rA,∅)
]
)
γLB = Pr(EUP (x = A, y = B, θ = L) ≥ EUP (x = B, y = B, θ = L))
= Pr((1− 2p̂B)u1 ≤ V L2 [qβ(1− p̂B)(rA,B − rB,B) + qβp̂B(rA,A − rB,A)] +
+ V L2
[
q(1− β)(rA,∅ − rB,∅)
]
)
Given the (candidate) equilibrium re-election strategies outlined above, we have that





V L2 (1− 2β(1− p̂B))
]
Given P’s actions, it is clear that π̂B,B > π and π̂A,A > π. However, π̂A,∅ > π requires
γLB <
(2p−1)(1−g)





(g+p−2pg)2 guarantees that this is
the case for every q and β.47







e(1− p̂B)) if βe ≤ 12(1−p̂B)
0 if βe > 12(1−p̂B)
where p̂B = Pr(s = A|y = B) = (1−g)pp+g−2gp .
It is now possible to write down the utility function that V maximizes when choosing
attention. Defining VH and VL the expected period 2 payoff from having a high or low
47Note that, with those re-election strategies, relaxing the assumption about the high type always




qV H2 (1− 2β)
]
, that is not necessarily zero.
Moreover, it is not easy to compare γHB and γ
L
B , because on the one hand 1 − 2β < 1 − 2β(1 − p̂B),
but on the other hand V H2 = E(u2) + E > V L2 , as the high type does not make mistakes in period 2.
Hence, transforming the high quality politician into a signal-abiding robot allows me to avoid all those
case-by-case complications focusing on the interaction of attention and pandering incentives.
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quality politician in power in that period, Γ = πVH + (1− π)VL and ∆V = VH − VL =
δ(1− g), V chooses q and β to maximize:
π + (1− π)
[
g − (g − p)γLB
]
+ qβ[Pr(x = B, s = B)(π̂B,BVH + (1− π̂B,B)VL)+
+Pr(x = A, s = A)(π̂A,AVH+(1−π̂A,A)VL)+(1−Pr(x = A, s = A)−Pr(x = B, s = B))Γ]+
+q(1−β)
[




The first part of (F1.1) is the present welfare and the rest is the expected period 2
welfare (taking into account re-election strategies) and finally the attention cost (on
which I keep the same assumptions as in the rest of the paper). Collecting terms in qβ
and in q, applying Bayes’ rule and substituting in γHA = 1, γ
H
B = 0 and γ
L
A = 1, this
can be simplified as
π + (1− π)
[









π(1− π)∆V ((2p− 1)(1− g)− γLB(p(1− g) + (1− p)g))
]
+ Γ− τC(q, β) (F1.2)
Obviously, γLB is to be treated exogenously when deriving the equilibrium level of
attention and endogenously in the ex ante case. The maximization with respect to
two different variables and the non linearity of the resulting system of two first order
conditions, together with the kink in γLB, imply that there are some serious tractability
issues.
However, there are already some interesting results. First of all, the effect of q and β
on pandering (captured by γLB in this case) is analogous to the main body of the paper
(as long as γLB is positive). Attention to the action increases pandering while attention
to the state reduces it. Moreover, pandering has a negative effect on present welfare
and it is easy to show that as long as γLB is positive, the effect of pandering on future
welfare is negative as well. Note that this second effect can be decomposed in two parts:
when both the action and the state are observed pandering is useful for selection, as
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it consists in the low quality incumbent choosing the wrong action (and hence he can
be spotted and replaced). Instead, when only the action is observed, pandering affects
selection negatively, as it makes the low quality incumbent more similar to the high
quality one. For sufficiently low β, and importantly for every β such that pandering
happens with positive probability, the negative effect dominates.
Given this, the basic effects of the different types of attention captured by the paper
are robust to this different model of political agency: the equilibrium choice focuses on
selection, ignoring the indirect effect of the two types of attention on pandering, and as
a consequence there is a tendency to choose too high a level of attention to the actions
and too small a level of attention to the state of the world.
Whether this happens or not in the equilibrium allocation depends on cross-effects as
well, and in this set up they can be quite complex, in the ex ante optimal choice. An
important difference from the model used in the main body of the paper is that any
complementarity between the two types of attention comes from the selection part of
the welfare function, rather than from the first period part. The reason is that there is
not good pandering in this set up, as the sole pandering is that of the low quality player
ignoring relevant information for re-election concerns. Hence, knowing the state on top
of the action helps in selecting a better period 2 incumbent. In contrast, discouraging
pandering makes this ability to select on the basis of both action and state less effective,
as it makes the low quality politician more similar to the high quality type.
Generally speaking, the importance of those cross-effects makes the general problem
with endogenous attention difficult to solve fully. Cross effects are simple in the case
of the fixed (and free) amount of attention to be allocated, hence it is clear from
there that the equilibrium q is higher than the ex ante optimal level and hence the
equilibrium β is too low (but not zero, as this is a feature of a model of political agency
with “ideological” incumbent, that sometimes has interests aligned with the consonant
politician). Given the tractability issues outlined above, I leave the full solution of the
model with costly endogenous allocation of the two types of attention (the equivalent
of section 1.3.2) to further research, focusing here on the tractable fixed amount of
attention case. However, it is possible to show through numerical simulation that
there are parameter values where the cross effects are sufficiently strong to lead to
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equilibrium over-attention with respect to both the action and the state.
Fixed total level of attention
As in Appendix D1, I assume that q+β = 1, that is, V allocates a fixed (and free) unit
of attention between action and state. As a consequence, substituting the constraint




W = q(1− q)
[





π(1− π)∆V ((2p− 1)(1− g)− γLB(p(1− g) + (1− p)g))
]
+ Γ
taking γLB as given. Note that, defining q







e(1− 2(1− qe)(1− p̂B)) if qe ≥ q̄
0 if qe < q̄
where q̄ = g−p2(1−p)g .
First of all, I implicitly characterize the equilibrium attention choice.
Lemma F1.1 The equilibrium level of attention is unique, strictly positive and given
by:






















Proof of Lemma F1.1.





< 0. As a consequence, any interior equilibrium is,















π(1− π)∆V ((2p− 1)(1− g)− γLB(q∗)(p(1− g) + (1− p)g))
]
.
The LHS of (F1.3) is flat in q below q̄ and then it is increasing, while the RHS is
always strictly increasing and both are continuous everywhere with a kink at q = q̄.
Obviously LHS(q = 0) > 0 = RHS(q = 0). Moreover, by substitution it is easy to see











∂q when q ≥ q̄ is 2(1− p)g(1− 2q)− (p+ q− 2pq) ≤ 0. Noticing that q has
to be at least g−p2(1−p)g , the condition simplifies to p− g, which is always negative.





(p+g−2pg)(p+g−2pg+2g(1−p)) . As a consequence, there is one interior





solution is q = 1.
Define q∗ as the equilibrium level of attention to the action. Looking now at the ex
ante case, it is quite clear that the objective function has a kink at q = q̄. However,
the problem is concave both above and below the kink, hence the maximum is either
at one of the corners or at the kink, or it can be obtained via first order conditions.
The objective function, using (F1.2), is
˜̃̃
W ex = P (γLB(q)) + q(1− q)H(γLB(q)) + qQ(γLB(q)) + Γ (F1.4)
where P (γLB(q)) = π+(1−π)
[
g − (g − p)γLB
]
and H(γLB(q)) and Q(γ
L
B(q)) are as above.
Of course now V can differentiate with respect to γLB as well. The next proposition
summarizes the findings, showing that the equilibrium level of attention to the action
is never too low. It can only be the right level or too high, depending on parameters of
the model. As a consequence, the equilibrium level of attention to the state can only
be either correct or too low.
Proposition F1.2 There is never equilibrium under-attention to the action. In par-
ticular:
1. If parameters are such that q∗ ≤ q̄, the ex ante optimal level of attention is the
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same as the equilibrium level;
2. If parameters are such that q∗ ∈ (q̄, 1), there is equilibrium over-attention to the
state and under-attention to the action;
3. If parameters are such that q∗ = 1, there is equilibrium over-attention to the
state and under-attention to the action as long as the ex ante optimal level of q
is interior. Otherwise, the equilibrium level of attention and the ex ante optimal
one are the same.
Proof of Proposition F1.2.
First of all, from Equation (F1.4), the second order conditions are trivially satisfied if










































< 0 implies −(g − p)(1 −
qπδ(1− g)(g − p))− q2π2(1− p)δ(1− g)g < 0 that is always true.
Moreover, from the derivation on the different slopes of the RHS and LHS of the
equilibrium fixed point condition, I know that ∂∂q (H + Q − 2qH) < 0. A sufficient




















∂q < 0. Taking into account that, for q ≥ q̄,
∂γLB
∂q > 0, this requires (1 − π)π∆V (g −
p)− 2q(1− π)π2(1− p)∆V g < 0. The condition simplifies to
4(1− p)gq > (g − p) (F1.5)
Noticing that I am considering the case of q ≥ q̄ (for q < q̄ concavity is trivially
satisfied), I substitute q = g−p2(1−p)g in (F1.5). This simplifies to 2 > 1.
In terms of comparison between the equilibrium attention allocation and the ex ante
optimal choice, we consider different cases. For q ≤ q̄, the equation that defines the
equilibrium and the first order condition of the ex ante maximization are exactly the
same, because γLB = 0. For q > q̄, the equilibrium solves H + Q = 2qH and the ex
ante optimum solves H +Q+Z = 2qH, with Z < 0. So, the LHS of the equation that
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defines the ex ante optimal attention is the same as the equilibrium equation for q ≤ q̄
and strictly below the other one otherwise, while the RHS is always the same.
As a consequence, if parameters are such that q∗ ≤ q̄, then this would be the solution
of the ex ante maximization as well. If instead parameters are such that q∗ ∈ (q̄, 1),
then the ex ante optimal attention to the action is smaller than the equilibrium one
(the RHS is the same but the LHS is smaller because of Z) and as a consequence the
ex ante optimal attention to the state is higher than the equilibrium choice.
Finally, if parameters are such that q∗ = 1, it can be either that H(q = 1) + Q(q =
1) + Z(q = 1) < 2H(q = 1), so the ex ante optimal attention to the action is smaller
than the equilibrium level, or that H(q = 1) +Q(q = 1) + Z(q = 1) ≥ 2H(q = 1) and
the two allocations are identical.
65
Chapter 2




A free media has been seen as a powerful guarantor of political accountability, both
theoretically (e.g. Besley 2006) and empirically (e.g. Ferraz and Finan 2008, Snyder
and Stromberg 2010). However, the media may be powerful enough to determine an
electoral outcome and to promote a bad candidate, even when voters are fully rational
and “Bayesian” (Prat 2014, Anderson and McLaren 2012, Enikolopov et al. 2011). As
a consequence, an incumbent politician may be interested in controlling what media
outlets report, to present a positive image to voters and to stay in power. This paper
looks at the effect of competition in influencing the incentives towards media capture,
with novel results.
The current literature stresses the positive effect of competition on media freedom:
increasing the number of outlets means that the bad politician has more publishers to
deal with, so capture is more costly. However, there is a more subtle effect, because the
competitive pressure decreases profits, and firms with smaller financial margins may
be more willing to sacrifice editorial independence for political money.1 Hence, they
1Although in a different context (i.e. advertisement driven media bias), this is consistent with the
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are cheaper to capture.
Overall, the direction of this trade off is not trivial: the “positive” view of the role of
competition in deterring capture can be questioned if more competition means smaller
(and financially weaker) media outlets, less able to inform the public opinion and to
resist to political pressure. Media outlets may be more numerous, but are they freer?
Under some conditions, more competition can actually harm the media’s independence
from political influence, as the empirical section of this paper suggests. This highlights
the need for a deeper understanding of the forces behind this trade off.
This paper makes two contributions: on the empirical side, it is the first2 to point out
the existence of a robust negative relationship between competition in the media market
and media freedom from political influence. On the theoretical side, the model provides
an explanation for the counter-intuitive empirical results, showing that potential risks
to media independence from the political power are high not only when competition
is too little, but also when it is too much. Moreover, the model highlights that the
standard “positive” result of competition and capture relies on restrictive assumptions
about voters’ behaviour and media outlets’ profits. From a policy perspective, both the
empirics and the theory stress the risk, in terms of editorial independence, of excessive
competition in the media sector.
More specifically, the theoretical model is a natural extension of the seminal contribu-
tion by Besley and Prat (2006). It shows that, relaxing some of the assumptions in a
fairly natural way,3 high competition is actually bad for media freedom, as the cost of
media capture is driven to zero as the number of outlets goes to infinity. Moreover, the
relationship can be non-monotonic, overall, meaning that media capture occurs when
competition is either very weak or very strong. Intuitively, increasing the number of
media outlets can make capture overall more expensive for the politician, as long as the
number of outlets that need to be silenced increases in the same way, and the politi-
cian pays monopoly profits to every captured outlet. But competition has a decreasing
results of Beattie et al. (2017), where they show that online competition for advertisement increases
media bias.
2To the best of the author’s knowledge.
3In this paper, voters are allowed to be heterogeneous in their interest for politically related news
and profits are convex in readership. Note that I refer to readers as consumers of media contents
for simplicity. However, the paper is agnostic with respect to the type of media firm (newspapers,
televisions, websites etc).
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effect on the influence that each individual outlet has on voters: basically, with more
competition every outlet is able to inform a smaller fraction of the electorate. In fact,
even established media outlets have limits in their ability to inform voters, as the recent
spreading of fake news highlights. Hence, when there are enough outlets, the politician
may be willing to allow for some free media outlets, since they will not be powerful
enough to change electoral outcomes. This decreases the profits that captured outlet
would make by rejecting the bribe from the politician, hence they are cheaper. The
overall effect of this trade off induced by competition (more outlets to be silenced, but
each of the is cheaper) depends on the relationship between readership and profits.
When it is convex (I provide a micro-foundation where media market is modelled as
a two sided one) then I show the existence of an equilibrium where high competition
makes capture cheaper, overall.
This result may sound surprising and somewhat counter-intuitive. But does it also
make sense in the real world? Of course, it is very hard to measure media capture
empirically, since “influence” is difficult to measure (and it can be generated in many
different ways: from bribing to buying advertising space). The empirical section of this
paper suggests that high competition in the mass media market is strongly correlated
with a reduction in media freedom from political influence. The identification strategy
exploits the staggered digitization of terrestrial television in Europe: a technological
change that allowed for a more efficient use of the spectrum and, hence, for the entry
of new players in the market. In an event study analysis, this paper shows that the
sign of the relationship between digitization (and hence competition) and the freedom
of the media from political influence is negative and strongly significant. And this
happens precisely in countries with high level of pre-treatment competition, suggesting
that media capture is easier in those places.
Also, importantly, it is possible to find anecdotal confirmation for the two steps lead-
ing to this result: firstly, competition has a negative effect on outlets’ profitability.
Secondly, financially weak outlets may be more willing to accept political influence.4
4Additional anecdotal evidence comes from Drago et al. (2014). They find that the entry of
newspapers increases the re-election probability of the incumbent: this is at odds with Besley and
Prat (2006), but it is consistent with the results of this paper. Moreover, they find that “competition
matters”, meaning that the effect of entry does not disappear as more newspapers participate in the
market, and in this model I will try to go into more depth than the standard monopoly versus duopoly
approach.
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For the first step, Cagé (2014) has precise estimations about the effects of an exoge-
nous increase in media competition on profitability, noticing that “entry reduces the
circulation of incumbent newspapers by nearly 25%”, and this implies a 20 to 36 per
cent reduction in revenues, 14 to 29 per cent reduction in size and a 9 to 13 per cent
reduction in the share of hard news. Moving to the second step, many different sources
show that the media is more easily influenced when revenues are low. The 2015 edition
of the Media Sustainability Index (IREX 2015), for example, stresses that “[o]verall the
issue seems to be that media have been weakened by a poor economy and been preyed
upon by political money, or political pressure has weakened the economic environment
in which media operate, thus making it easier for political money to distort the mar-
ket and put independent media at a strong disadvantage” (IREX 2015, p. ix, italics
added). One example is Bulgaria, where “most traditional media operate at a financial
loss, which leads to compromises with editorial independence. With few exceptions,
the big advertisers enjoy complete media support. As public institutions remain the
biggest advertisers, any government regardless of its political affiliation receives media
support” (IREX 2015, p. xi, italics added). Others are Albania,5 FYR of Macedonia6
and Turkey7.
In the theoretical model, voters act as principal while the incumbent (of good or bad
type) is the agent. Media outlets may receive a common, verifiable signal about the
type of the incumbent, and may be bribed by the bad politician not to reveal it. Hence,
outlets face a trade off between publishing the signal and enjoying the higher audience-
related revenues and accepting the politician’s bribe instead. In contrast to the basic
version of Besley and Prat (2006), in this paper not all the voters are interested in
politically related news, hence not all of them will become aware of the incumbent’s
5The website worldaudit.org points out the risk of political influence on financially weak media in
Albania: “many independent media outlets are hampered by a lack of revenue. Publishers and media
owners tend to dictate editorial policy based on political and economic affiliations, which, together
with the employment insecurity journalists face, nurtures a culture of self-censorship”.
6According to fairpress.eu (Iloska 2014), the country is characterized by a “large number of broadcast
and print outlets in comparison with its population size”. Despite this, “Macedonian media are subject
to severe interference and political pressure. [...] In the last few years the Government was regularly
criticized for its liberal use of promotional advertising, leading to increased financial dependence of
media and increasing the number of outlets that favour its position”.
7The Turkish newspaper “Today’s Zaman” (Zibak 2015) recently claimed that “the diversity and
abundance of media outlets in Turkey do not necessarily guarantee the presence of a free, independent
and pluralistic media”. This highlights two things: on the one hand, the existence of free media even
in a country with potentially serious problems of media capture; on the other hand, the fact that a
very competitive market is not enough to avoid these problems.
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type if only a small fraction of the outlets is publishing the signal. Moreover, audience-
related revenues are not constrained to be linear in readership. This allows me to check
the robustness of the results to different specifications of the profit function, noticing
that a profit function convex in readership can emerge from a media market modelled
as a two-sided one, where outlets are selling content to the readers and advertising
space to a monopolist advertiser, who seeks to place advertisements where the readers
are.
In this setting, increasing the number of outlets increases the number of players that
the incumbent politician may want to silence (as in Besley and Prat 2006), but it
may also reduce the cost of capture by reducing the “business-as-usual” profits for
captured outlets,8 which would have to compete with more subjects and hence attract
lower audience-related rents. As a consequence, they are more willing to sacrifice
their independence in exchange for money. When the profit function is convex in the
readership, as the number of outlets goes to infinity, there exists an equilibrium where
media competition makes capture easier.
This result follows from the combined effect of the two modifications highlighted before.
First of all, when the politician does not need to capture the whole industry, the bribe
he has to pay to each captured outlet is no longer the monopoly profits, but it is
reduced by the competition effect. As the number of outlets increases, the readership
gains from publishing the signal are divided with more and more free outlets, hence
the individual bribe to be paid becomes smaller. However, at the same time, there are
more outlets to be silenced. The total cost of capture is simply the product between the
number of outlets to be silenced and the individual bribe and, when the profit function
is convex in the readership, the “reduction in bribe” effect prevails on the “increasing
in number” one, reducing the total cost of capture as the number of outlets goes to
infinity. Note that both modifications are necessary.9
On top of this, the model shows conditions on the parameters where the relationship
is non-monotonic, i.e. capture happens when competition is either too little or too
8I.e. the profits that each captured outlet would make by rejecting the bribe and publishing the
signal.
9The online appendix of Besley and Prat (2006) considers an extension where the politician does
not need to capture the whole industry, pointing out that this does not change the result. This happens
precisely because the linearity assumption on the profit function is maintained.
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much. Essentially, this happens when an increase in competition, keeping constant
the number of free outlets, increases the total cost of capture (because the politician
has to silence more of them). But, at some point, more competition implies that the
politician can allow some outlets to be free. Hence, the reduction in the “business-as-
usual” profits kicks in and, as competition goes to infinity, the total cost of capture
goes to zero. Finally, since the voters’ ex ante welfare is strictly decreasing in the ex
ante probability of successful media capture, the effect of competition on welfare can
be negative as well.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the related
literature. Section 2.3 presents an empirical analysis of the digitization of terrestrial
television in Europe which, by showing a negative effect of competition on media free-
dom, motivates the theoretical part of the paper. Section 2.4 describes the setting of
the model and comments on the main assumption, while I derive the equilibrium and its
consequences on welfare in section 2.5. Section 2.6 provides a two-sided market based
microfoundation for the profit function used in the basic model and 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
This paper contributes to different branches of the economic literature, from the polit-
ical economy of mass media, to the economic regulation of the media market. There is
particular attention on media capture and on the effects that media competition has
on political outcomes via media capture.
The relationship between media and politics has been widely studied in the political
economy literature, and detailed and comprehensive reviews are provided by Prat and
Strömberg (2013), Strömberg (2015), Gentzkow et al. (2016) and Puglisi and Snyder
(2016).
Media capture can be seen as a particular way of endogenizing supply-driven media
bias,10 with the important difference that, in media capture models, the political pref-
10The vast political economy literature on media acknowledges the existence of a demand driven
media bias as well. See, for example, Strömberg (2004), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006), Bernhardt et al. (2008), Chan and Stone (2013), Andina-Diaz and Garcia-Martinez
(2016). Models of supply driven media bias (but without an explicit model of media capture) are for
example Baron (2006), Anderson and McLaren (2012), Duggan and Martinelli (2011) and Prat (2014),
Hafer et al. (2017), Levy et al. (2017).
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erences of media outlets are endogenous, and hence determined and constrained by
the parameters of the game. Generally speaking, competition is seen as sometimes
problematic in models of demand-driven bias, while the current literature considers it
a good deterrent in the case of supply-driven bias.
Prat (2016) offers a good summary of the literature on media capture. The seminal
paper is Besley and Prat (2006): the basic framework of their model is the starting
point for the model in this paper. Given the necessity of capturing the whole industry,
in equilibrium the politician will either silence every outlet or none of them, and has
to pay monopoly profits to each of them. As a consequence, the cost of media capture
(and hence politicians’ turnover and voters’ welfare) monotonically increases in the
number of outlets.
Petrova (2008) and Corneo (2006) look at media capture too, in cases where the cap-
turing entities are interest groups or particular factions of society. Drufuca (2014)
extends Besley and Prat (2006), endogenizing voters’ informational choices, but she
does not focus on the effects of competition and the market structure. Vaidya and
Gupta (2016) study the effect of media competition on corruption via media capture,
finding a mixed result: when the probability that bad news about the incumbent can
be discredited is sufficiently high, then it may be cheaper to capture a duopoly than a
monopoly, while the opposite is true when the probability is low. However, this result
is obtained in a setting where signals are not perfect and voters are not fully ratio-
nal, meaning that they ignore the possibility of interactions between the politician and
media outlets. Gehlbach and Sonin (2014) look at the link between media bias and a
continuous outcome that the government is interested in – political “mobilization”11
- while Kibris and Kocak (2017) look at how the presence of social media can make
capture more or less effective.
It is difficult to find empirical evidence for media capture from the politicians, since
it is neither visible nor precisely defined. A very recent review of empirical research
on media capture is in Enikolopov and Petrova (2016). Their overall finding is that
competition helps in reducing media capture, even if the method for testing the presence
11The modelling strategy of this paper shares with Gehlbach and Sonin (2014) the importance given
to a precise structure for the advertising market, related to readership. It takes it further by modelling
it in a precise two-sided setting. However, the political setting is quite different (and closer to Besley
and Prat 2006) since it does not assume a particular “bad” nature of the government, and citizens are
interested in being governed by a “good” type.
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of media capture is generally indirect.12
Probably the most direct insights on how media capture works come from McMillan
and Zoido’s (2004) study on Fujimori’s media control mechanism in Perù, showing
the huge costs he had to pay to silence media channels (with respect to members of
congress or judges), and from Szeidl and Szucs (2017), pointing out that media capture,
in Hungary, occurs through advertisement misallocation. Di Tella and Franceschelli
(2011) find a negative correlation between advertisements bought by the government
and the space dedicated to scandals in Argentinian newspapers, while Hamilton (2004)
relates the emergence of independent (rather than politically affiliated) newspapers to
the increasingly important advertising market. Petrova (2011) has a similar result.
Finally, Petrova (2008) finds empirical support for the theory that media freedom is
decreasing in income inequality in democracies.
Looking at a different type of capture (from advertisers rather than from politicians)
Beattie et al. (2017) find that newspapers tend to provide less coverage of car recalls
when they involve their advertisers, and that this effect is mitigated by competition in
the number of outlets but exacerbated by competition for advertisement.
This paper is distinguished from standard models of media capture because it looks
more closely at the media market. In particular, this model is related to those stressing
the importance of the “two-sidedness” of the market of media (Argentesi and Ivaldi
2005)13 and of the role of the advertising market, highlighted for example in Germano
and Meier (2013) and Blasco et al. (2015).
Finally, this paper adds to the literature on media market regulation. Since there is
no general agreement about what a “healthy” broadcasting sector is (Seabright and
von Hagen 2007), this paper highlights that the role of competition, in the context of
media capture, may be more complex than the standard answer given by the political
economy literature.14
12For example, Galvis et al. 2016 looks at the effect of competition on media bias in US late 19th
century newspapers. This can be due to political capture, but it is more generic than that.
13Ellman and Germano (2009), for example, use a two-sided market model in order to see the
effect of the advertising industry on media bias, while Godes et al. (2009) and Dukes (2006) use a
two-sided model to study how media competition affects pricing strategies and content quality choices
respectively. This paper “incorporates” their approach (media outlets selling copies to the readers,
i.e. competing on prices, and advertising space to the advertisers, i.e. competing on quantity) in a
standard media capture political agency framework.
14In particular, Polo (2005) studies whether market incentives are powerful enough to guarantee
internal and external pluralism in the media market, finding that the differentiation triggered by
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Outside the formal economic modelling, Hollifield (2006) highlights the possibility of
a reverse-U shaped relationship between competition and journalistic performance,
listing many different channels that may contribute to it. In contrast to that paper,
this work focuses solely on media capture, deriving the non-monotonic relationship as a
result of a formal, game theoretical model and looking directly at the effects of political
and commercial forces.
2.3 Suggestive Empirical Evidence
The empirical identification of a causal effect of competition on media capture is prob-
lematic. Firstly, media capture is rarely explicitly observed and recorded. Secondly,
the effect of competition in the media market on political outcomes is normally iden-
tified using local variations in the number of media outlets (e.g. Drago et al. 2014,
Cagé 2014, Galvis et al. 2016), but media capture (or its proxy: media freedom from
political influence) is measured at the national level. Hence, instead of using local
variations, this paper exploits the staggered implementation, at a country level, of the
digitization of terrestrial television, i.e. a policy that was expected to increase the level
of competition in the TV market.
As the timing of digitization is decided by each different government, the identification
is not perfect, but it is the best that can be done given the restrictions on the outcome
variable. I find strong evidence of a robust negative correlation between digitization
and media freedom, and anecdotal evidence highlighting the positive relationship be-
tween digitization and competition. Moreover, splitting the sample between countries
with above- and below-average levels of pre-treatment competition in the TV mar-
ket15 shows that this effect comes precisely from those countries with a high level of
the market does not necessarily extend to political views, and that internal pluralism is limited by
the personal interests of the media owner, while Torrens (2014) looks into the optimal media market
structure from a normative perspective, taking into account the possibility of media capture and finding
the same results as in Besley and Prat (2006). The basic welfare trade-off is given by the fact that,
in his model, more media outlets imply a lower probability of capture but also higher fixed costs to
be supported without an increase in the amount of information available. It is interesting to note,
however, that Torrens’ (2014) main effect of the number of outlets on the possibility of capture is
analogous to Besley and Prat (2006) precisely because he shares the same assumption about the fact
that a single media outlet publishing the news is enough to inform the whole electorate.
15Competition is measured as the Herfindahl index calculated using the annual average daily audi-
ence market share of the top eight TV channels. Unfortunately, the current dataset does not allow me
to keep track of the ownership structure of those channels, or of their content.
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competition, while it is not statistically different from zero in low pre-treatment com-
petition countries. In other words, too much competition seems to be correlated with
a reduction in freedom of the media from political influence, making capture easier.
2.3.1 Background
Terrestrial television is one of three main modes for transmitting television signals (the
other two are satellite and cable). It is the oldest technology and it is based on radio
waves. Until the end of the 20th century, terrestrial television was based on analogue
transmission that allowed for a limited number of frequencies and hence, a limited
number of TV channels. Technological innovation made possible the digitization of
terrestrial television, allowing for a more efficient use of the spectrum16 and, as a
consequence, an increase in the number of TV channels that can be transmitted.
Over the first decade of the 21st century, some countries started to replace analogue
terrestrial signals with digital ones. In order to harmonize the process within the
Continent, the European Commission17 (EC) set 2012 as the deadline for the full
replacement of analogue terrestrial signals with digital terrestrial signals. This process
was supposed to reduce transmission costs, free up frequencies and give consumers a
wider choice of TV channels.
The positive relationship between terrestrial digitization and competition in the mass
media market has been mentioned by multiple sources. For example, Barone et al.
(2015) notice that Italy had 78 new free to air channels after the transition, “51 of
which have no ties with Berlusconi or the public network” (Barone et al. 2015, p.
33), implying that new players are entering in the market. The aforementioned EC
communication mentions the increased number of alternatives for consumers, while
Kenny et al. (2014) stress the “key role” of digital terrestrial television in securing
competition between platforms and content providers.
The empirical strategy exploits the implementation of this European decision to find
something as close as possible to the causal effect of digitization of terrestrial television
on media freedom from political influence. The fact that digitization happened in a
16Technically, multiplexes are able to “squeeze” multiple signals in a smaller space, freeing frequen-
cies for other signals and other multiplexes.
17COM(2005) 204.
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staggered way between countries is important, with some countries starting the process
earlier than others. Figure 2.1 gives an idea of the staggered process, plotting the
cumulative number of countries that started digitization as a function of time. Overall,
the analysis is a reduced form one, looking at the direct effect of digitization on media
freedom in an event study set up.
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Cumulative number of countries that started the digitization process over time
2.3.2 Empirical strategy
The switch over process took place in a staggered way between and within EU coun-
tries,18 with some regions switching off the analogue terrestrial signal earlier than oth-
ers. Hence, thanks to the EU Commission deadline, every EU country is treated, while
the staggered implementation allows me to exploit a quasi-experimental set up with
an event study approach, where the treatment intensity (i.e. the portion of terrestrial
television that has already been digitalized) varies over time.
The treatment variable is the penetration of digital terrestrial television, i.e. the num-
ber of households receiving TV signals primarily through digital terrestrial over the
18On average, there are more than 5 years between the launch of the first digital terrestrial signal
in a country and the cessation of analogue terrestrial signals, i.e. the end of the replacement process.
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Note, however, that this treatment is basically the composition of two different effects.
First of all, the staggered implementation within countries implies that the replacement
ratio, i.e. the fraction of terrestrial television households already receiving digital
terrestrial television (DTT), is different at different points in time, and moving between
0 (before the launch of digital terrestrial television) and 1 (when all analogue terrestrial
signals are switched off). Define the implementation part of the treatment as Ii,t =
DTTi,t
TerrTVi,t
, where DTTi,t and TerrTVi,t are the number of households receiving digital
terrestrial television and the number of households receiving terrestrial television19 in
country i at time t respectively.
Secondly, the fraction of the population affected by the reform is different in different
EU countries. The reform only affects the digital terrestrial television, so its impact
depends on the number of households using primarily terrestrial television, rather than
cable or satellite TV. This number is heterogeneous amongst EU countries: some are
traditionally “cable” countries (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands), while others
are traditionally “terrestrial” countries (e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain). Figure 2.2 shows
the penetration of terrestrial television in Europe in 1997.
Moreover, the fraction of households receiving primarily terrestrial television (rather
than cable or satellite) changes over time. Formally, the population affected by the















= Ii,t ∗ PAi,t
Given the precision of the data it is not possible to disentangle the two parts of the
treatment.20 However, the results are robust to different ways of measuring the treat-
19I.e. the total number of households minus those receiving TV signals via cable, satellite and those
not having a television.
20In particular, the EAO yearbooks contain a measure of digital terrestrial penetration, but not of
terrestrial penetration. This can be obtained as a residual once the number of households receiving
primarily cable and satellite is subtracted from the total number of households with a television, but
77
Figure 2.2: Terrestrial television penetration in 1997
Terrestrial television penetration, in per cent of households with a television, in 1997. The
remainder is cable and satellite.
ment (dummy times pre-treatment population affected, as in Card 1992), as discussed
in Appendix A2. The main specification used is
mfi,t = λi + µt + β1DTTpenetrationi,t + γ
′
xi,t + εi,t (2.1)
wheremfi,t is the Freedom House media freedom from political influence score, DTTpenetrationi,t
is defined above21 and λi and µt are country and time fixed effects, xi,t is a vector of
time-varying control variables (log of GDP per capita, corruption perception index and
low/unique chamber electoral years) and εi,t is the error term.
In practice, I am comparing the level of media freedom from political influence at
different stages of the implementation process, and weighting this effect by the fraction
this variable is extremely noisy, with some peculiar results (e.g. a supposedly negative number of
terrestrial television households). This is probably due to different measurement methods for cable
and satellite penetration. An exception is the terrestrial penetration in 1997, provided directly by the
1998 Statistical Yearbook.
21Given the fact that there are some discrepancies in the data, I use two different measures of
DTT penetration. One is calculated manually by dividing the number of households using primarily
terrestrial television by the total number of households, both coded using observations from the most
recent yearbook available. The other is directly provided in each yearbook and I use, for every year,
the observation coming from the next yearbook (i.e. the closest one). In this paper, I report the results
using the former, but almost nothing changes if I use the latter.
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of population affected by the reform. In this set up β1, under the assumption of parallel
pre-trends and no other policies changing at the same time, measures the causal effect
of the digitization of terrestrial television on media freedom.
The main threat to this identification strategy is from the endogeneity of the digiti-
zation decision at a country level. In other words, every EU country had to complete
the switch over process, but the timing was decided by national governments. Ways to
address this concern are discussed in section 2.3.5.
2.3.3 Data
The newly assembled dataset of 28 EU countries combines data from two main sources:
Freedom House and the European Audiovisual Observatory. Media freedom from po-
litical influence is measured using the score of the political environment from the “Free-
dom of the Press” index produced every year by the American NGO Freedom House.
The score goes from 1 to 40 22 and evaluates the level of media freedom from political
influence in every country, leaving aside economic and legal constraints on what the
media is able to report on.23
All the variables about television signal penetration and the European audiovisual mar-
ket (number of households, number of households receiving primarily digital terrestrial
television, percentage of DTT penetration, terrestrial, cable and satellite penetration in
1997, country by country DTT launch year and year of completed switch off of analogue
signal, daily audience market share of the biggest 8 TV channels, total expenditure on
TV advertising) come from the European Audiovisual Observatory yearbooks (1998
edition to 2015 edition). The level of competition in the television market is measured
using the Herfindahl Index, using the daily audience market share of the biggest eight
channels per country per year.
In addition I collected data for GDP per capita (from the UNESCO Institute for
Statistics), corruption (using the corruption perception index from Transparency In-
ternational) and a dummy equal to 1 for electoral years in the lower/unique legislative
22The original score measures the level of influence, hence 0 is a country whose media sector is
completely free from political influence and 40 is a country with the highest possible level of influence.
However, to give a more intuitive interpretation to the outcome variable as a measure of media freedom,
I use 41-original score.
23These are captured by the other two environments.
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chambers (from the International Foundation for Electoral System). Table 2.1 summa-
rizes these variables.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Media freedom 392 32.844 3.788 20 40
# of households 392 7339.625 9859.954 118 40129
DTT penetration (%) 379 12.414 17.608 0 77.83
Households with DTT 379 1206.19 3073.866 0 17690
GDP per capita 391 29522.6 13775.04 6507.8 97661.94
Corruption 387 6.293 1.863 2.6 9.9
Election year 392 0.263 0.441 0 1
Herfindahl audience 354 1345.314 560.616 397 3674.93
TV adverts 373 1067.308 1544.048 7 6201
Media freedom is 41 minus the Freedom of the Press score for the Environment B; # of households is the
number of households, DTT penetration (%) is the penetration of terrestrial digital calculated using the most
recent observation available, Households with DTT is the raw number of households receiving DTT calculated
using the most recent observation. GDP per capita is in PPP at current international dollars. Corruption is
the Corruption Perception Index, Election year is 1 if elections have been hold for the lower or for the unique
chamber of the Parliament (whichever applies). Herfindahl audience uses the daily audience share of the 8
biggest TV channels; TV adverts is the expenditure for TV advertising (mill. of Euro).
2.3.4 Results
The results of regression (2.1) are summarized in Table 2.2.24 I first estimate the pure
fixed effect regression, without any control. Columns (2)-(4) show that the treatment
effect is not affected by the inclusion of different controls.25 Wild bootstrapped stan-
dard errors are added to take into account the low number of clusters, and results with
group specific time trends are presented in Appendix A2.
Interestingly, a policy change that increases media competition is associated with
a decrease in media freedom from political influence. Moreover, this result is only
marginally affected by the introduction of different control variables. In terms of mag-
nitude, a one standard deviation increase in digital terrestrial penetration is associated
with a decrease in media freedom from political influence of 0.12 standard deviations.
This result is already at odds with the existing theoretical literature on media capture
and competition. To better understand what is driving it, I split the sample between
24Reported results are estimated with a standard OLS regression, hence treating the discrete out-
come variable as a continuous one, given that it takes 40 values. This is consistent with the literature
(e.g. Petrova 2008).
25I do not control for our measure of competition and for our measure of advertisement expenditures
because they are potential outcomes of the treatment.
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Table 2.2: Regression results, main specification
Dep. variable: media freedom
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DTT penetration −0.027 −0.026 −0.025 −0.025
(0.013)∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗
[0.014]∗ [0.012]∗∗ [0.012]∗∗ [0.012]∗∗






Time FE Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y
N 379 377 373 373
R2 0.483 0.457 0.466 0.467
Dependent variable: media freedom score. DTT penetration uses the most re-
cent observation. Column 1 is the pure DID set up without controls. Columns
2-4 add one control each. Country level clustered standard errors are in paren-
theses. Wild bootstrap s.e. in squared parentheses, in order to take into account
for the small number of clusters.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
countries whose Herfindahl Index, calculated using 1999 data, is above and below the
1999 average. This is to see whether the treatment effect is different in countries whose
TV sector was already highly competitive before the digitization and countries where
competition was lower.
The results, reported in table 2.3, show an interesting pattern: on the one hand, the
effect of digitization on media freedom is not statistically different from zero in countries
with a low level of initial competition. On the other hand, digitization has a strong and
negative effect on media freedom where there was already a high level of competition.26
In other words, this indicates the possibility that too much competition makes it easier
for politicians to influence media outlets.
The model reconciles those results with the theoretical literature on media capture.
This explanation holds as long as digitization is associated with higher competition,
and there is evidence that this is indeed the case. In particular, Figure 2.3 shows
the correlation between digital terrestrial penetration and concentration, as measured
by the audience market share Herfindahl index described above. The correlation is
negative and statistically significant, showing that digitization is associated with higher
competition.27
26Even though the difference between the two is not significant in a regression with the full sample
interacted with the high/low competition dummy.
27The coefficient remains negative and significant when the Herfindahl index is regressed on penetra-
tion, the controls, country and year fixed effect. A one standard deviation increase in DTT penetration
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Table 2.3: Sample split by competition in 1999
Dep. variable: media freedom Competitive 1999
Low comp High comp




Time FE Y Y
Country FE Y Y
N 160 213
R2 0.525 0.476
Dependent variable: media freedom score. DTT penetra-
tion uses the most recent observation. Column 1 uses coun-
tries with a 1999 Herfindahl index above the average, Col-
umn 1 uses countries with a 1999 Herfindahl index level
below the average. Controls are corruption, log of GDP
per capita, election dummy. Country level clustered stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. Wild bootstrap s.e. in
squared parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.3.5 Parallel trends and robustness
One concern about the validity of the identification strategy is the endogeneity (at
country level) of the decision to begin the switch to digital. I address this concern in
three ways. First, even if the timing of the initiation of the digitization process is at the
discretion of each country, they all had to make the switch before the European Com-
mission deadline, hence the margins for a strategic use of digitization were relatively
small. Second, this endogeneity seems not to affect the parallel pre trends. To test for
this, I perform an event-study analysis using logic similar to Dobkin et al. (2014). To
do so, I run the following regression:
mfi,t = λi + µt +
+9∑
τ=−9
γτ ∗ di,τ + δ′xi,t + εi,t (2.2)
where dτ is a dummy that takes value 1 for country i two years before the beginning of
the adoption process and so on, up to nine years after the starting point of the adoption
process. Since every country in the sample gets the treatment at some point in time,
I normalize with respect to the coefficient of the year before the DTT launch.28
Figure 2.4 shows the coefficient plot of (2.2). Coefficients are not significant before
the introduction of DTT and becomes significant and negative afterwards. However,
the point estimation of pre-treatment coefficients is not extremely close to zero, and
is associated with a 0.15 standard deviations decrease in the Herfindahl index.
28In other words, di,τ = 0 when τ = −1.
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Correlation between the Herfindahl Index (top 8 channels) using daily audience market share
and DTT penetration. Correlation is −0.312, p-value < 0.01.
as a consequence I do not want to stress too much the causal interpretation of those
results. They seem to point at a very robust negative correlation between digitization
of terrestrial television and media freedom from political influence, with some evidences
suggesting that the former may have a causal effect on the latter.
Finally, one last way to address the concern related with the endogenity of the digi-
tization decision is to split the sample between early and late adopters. As table 2.4
shows, the two samples are quite different in terms of observables, hence it is worth
enquiring whether the effect of DTT penetration acts differently.
Table 2.4: Summary statistics, early vs late adopters
Post 2006 Pre 2006
mean sd mean sd
Freedom from pol. influence 31.525 3.407 33.469 3.541
Households 3712.820 3857.044 10460.957 11828.639
penhh 8.161 15.310 15.846 18.759
DTT households 173.377 348.315 2080.598 3922.211
GDP p.c. 22305.891 9434.140 32392.013 9880.754
Corruption 5.125 1.246 7.001 1.805
Election year 0.270 0.446 0.254 0.436
Herf. index 1402.272 587.799 1292.241 510.356
TV adv. expenditures 411.220 413.961 1521.048 1831.167
Summary statistics for the two subsamples of countries starting the digitization process before or in
2006 and post 2006.
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Figure 2.4: Pre-trends analysis
Start year effect on media freedom score, where 0 is the DTT launch year. Media freedom from
political influence score is regressed on country fixed effects, year fixed effects, time varying
controls and indicator variables corresponding to the number of years before and after the
launch of digital terrestrial television in country i. Coefficients plot of the indicator variables
with 95 per cent confidence intervals using the year before the introduction of DTT as reference
point.
Table 2.5 looks at the treatment effect splitting the sample between late and early
adopters (i.e. countries that started the digitization before or during 2006 vs after
2006). Obviously this implies a lower statistical power, but note that the treatment
effect is negative, similar to that in the whole sample, and only marginally non signifi-
cant (both p-values are below 0.15). Hence, even if early and late adopters are different
in terms of observables, it seems that the treatment works on both subsamples in a
very similar way. On top of this, table A2.2 in Appendix A2 show that the results are
robust to the inclusion of both linear and flexible early-late adopter time trend.
Finally, note that the tests in this section are necessary only in order to give causal
interpretation to the negative relationship between digitization and media freedom
from political influence. Even if taken as correlations only, the results of section 2.3.4
go in the opposite direction with respect to the current view of the literature on media
capture, thus providing a motivation for extending the existing theoretical analysis.
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Table 2.5: Regression results, early vs late adopters
Dep. variable: media freedom Early-late adopters
Pre 2006 Post 2006




Time FE Y Y
Country FE Y Y
N 242 131
R2 0.484 0.601
Dependent variable: media freedom score. DTT pen-
etration uses the most recent observation. Column 1
uses countries that started the digitization before or
in 2006. Column 2 uses countries that started after
2006. Controls are corruption, log of GDP per capita,
election dummy. Country level clustered standard er-
rors are in parentheses. Wild bootstrap s.e. in squared
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.4 The Model
The model builds on Besley and Prat (2006), keeping essentially the same structure
(principal-agent-supervisor, as in Tirole 1986, pure adverse selection) and the same
timing. There are two important modifications. Firstly, voters have heterogeneous
interests in political news, hence not all of them become informed when one media outlet
publishes news about the politician.29 Secondly, the relationship between readership
and outlets’ profits is not necessarily linear, but it is assumed to be described by a
generic iso-elastic function. Section 2.6 shows that it can be derived as the equilibrium
profit of a two sided media market where outlets are selling content to the readers and
advertising space to a monopolist advertiser.
2.4.1 The game
Incumbent’s type and voters’ payoffs
The players of this game are a politician (he), media outlets (it) and voters (she). In
period 1 an incumbent of type θ ∈ {b, g} is in power, with Pr (θ = g) = γ. θ is private
information of the incumbent. The “good” incumbent always picks the policy that
29Note that this is, broadly speaking, consistent with the result of Durante and Knight (2012),
where they point out that the change in viewing habits due to Berlusconi’s control of some media
outlets is only partial.
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maximizes voters’ welfare, while the “bad” incumbent is only a rent seeker. While
in power, he earns rent equal to R. As in the baseline of Besley and Prat (2006), the
problem is a purely adverse selection one, so when a good incumbent is in power voters’
payoff is 1, and when a bad incumbent is in power this payoff is 0.
Signal structure
Media outlets (but not the voters) may receive a common, verifiable signal s = {∅, b}
of the incumbent type. In particular, Pr(s = b|θ = b) = q, Pr(s = ∅|θ = b) = 1 − q
and Pr(s = ∅|θ = g) = 1. Upon observing s, the incumbent offers a vector of bribes
{ti}i=1,...,n in exchange for silence.
Every media outlet then has the option to choose a reporting strategy, defined as
s̃i ∈ {b, ∅}. If s = ∅, then the only option available is s̃i = ∅, since there are no signals
and news cannot be fabricated. However, if s = b, each outlet can decide between
reporting s̃i = b, enjoying the profits from a higher readership, or accepting ti while
publishing s̃i = ∅. A media outlet that chooses s̃i = b is referred to as an outlet that
publishes the news about the incumbent.
Voters’ types
Voters are heterogeneous in their interest in politics, meaning that only some of them
will be interested in political news. Formally, there are two types of consumers/voters.30
A fraction α of them is composed of interested voters, who are exactly like every voter
in Besley and Prat (2006). In particular, they are interested in political news and
willing to consume political news from any outlet willing to publish them. Hence, they
observe whether some of the outlets have published the news about the politician and
they consume that content. They are not going to consume news from any outlet
otherwise. In terms of Bayesian updating, note that it is enough that one outlet
publishes the news in order for them all to become informed about the signal.
The other 1 − α voters are rationally ignorant, meaning that they have no interest
in spending money or effort to buy political content. As a consequence, unlike the
interested voters, they do not actively seek outlets reporting news about the politician,
30In total, consumers/voters are a large number normalized to 1.
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hence they do not pay attention to whether any of the outlets has published the news
about the incumbent. However, they read the media for other reasons (e.g. they
like sport, gossip, gardening etc.), and hence they are equally divided amongst all the
outlets, irrespective of the signal that they publish. Hence, a fraction of rationally
ignorant voters may become informed about the politician’s type by reading, for other
reasons, one of the outlets publishing the signal.31 Voters know their type and α ∈ (0, 1)
is common knowledge. As is quite standard in these models, every reader/voter reads
at most one piece of news.
As the only relevant piece of news that outlets can publish is the fact that the incumbent
is bad, I define informed voters as those who are aware of the fact that s = b has been
received by media outlets (and hence θ = b). Note that both interested and rationally
ignorant voters can become informed about the (bad) type of the incumbent. This is a
consequence of the outlet they read. In particular, every interested voter will become
informed if at least one outlet publishes the signal, while the fraction of rationally
ignorant voters that becomes informed depends on the fraction of outlets publishing
the signal.
Media outlets
The number of media outlets, n, is exogenously given and it will be the main aspect
of the comparative statics analysis. In general, media outlets derive revenues from
two sources: audience-related revenues and money from the politician. Formally, the
total profits are defined by Πi. The component coming from readership is defined by
π(ri) = (ri)
δ, with δ ≥ 0. Note that δ = 1 incorporates the case of Besley and Prat
(2006), while δ > 1 can be the equilibrium result of a two sided media market, as
explained in section 2.6. The bribe offered to outlet i is defined by ti. For simplicity,
it is assumed that outlets offer their contents for free.32
After the vector of bribes is decided, outlets observe it and each of them simultaneously
31This precise assumption about the behaviour of rationally ignorant voters is not crucial for our
main result. This holds as long as a fraction of rationally ignorant voters becomes informed when some
outlets are publishing the signal, and this fraction is increasing in the fraction of outlets publishing the
signal.
32This assumption makes the model more tractable, but it can be shown that it appears quite easily
as an equilibrium result in a model where outlets choose the price of their contents in a competitive
way and are sufficiently interested in maximizing the readership.
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decides whether to accept the individual offer or not. Defining I the set of media that
accepts the offer, the incumbent gets a payoff of R −
∑
i∈I ti if he is elected and of
−
∑
i∈I ti if he is voted out of office. R is drawn from a distribution FR with sup-
port [0,+∞). The distribution is common knowledge, while the realization is private
information of the incumbent and the outlets.
At the end of period one, voters decide whether to confirm the incumbent or to choose
a challenger that is good with probability γ. It is assumed that every voter votes
sincerely.33 In period 2 there is voters’ and politicians payoff payment only.
2.4.2 Summary of the timing
1. θ is realized. If θ = g then s = ∅ with probability 1. If θ = b, s = b with
probability q and s = ∅ with probability (1− q). The incumbent observes the
media signal and decides {ti}i=1,...,n.
2. Each media i observes s and {ti}i=1,...,n and decides whether to accept or reject
ti. If she rejects, she reports the true signal (if s = b) competing with the other
outlets that reported the news, if she accepts she reports s̃i = ∅.
3. Voters make readership decisions. Rationally ignorant voters do not observe
the vector of reports {s̃i}i=1,...n and they just split themselves among all the
outlets, observing just the report of the outlet they pick, i.e. s̃i. Interested
voters instead observe the vector {s̃i}i=1,...n and either split themselves among
the outlets choosing s̃i = b or do not consume any content.
4. Consumers/voters use the information they have to update beliefs and vote. If the
incumbent is voted out, the new incumbent is randomly drawn with Pr (θ = g) =
γ. Period 1 ends.
5. In period 2, payoffs for both periods are paid and the game ends.
33Note that, with two alternatives, this is a weakly undominated voting strategy.
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2.5 Equilibrium and welfare
2.5.1 Solving the game
The model is solved by backward induction, focusing on showing the existence of a
symmetric34 sincere pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I construct the equi-
librium using a series of lemmas: all the proofs are in Appendix B2. Of course, it
makes sense to focus only on the case where θ = b and s = b, since nothing interesting
happens in the rest of the game.
First of all, let us look at voters’ choice. Note that, irrespective of their type, the
voters’ information set is binary (i.e. they observe ∅ or that there is at least one b).
This is because rationally ignorant voters will just observe the report of the outlet
they consume, while informed voters can use the whole vector of reports. Lemma 2.1
describes their equilibrium choices, assuming sincere voting. It is reminded that an
informed voter is a voter that knows that observes at least one s̃i = b, hence she knows
that θ = b. A uninformed voter is a voter that observes only s̃i = ∅.
Lemma 2.1 In a sincere voting equilibrium, all uninformed voters vote for the incum-
bent and all informed voters vote for the challenger.
Intuitively, in this type of model no news is good news, and this is true even when
voters take into account the possibility of media capture. As a result, the politician
only needs to keep half the voters uninformed to win elections and remain in power.
Given the assumption about voters’ heterogeneous interest in political news, it is
straightforward to derive the readership of each outlet depending on its reporting
strategy. In particular, define IC the set of outlets that rejected the bribe from the
incumbent (with cardinality m ≥ 0) and I the set of outlets that accepted the bribe.
It is easy to see that rj =
1−α




n ∀k ∈ I
C .35
In other words, n outlets enjoy some readership coming from the rationally ignorant
voters, while only those outlets publishing news about the politician will enjoy the
34I.e. every outlet follows the same strategy.
35This abstracts from the outlets’ pricing decisions. However, section 2.6 shows that an equilibrium
with zero price can be easily obtained.
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∀j ∈ I (2.3)
The politician determines the optimal number of outlets to silence knowing that all of
the α interested voters will become informed once a single outlet publishes the news,
while the fraction of the other 1 − α rationally ignorant voters that become informed
is increasing in the fraction of media outlets reporting the news. Hence, if every outlet
publishes the news, then all the voters become aware of the type of the politician, while
if m = 0 then none of them are. To stay in power, given Lemma 2.1, the bad politician
needs at least 50 per cent of the voters to be uninformed.36 Because getting a higher
percentage of uninformed voters is irrelevant in terms of re-election, but costly in terms
of bribes, the politician knows that he can have a certain number m of outles “allowed”
to publish the news about his type, without affecting his re-election. In particular, m
must be such that










, i.e. if there is a majority of interested voters, then the result is
the same as in Besley and Prat (2006), where the bad politician has to silence the whole




. In this respect, Hamilton
(2004) points out that interested readers/voters are usually a minority, compared with
the rationally ignorant. Hence, the case considered here is likely to reflect reality.





As a consequence, defining λ the fraction of outlets that the politician has to silence in
order to be re-elected, we can see that, in case of capture, it is optimal for him to have
1− λ = 1− 2α
2 (1− α)
36As an indifference breaking rule, I give a small “incumbency advantage” to the politician in power







Given that λ is not a function of n, from now on dλne, i.e. the smaller integer greater
or equal to λn, defines the number of outlets that the politician silences in equilibrium.
It is now possible to characterize (in Lemma 2.2) the bribe structure and the total
equilibrium cost of capture in the lowest-cost equilibrium, from the point of view of
the incumbent.
Lemma 2.2 There exists an equilibrium where, to be re-elected at the minimum cost,













outlets, where λ is defined in equation (2.5), and tj = 0 to the remaining outlets.
The formal proof of this equilibrium is in Appendix B2. Note, however, that there are
no unilateral profitable deviations. Outlets not receiving any bribe cannot do anything
other than publish the signal. On the other hand, the politician has to pay to every
bribed outlet its outside option, i.e. the profits each of them would make if, when the
other dλne−1 outlets are captured, it would decide to deviate from accepting the offer,
publishing the news and hence competing with the other b(1− λ)nc free outlets, minus
the profits the outlet is making by staying silent.








. The politician has to pay the difference between
this and the amount of profit made under capture to all the dλne outlets he needs to















Moreover, the politician cannot hope to stay in power by bribing a lower number of
outlets (as seen above) or with a lower offer, since it would be rejected. Clearly, it is
optimal for the bad politician to bribe the outlets if this amount is lower than the office
rent he could realize by staying in power in period 2 (defined as R), and hence capture
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It is immediately clear that the effect of n on this condition is non trivial. On one
hand, raising n implies, as in Besley and Prat (2006), that the politician has to silence
more outlets. On the other hand, raising n also increases competition in the slice
of the market that remains free (if this exists, of course). This reduces the outside
option for every captured firm and makes capture more attractive (and cheaper, for
the politician). Given this:
Proposition 2.1 In the equilibrium described by Lemma 2.2, if δ > 1 then, as n
becomes large, competition drives the total cost of capture to zero.
Intuitively, as the extra available readership is reduced because of competition among
free media outlets, its marginal effect on profits is also getting increasingly small. As
a consequence, the compensation the politician has to pay for capture gets small quite
quickly. And this reduces the total cost of capture faster than the increase in the total
cost caused by the higher number of firms that need to be silenced. Hence, consistent
with the empirical results of section 2.3, excessive competition can actually be bad for
media freedom.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate of the effect of δ on the total equilibrium cost of capture
(normalized so that K(n = 1) = 1 irrespective of δ). When it is below 1 (red dotted
line), the cost tends to “explode”, hence competition makes capture more costly (in
the limit) precisely because the “increasing in number” effect dominates the “outside
option reduction effect”. When δ is big enough (black dashed line), then the total
cost of capture is always decreasing in competition, irrespective of the number of free
outlets.
The most interesting case occurs for intermediate values of δ (blue solid line), where the
effect of competition on capture is non-monotonic. K still goes to 0 in the limit, but
this effect kicks in only when competition is sufficiently high, i.e. there is a sufficiently
large number of media outlets so that one of them publishing the news is not enough
to inform the majority of the voters. Section 2.5.2 discusses this in greater detail.
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Finally, note that the basic message of Figures 2.5 and 2.6 is not affected by α.
Figure 2.5: Model simulation, high α
Total equilibrium cost of capture for different values of δ when α = 0.4. The dotted red line
is K(δ = 0.75), blue solid line is K(δ = 2), black dashed line is K(δ = 5). Everything is
normalized so that K(n = 1) = 1 irrespective of δ.
Figure 2.6: Model simulation, low α
Total equilibrium cost of capture for different values of δ when α = 0.2. The dotted red line
is K(δ = 0.75), blue solid line is K(δ = 2), black dashed line is K(δ = 5). Everything is
normalized so that K(n = 1) = 1 irrespective of δ.
2.5.2 Non-monotonic effect of competition
Can this negative result of competition be reconciled with the more positive message
of Besley and Prat (2006)? It seems to be the case, at least for specific values of δ. In
fact, it can be shown that, when δ ∈ (1, 2], the effect of competition on media capture
can be non-monotonic.
To see this, note that since λ > 12 , total capture will be necessary for at least n = 1
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and n = 2. The aforementioned restriction on δ guarantees that, before the compe-
tition effect kicks in reducing the outside options of captured outlets (i.e. as long as
b(1− λ)nc = 0), K is increasing in n. This is formalized in the following corollary:
Corollary 2.1 In the equilibrium described by Lemma 2.2, if δ ∈ (1, 2], there is at least
one configuration of the market with free media characterized by a number of outlets
n∗ > 1 and R ∈ (K (1) ;K (n∗)), then we observe media capture for n < n and for
n > n̄, so the effect of n on the possibility of media capture is non-monotonic.
This means that media will be captured when their number is either too small or
too big, since competition would, at some point, make them so cheap that it will be
convenient for the incumbent to silence them. To understand the behaviour of the cost
function, Figure 2.7 simulates the model with parameters consistent with Corollary
2.1.
Figure 2.7: Model simulation, non-monotonicity
Model simulation for different values of n when R = 1.5, α = 0.45, δ = 2.
The number of media outlets is on the x-axis, while the cost of silencing enough of them
to have a bad incumbent re-elected when the outlets get the signal is on the y-axis.
For the other parameters, R = 1.5, α = 0.45, δ = 2.
The non-monotonic effect of competition is readily apparent: the incumbent can cap-
ture enough outlets and stay in power after a bad signal is received when the blue solid
line (the total equilibrium cost of capture) is below the orange dotted line (office rent).
That is, when there are at most 4 or at least 11 media outlets. In between, there will
be no capture as it would be too costly for the incumbent.
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It is clear from the graph that rounding plays a role.37 In particular, the cost of capture
is increasing in n as long as the number of outlets is such that the politician has to
silence the whole market. It “jumps down” when n goes from 10 to 11 because of
the competition effect given by the possibility of having one free outlet (this lowers
the outside option of every captured outlet and hence the total cost). The behaviour
is similar for the remaining parts of the graph, with jumps when n goes from 21 to
22, from 32 to 33 and so on. Note, however, that the slope of the cost function is
progressively decreasing as n grows, because n enters at the denominator with a power
of two.
2.5.3 Discussion
In terms of assumptions, the most important difference between this model and the
literature on media capture is the heterogenity in voters’ interest in politics. This
implies that this model does not assume that having one outlet publish the news is
enough to inform the whole electorate.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) use the argument of re-broadcasting as a justification
for the assumption in Besley and Prat (2006). However, “silenced” media may not be
willing to re-broadcast anything, since they have been compensated in for not doing
so. Moreover, in reality there are many ways of re-broadcasting a news item: what
matters in this model is the message transmitted to the readers about the type of the
incumbent.
Moreover, it must be noted that even in places traditionally associated with media cap-
ture (e.g. Italy, Russia), the capture never reached the whole media industry (in Italy
it did not even reach the whole television industry when Mr Berlusconi was simultane-
ously Prime Minister and owner of the three main private television stations). McMillan
and Zoido (2004), for example, point out that Montesinos was not bribing the whole
media industry, but was choosing the outlets with the highest viewership/readership,
and this is consistent with this model. Hence, the possibility that λ < 1 should at least
be considered.
37The graph where n is treated as a real, rather than as a natural number, is shown in Appendix
C2.
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The second important difference is the generic way of describing the relationship be-
tween readership and profits. Note, first of all, that the linear case is just a special
case of this specification. Secondly, section 2.6 will provide a microfoundation, based
on the two sided market literature, of a profit function where δ > 1.
2.5.4 Welfare of the voters
It is now possible to look at the (ex ante) welfare of the voters, and how it is affected
by competition and the presence of media capture. As already mentioned, office rents
R are assumed to be drawn from a generic distribution FR, with support <+. As
a consequence, when α < 12 , the ex ante probability of successful media capture,































With this definition, the probability that a bad incumbent is voted out is (1 − σ)q
and the expected turnover is (1 − γ)(1 − σ)q. Hence, it is decreasing in σ. In the
standard Besley and Prat (2006) model, since n was monotonically decreasing σ, then
n was supposed to increase the expected turnover. Interestingly, Drago et al. (2014)
find that this is not the case, at least for the entry of local newspapers in Italian
municipalities. In this model, when δ > 1, n increases σ in the limit, falling as a
consequence the expected turnover. This is consistent with Drago et al. (2014).
Finally, the ex ante voters’ welfare is defined as
W := γ(2) + (1− γ) [q (1− σ) γ] (2.8)
because the good incumbent would be re-elected for sure, leading to a payoff of 1 in
each period. On the other hand, the bad incumbent is voted out with probability
q(1− σ), and in that case the new politician is good with probability γ. If confirmed,
the bad incumbent would bring a payoff of 0 in both periods.
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As expected, (2.8) shows that voters’ welfare is decreasing in the probability of media
capture. As a consequence, the effect of media competition on voters’ welfare can be
described as follows:
Proposition 2.2 In the equilibrium described by lemma 2.2, if α < 12 and δ > 1
competition has, in the limit, a decreasing effect on voters’ welfare.
This result suggests that some care is required when thinking about competition as a
tool for avoiding media capture. Under some conditions, excessive competition can be
counter-productive.
2.6 Microfounding the profit function
As mentioned in sections 2.4 and 2.5, the relationship between outlets’ profits and
readership pays an important role in my results, and it is important to look beyond
the linearity assumption of Besley and Prat (2006). One way of micro-founding a more
generic relationship is through a two-sided market approach, where outlets are assumed
to be selling contents to the readers and advertising space to a monopolist advertiser,
who is interested in placing advertisements where they will reach a large audience.
The timing of the media market part of the game, which determines the shape of the
profit function and hence the bribe that the politician has to pay recalls Ellman and
Germano (2009),38 is as follows, starting after the choice of publication strategies.
1. Every media outlet i ∈ N sets the price of its content, pi ≥ 0, achieving as a
consequence a readership ri. Interested voters/consumers are buying the content
(one copy each) as long as it publishes the political news and as long as pi ≤ p̄,
where p̄ ∼ U [0, 1] is a positive individual reservation price. Since these con-
sumers/voters are interested only in the political news, and this news will be the
same in every outlet, they treat the m outlets as homogeneous, and hence they
will all buy their copy from the outlet setting the lowest price. Rationally igno-
rant voters/consumers are just equally split between the outlets with the lowest
38The idea behind this timing is that readership choices and editorial choices tend to be stable,
while you can sign advertising contracts based on them. However, this timing choice is not crucial for
the results of this paper.
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price.39
2. Given the readership, outlets choose the unit price of advertising space, qi.
3. Finally, the monopolist advertiser, knowing the readership and the price, chooses
the quantity of advertising it wants to buy.
In this set up, every media outlet i ∈ N derives profit from readership and from
advertising space. Formally,
πi = πr,i + πa,i (2.9)
where πr,i and πa,i are the profits that outlet i makes from readership and from adver-
tising space respectively. When the decision about the quantity and price of advertising
is made, the readership of every outlet has already been determined, hence the (mo-











where yi is the quantity of advertising purchased from outlet i, ri is the readership of
that outlet (determined in stage 1) and qi is the market price of a unit of advertising
on outlet i, already chosen by each outlet i.
The justification for this objective function is found in the literature on advertising
and the media market. As pointed out by Hamilton (2004), “once people are watching
a program or reading a news entry, advertisers care about the chance to divert their
attention to a commercial product”. So, following this idea and similarly to the mi-
crofoundation of advertiser’s demand in Ellman and Germano (2009), I assume that
each reader/consumer’s demand for the advertised good is increasing and concave in
the quantity of advertising in the publication he buys.40 In other words, the quantity
of advertising space boosts the demand for the advertised good at a decreasing rate.
As in Ellman and Germano (2009), the advertiser is interested in the total demand
for the good, so she multiplies the individual demand determined by the quantity of
advertising on outlet i by the readership of that outlet, summing across all outlets pub-
39As long as this price is below their reservation price.
40The squared root is chosen for convenience. It is easy to see that, defining z ∈ (0, 1) the exponent
on yi, then δ =
1




then the non-monotonicity in the effect of competition on media capture is always there as well.
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lishing the signal. This leads directly to the objective function. Note that, as in Dukes
(2006), the objective function is additively separable in the media outlets; moreover it
is linear in the readership, as in Ellman and Germano (2009) and it exhibits decreasing
marginal returns in the quantity of advertising space as in Godes et al. (2009).
The problem is concave and, from first order conditions, the inverse demand function







Moving now to the outlets, each one will choose qi to maximize its profits, knowing










where c is the cost of hosting advertising space (in terms of foregone “useful” space in
a newspaper or on a website etc.) that is strictly positive but arbitrarily small. For











that is strictly increasing in ri. Note that the advertiser is also making positive profits











where π∗ADV,i is the equilibrium profit level for the advertiser on outlet i.
Going backwards to stage 1, note that outlets may, in principle, adopt a different
pricing strategy depending on whether they are publishing the signal or not, hence
whether they are trying to “attract” also interested readers or not. However, it is easy
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to note that, as long as m ≥ 2 and n −m ≥ 2, the standard features of a Bertrand
competition apply in this setting. Every outlet will try to undercut the others in order
to reach more readers. Given the zero marginal cost assumption, the only equilibrium
is the one where pi = pj = 0 for ∀ i, j ∈ N . The readership decision is the same as



















For cases where Bertrand competition does not apply, the following lemma is sufficient
for a zero price equilibrium:
Lemma 2.3 If c ≤ α8 then every outlet, irrespective of the market configuration and
on whether they are captured or not, finds optimal to set a price equal to 0 in order to
maximize the readership.
As proved in Lemma 2.3, as long as c is small enough41 even the monopolist outlet
behaves in the same way as in the “Bertrand competition” environment, and as a






16c and all the rationally ignorant voters are
equally divided between all the outlets.
Finally, note that many types of media outlets offer their content for free (websites,
most of the TV channels, radio channels, free newspapers), deriving 100 per cent of
their profits from advertising and, as pointed out by Ellman and Germano (2009),
revenues from advertising account for 50-80 % of the total revenues of “standard”
newspapers. Hence, the assumption is not far from reality.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that competition in the mass media market does not have a uni-
versally positive role in deterring media capture by bad politicians. On the empirical
41The assumption of c ≤ α
8
is made for simplicity, since even captured outlets have a readership and
hence a pricing decision to make. Hence, for example if n = 2 and the politician needs to capture every
outlet and the optimal outside option choice for an outlet that rejects the bribe involves a positive
price, then the other one may find it optimal to impose a positive and slightly lower price. But this
would affect the readership of those outlets and hence the number of readers/voters informed and so
on. Hence, this assumption plays a role only when Bertrand competition does not apply.
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side, it is possible to identify the negative effect on media freedom from political in-
fluence of a competition-increasing reform (digitization of terrestrial television in the
European Union). Interestingly, this effect seems to be driven by countries with high
level of pre-treatment competition, highlighting that the risks comes from excessive
competition.
The theoretical model provides a rationale for those results, reconciling the theoretical
literature on media capture with the empirical evidence. It relaxes two assumptions
from the media capture literature (voters’ homogeneity in interest for politics and
profits linear in readership) and derives conditions for a negative limit effect and for
a non-monotonic effect of competition on the total equilibrium cost of capture. The
profit function necessary for those results can arise from a media market modelled as
a two sided one.
These findings are relevant in a complex world where the internet seems to allow for
proliferation of media outlets and the independence of media from political influence
is under threat in many contexts.
This paper is a first step toward a better understanding of the effect of media compe-
tition on media freedom from political influence. Two main points are open to further
research. First, the role of ideology, and whether ideologically biased media make me-
dia capture more or less effective. Second, it would be important to measure media
freedom from political influence at a local, sub-national level, in order to use this type




I present here two alternative empirical strategies, showing that the main point of
the results of Section 2.3 (a negative, significant sign) is robust to those different
specifications.
First of all, table A2.1 uses an approach similar to Card (1992), where the treatment is
measured by a dummy variable (equal 0 before the beginning of the switch over process,
and 1 when it starts) multiplied by the terrestrial television penetration measured in
1997, to capture the difference in affected population discussed in section 2.3. Despite
the measurement error implied by this specification (the digitization process takes time,
while the treatment variable is 1 immediately after the beginning of the process) the
coefficient is negative and significant.
Table A2.1: Robustness: different treatment variable
Dep. variable: media freedom
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment*population −0.013 −0.014 −0.013 −0.013
(0.006)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗
[0.007]∗ [0.007]∗∗ [0.007]∗ [0.006]∗






Time FE Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y
N 378 377 374 374
R2 0.453 0.462 0.449 0.450
Dependent variable: media freedom score. Treatment*population is the interaction of
a dummy = 1 when the digitization process begins and the penetration of terrestrial
television in 1997. Only observations before the beginning of digitization or after the
ASO are used. Column 1 is the pure DID set up without controls. Columns 2-4 add
one control each. Country level clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Wild
bootstrap s.e. in squared parentheses, in order to take into account for the small
number of clusters.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Finally, I look at the effect of different specific time trends on the treatment effect.
In particular, Table A2.2 repeats the estimation of (2.1) controlling for subgroup spe-
cific linear and flexible time trends (where the chosen subgroups are countries with
terrestrial television penetration in 1999 above and below 50 per cent and early and
late adopters as specified above) and country specific linear time trends. The result
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is robust to all the specifications but the last one, and the coefficients of columns 1-4
are similar to the specification in the main body of the paper. The result of column 5
is not particularly worrying: Borusyak and Jaravel (2016) show that this type of time
trends should not be added to event study analysis, such as the present one.
Table A2.2: Robustness: time trends
Dep. variable: media freedom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DTT penetration −0.024 −0.024 −0.025 −0.025 −0.009
(0.013)∗ (0.014)∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.013)∗ (0.012)
[0.014]∗ [0.015] [0.013]∗ [0.014]∗ [0.012]
Terr. linear trend Y N N N N
Terr. flexible trend N Y N N N
Early-late linear trend N N Y N N
Early-late flexible trend N N N Y N
Country specific linear trend N N N N Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 352 352 373 373 373
R2 0.473 0.500 0.488 0.499 0.712
Dependent variable: media freedom score. DTT penetration uses the most recent observation.
Column 1 controls for terrestrial specific linear time trends, Column 2 for terrestrial specific flexible
time trends, Column 3 for early-late adopter specific linear time trend, Column 4 for early-late
adopter flexible time trend, Column 5 for country specific linear time trends. Controls are corruption,
log of GDP per capita, election dummy. Country level clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
Wild bootstrap s.e. in squared parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
B2 Proofs
Proof of of Lemma 2.1.
Let us start with interested voters, who behave exactly as the voters in Besley and Prat
(2006), i.e. they will all become immediately informed if at least one outlet publishes
the signal and they will all observe s̃i = ∅ otherwise. Note that
Pr (θ = g|at least one s̃i = b) = 0 < γ
Moreover, suppose the voters believe that the bad politician is able to silence all the
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media with probability42 σ
′ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, again by Bayes’ rule,
Pr (θ = g|{s̃i}i=1,...n = ∅)
=
Pr ({s̃i}i=1,...n = ∅|θ = g)Pr (θ = g)
Pr ({s̃i}i=1,...n = ∅|θ = g)Pr (θ = g) + Pr ({s̃i}i=1,...n = ∅|θ = b)Pr (θ = b)
=
γ
γ + [(1− q) + qσ′ ] (1− γ)
From this, I derive that
Pr (θ = g|{s̃i}i=1,...n = ∅) ≥ γ




and hence it is never sequentially rational for an interested voter observing {s̃i}i=1,...n =
∅ to vote out the incumbent.43
Consider now the fraction of uninformed rationally ignorant voters. The single voter,
despite knowing his type, does not know if she is observing s̃i = ∅ because she picked
up one of the silenced outlets or because there is no signal to be transmitted. Of course,
she is still rational and hence she assigns a probability σ to the event of (partial or
total) media capture44 and a probability η to her belonging to the fraction of rationally
ignorant voters that would become informed in case of the publication of the signal
and capture. In particular, η is equal to the ratio between the number of free outlets in
case of capture over the total number of outlets. In equilibrium I will show that η = mn ,
where m is the total number of free outlets and n is the total number of outlets. Note
that the rationally ignorant voter knows n and is able to work out how many outlets
42Voters do not know the realization of R, but they know that it is a random variable drawn from
a generic cumulative distribution function FR. Note that σ
′
is the probability of total media capture
conditional on having a bad incumbent and on the media having received the signal about his type.
43As a tie-breaking rule, I am assuming that the indifferent voter will confirm the incumbent.
44Note that σ and σ
′
are not the same thing. The latter is the probability that the whole industry
is silenced. This is relevant for the interested voters, since they all become informed if a single outlet
publishes the news, hence when only partial capture is necessary, then σ
′
= 0. On the other hand, σ
is the probability that some outlets are captured (both conditional on having a bad incumbent and
s = b). Note that the voters are able to work out the fraction of media outlets a bad incumbent needs
to capture in order to stay in power and the fact that a bad incumbent will either capture just enough
outlets or none of them.
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can be left free by a bad incumbent in case of successful capture. In other words,
Pr (s̃i = ∅|capture, θ = b, s = b) = 1−
m
n
So, every rationally ignorant voter observing s̃i = ∅ would update her belief in the
following way:









This happens because, when the incumbent is a bad type, the voter observes s̃i = ∅
when there is no signal to be transmitted (this happens with probability (1− q)) and
when there is a signal to be transmitted, but there is capture and she belongs to the













So it is always optimal for the rationally ignorant voter observing s̃i = ∅ to con-
firm the incumbent. Trivially, they will vote out the incumbent after s̃i = b since
Pr (θ = g|s̃i = b) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
To characterize formally the equilibrium in the game between the politician and the
outlets, I follow closely the proof used in the 2001 working paper version of Besley and
Prat (2006).
First of all, it is without loss of generality to order the observed vectors of transfers
{ti}i=1,...,n such that t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ tn. Defining Ii = 1 if outlet i accepts the offer and
Ii = 0 if she rejects it, I characterize the best response recursively.
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Since the LHS is non-decreasing in i and the RHS is non-increasing in i, there must be
a k ∈ [0, n] such that Ii = 1 for every i ≥ k + 1 and Ii = 0 otherwise.
































. As a consequence, an outlet i ≤ k does not
want to deviate and accept the offer because



























A similar type of reasoning shows that i ≥ k+ 1 does not want to deviate rejecting the
offer, since



























Hence, equation (B2.1) describes actual best responses. Finally, note that in equi-
librium k = b(1− λ)nc, because the incumbent does not need to capture b(1− λ)nc
outlets, and hence the first b(1− λ)nc offers can be equal to zero. Then, the lowest














Finally, note that a strictly positive bribe to the outlets that it is not necessary to
capture is a weakly dominated strategy, hence I focus on the equilibrium where all the
first tk bribes are zero.
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
To see this, it is enough to take the limit of (2.6) for n going to infinity. Note, however,
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To calculate limn→∞K, I use the fact that limn→∞
dλne




Moreover, note that limn→∞
1
nδ−1












Proof of Corollary 2.1.
The fact that, for δ > 1, media capture will be observed for sufficiently high competition
follows directly from Proposition 2.1.
The increasing effect of n on K requires the additional constraint on δ. To see this,
I treat n as a continuous variable and look at the derivative of K with respect to n,
making sure that it is positive at least as long as b(1− λ)nc = 0, i.e. as long as the
























































Note that the second part of (B2.2) is surely positive because δ > 1. A sufficient
condition for ∂K∂n > 0 is 1−
(1−α)δ
αn+1−α ≥ 0, which simplifies to α ≥
δ−1
n−1+δ .
Suppose now that parameters are such that the condition above does not hold. Then,

















(1− α)δ − αn− 1 + α
(αn+ 1− α)(δ − 1)
(B2.3)
As the LHS of (B2.3) is smaller than 1, it tends to 0 as δ increases. Moreover, the RHS




(1− α)(αn+ 1− α)(δ − 1)− (αn+ 1− α) [(1− α)δ − (αn+ 1− α)]
((αn+ 1− α)(δ − 1))2
=
(αn+ 1− α)αn
((αn+ 1− α)(δ − 1))2
> 0
As a consequence, it is necessary to find an upper bound of δ such that (B2.3) is always
true. As this is analytically very complicated, I just show that, for δ = 2, (B2.3) is












> 1− α− αn
(1− α)2 > (1− α− αn)(1− α+ αn)
(1− α)2 > (1− α)2 − (αn)2
that is always true.
As a consequence, for δ ∈ (1, 2] K is strictly increasing in n as long as the politician
needs to capture the whole market, and the total cost goes to zero as n increases.
Hence, if R is such that capture is profitable for sufficiently low competition but it
becomes too costly as n increases and the politician has to capture the whole market,
then we observe a non-monotonic effect of competition on media capture.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
The result follows directly from Proposition 2.1 and equation (2.8).
Proof of Lemma 2.3.
If there is one free (say i) and (at least) one captured (say j) outlet, then the captured
one has the incentive to undercut the free one, since rationally ignorant voters would
just pick the cheapest one. Hence, outlet i can either choose a positive price and sell in
equilibrium to interested readers only, or set pi = 0 getting a readership ri = α+
1−α
2 .




since she will sell to interested voters only and their demand, as a consequence of the
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assumption about the individual reservation price, is:
D (pi) =

0 if pi ≥ 1
α if pi = 0
(1− pi)α if pi ∈ (0, 1)
Note that, after few manipulations, the objective function can be written as















so the function is quadratic in pi. Moreover, note that h (pi) = 0 ∀pi ≥ 1 and that





16c . A necessary condition for an interior solution is the
concavity of (B2.4), hence α16c − 1 < 0 or c >
α
16 . However, this is not sufficient. In
fact, if α8c − 1 > 0, i.e. if c <
α
8 , then h (pi) would reach its maximum for a pi < 0,
which of course is ruled out by the constraints. Hence, if α16 < c <
α
8 , then the
only admissible solution is pi = 0, since the function would be strictly decreasing for
pi ∈ [0, 1). Moreover, note that if c < α16 , then h (pi) is a convex function in pi ≥ 0.
There are two possibilities, in this case. Either the minimum of the function is in pi ≥ 1
or it belongs to the interval (0, 1). In the first case, h (pi) would be strictly decreasing
in (0, 1), and as a consequence the solution of the maximization problem is pi = 0. The
same is true also for the second case, since the function would be strictly convex in [0, 1]
and as a consequence the maximum can only be on a corner. Since h (0) > 0 = h (1),
then the unique solution is pi = 0.
Finally, consider the case of n = 1. In case of capture, her objective function will be
h′(pi) = pi (1− pi) (1− α) +
1
16c
[(1− pi) (1− α)]2
and, for the same argument as above, p∗i = 0 if c ≤ 1−α8 that is greater than
α
8 in the
interesting case of α < 12 . If she publishes the signal, her objective function is




and, for the same argument as above, p∗i = 0 if c ≤ 18 that is greater than
α
8 . Hence,
the assumption of c ≤ α8 ensures that the optimal price is 0 in every possible market
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configuration and irrespective of the capturing decision.
C2 n as a real number
Figure C2.1 shows what happens if n is treated as a real number, rather than as a
natural one. This is obviously an approximation, since n is the number of outlets and
hence it is discrete by nature. However, it provides a different way of showing the
non-monotonicity of K in n. It increases as long as increasing the number of outlets
dominates the effect of reducing their outside options, and then it starts decreasing
converging to 0 in the limit. As a consequence, media capture occurs when there is a
too small or a too large a number of outlets.
Figure C2.1: n as a real number







Plot of K (blue) and R (orange) as a function of n setting δ = 2, α = 0.45 and R = 0.7.
D2 Data sources
Variables used in the empirical analysis and their sources:
Media freedom score: 41 minus the Environment B score from the Freedom of the
Press (Freedom House);
EU: dummy =1 if a country belongs to the European Union on the 25 August 2016;
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DTTlaunch: year in which the country started the DTT adoption process. Source:
Yearbook 2015;
ASO: year in which the country completed the DTT switch over process. Source:
Yearbook 2015;
DTTpen: primary DTT receiver / number of households *100, using country specific
tables from 2006-2015 Yearbooks. 0 for years before the DTTlaunch year. Note:
no country specific tables for 2014 Yearbook, so I use other data (in practice,
DTTraw2013 and HH2013) to work that out. For earlier Yearbooks (2003-2005),
I calculated DTTpen using the table “digital TV reception in Europe”, vol 2,
divided by the number of households, with linear interpolation when necessary
and all rounded to the first decimal number;
HH: number of households in thousands, from country specific tables, 2004-2015
Yearbooks. Note: no country specific tables for 2014 Yearbook, so I use the
average between YB2013 and YB2015 households to compute HH in 2013 (i.e.
linear interpolation);
DTTraw: number of DTT households in thousands from country specific tables
and using always the most recent observation available (i.e. taking them from
the “market trends” graphs for all the previous years). Note that there are no
“market trends” country tables for YB2014, so I use the YB2013 market trend
graph for DTTraw 2009. Again, =0 before DTT launch year. For DTTraw 2001-
2003 I used the tables T.7.12 (YB2003, vol 2 pag 48) and T.7.6 (YB2003, vol. 2,
pag. 42);
Penhh: measure of DTT penetration, equal to dttraw/hh*100. In practice, it cal-
culates the DTT penetration using only the most recent observation available;
GDP per capita: GDP per capita in PPP in current international dollars, from
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, demographic and socio economic indicators.
Used in logs in the regression. Available at: http://data.uis.unesco.org/In
dex.aspx?queryid=234;
Corruption: Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International. Avail-
able at http://www.transparency.org (recent years) and from Teorell, J. et al
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(2015) (older observations);
GDP per capita: GDP per capita in PPP from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics
database;
Election: dummy =1 if election year in the lower chamber or in the national as-
sembly. Data collected manually from electionguide.org, provided by the Inter-
national Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).
Herfindahl Audience: Herfindahl index calculated using the annual average of the
daily audience market share of the top eight TV channels per country per year. I
take the data from the most recent yearbook where available. In particular, Aud1,
Aud2 etc denote the yearly average daily audience market share of the highest,
second ... eight channel in term of audience in that year (hence, the identity of
the channel may change). I use only channels listed in the table. Hence, if less
than 8 channels have a listed market share, I put a 0 on the remaining channels
(irrespective of whether the row “Others” is different from zero). Most of the
observations for Belgium are missed, since data are divided between French and
Flemish community. Luxembourg and Malta are also coded differently and hence
missed.
TV Advert: total expenditures in television advertising in millions of Euro (when
not available directly, I use the expenditures in dollars and convert them to Euro
using the year-specific average exchange rate).
TerrPen97: terrestrial television penetration (as a fraction of TV household) in 1997.
Coded using table T.2.16 of the 1998 EAO Statistical Yearbook.
References for data sources
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J. W. (2013) A new data set of educational attainment in the
world, 1950-2010, Journal of Development Economics, 104, 184-198.
European Audiovisual Observatory (1998-2015) Yearbook. Television, cinema, video
and on-demand audiovisual services in Europe, 1998-2015 Editions, Strasbourg.
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Freedom House, Freedom of the Press database (n.d.) https://freedomhouse.org
/report-types/freedom-press.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World database (n.d.) https://freedomhouse.o
rg/report-types/freedom-world.
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (n.d.) database, http://www.id
ea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm.
International Foundation for Electoral System (n.d.) database, electionguide.org.
Johnson, J. W. and Wallack, J. S. (2010) ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THE
PERSONAL VOTE. Update of database from “Particularism Around the World”,
http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jwjohnso/espv.html.
Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Hartmann, F. and Svensson,
R. (2015) The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan15, Univer-
sity of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.po
l.gu.se.





On April 18, 2013, the New York Post plastered its cover page with a picture of two men
under the headline “BAG MEN: Feds seek these two pictured at Boston Marathon.”
The Post was hinting that the duo was responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings
and had carried the bombs in their bags. They were innocent, and the Post was wrong.
16-year-old Salaheddin Barhoum and 24-year-old Yassine Zaimi later filed a lawsuit,
and the New York Post’s credibility was damaged. Similarly, in September 2008,
Bloomberg incorrectly reported that United Airlines was filing for bankruptcy. Before
Bloomberg issuing a correction, United Airlines’ stock price nosedived 75 percent.
Media critics often cite such examples to argue that competitive pressures in the mod-
ern digital environment have pushed outlets towards early release of less accurate infor-
mation (Cairncross 2019).1 Matt Murray, Editor-in-Chief of the Wall Street Journal,
acknowledged in a recent interview that the Internet had created both time and com-
petitive pressures. However, part of the pressure, he noted, “is to stay true to what
has worked and works (really) well, which is reporting verified facts.” In a similar vein,
some media scholars argue that the fears surrounding the effect of competition may be
overblown (Knobel 2018, Carson 2019).
1This, of course, is a cause of concern for modern democracies. Media outlets, through fact-
checking and investigative journalism, deliver revelations that have a profound impact on the society
and its institutions. For instance, The Hindu’s Bofors scam exposé in India in 1987 brought the topic
of political corruption to center stage and lead to the defeat of the government in power in 1989.
More recently, the New York Times’ exposé on sexual abuse in Hollywood and corporate America has
reignited discussions on gender discrimination in the workplace.
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In this paper, we discuss why competition among media outlets might not privilege
speed over accuracy. We consider the implications of competition on audience welfare
and information dissemination. We argue that two opposing forces determine the res-
olution of the speed-accuracy tradeoff: preemption and reputation. While preemption
pushes outlets towards speed, reputation gives media outlets a reason to engage in
careful, detailed reporting.
We build a two-period model in which two career-concerned media outlets compete
against one another and fear preemption. There is a topic on which the outlets may
publish stories. Both outlets receive an initial informative signal about the topic. They
may research the topic further at a cost, which depends upon their ability. We model
research as generating a perfectly-informative signal about the topic. There is a scoop
value associated with being the first outlet to publish a story on the topic. In addition
to valuing scoops, outlets also care about their reputations. Reputation depends upon
an audience’s inference about the outlet’s ability to research.
Our model yields three main results. The first two speak to the changes in the media
landscape brought about by the Internet. The last result deals with how a source
disseminates information to media outlets facing the speed-accuracy tradeoff.
Effect of the Internet. One effect of the Internet has been to increase competitive
pressures. The Internet has reduced barriers to entry and contributed to a 24-hour
news cycle where reporters are always on deadline. Consequently, pressure on media
outlets to be the first to publish have increased.
In our model, while competition can push media outlets to publish more quickly, it can
also have the opposite effect – to push outlets to research stories more thoroughly. We
find that in more competitive environments, it is easier for outlets to build reputation.
This effect increases outlets’ willingness to hold back on stories and research them
thoroughly. Importantly, our argument relies upon the assumption that the audience
does not observe the amount of time outlets spend researching stories but they do
observe which outlet publishes first. Knowing the sequence of publication rather than
the amount of research, allows for additional observational learning with competition.
Consequently, it gives better outlets a reason to differentiate when facing competition.2
2We discuss in detail the new media studies literature in Section 3.1.1 and show some anecdotal
support for our main finding.
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We show that when there is a high scoop value, competition drives media outlets
to publish more quickly; in contrast, when there is a low scoop value, competition
drives media outlets to research stories more. Therefore, the model suggests that
breaking news-type stories such as those on terrorist attacks, malfeasance of senior
government officials or adverse economic shocks, will suffer particularly from problems
of accuracy in the Internet age. In contrast, outlets do better research on non-urgent
stories that do not influence immediate decision-making. Examples include: revelations
of sexual abuse by Hollywood executives, how terrorist organizations work, and illegal
data hacking that is used to influence public opinion.3
A second effect of the Internet has been to improve what quickly-released stories look
like. Journalists can quickly “contact people, access government records, file Freedom
of Information Act requests, and do searches” (Knobel 2018). Similarly, Chan (2014)
argues that “digitization brings better access to sources and data.” At the same time,
however, the cost of doing in-depth research has not changed much. For instance, one
would not expect the cost of conducting interviews and building trustworthy sources
to have changed significantly. We model such an effect as improving the quality of the
initial signal without changing the cost of research.
We find that a better initial signal can reduce the welfare of the audience. When initial
signal becomes better, the audience is less able to attribute correct information by
the media outlets to their ability to conduct in-depth research. The audience instead
assign it to better initial signal of the outlets that is due to better technology. Thus,
reputational concerns get diluted and timing pressures become more salient, making the
media outlets move towards speed. Moving towards speed reduces overall welfare only
if a significant proportion of audience values better reporting. However, it improves
welfare if the audience does value early reporting. It is easy to map the above examples
from the previous paragraphs to the relevant situation for audience welfare.
Information dissemination by a source. Our model is also useful for determining
3The first story was publishished in both the New York Times and the New Yorker. https:
//www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harve
y-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories. The second story appeared on the New York Times
after the reporters researched for more than a year and a half. https://www.nytimes.com/interact
ive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html. The third story broke out
in The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/11/senator-ted-cruz-presi
dent-campaign-facebook-user-data.
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how a strategic source shares its information with competing media outlets. Notably,
it helps explain why politically-motivated sources may share rumours with multiple
outlets to get “unverified facts” out to the audience.
Our model predicts that a source who is merely interested in getting potentially in-
correct information out without further research can exploit the time pressures that
competing media outlets face. We show that when media outlets are intrinsically driven
to explore issues, it is better to share information with all the media outlets to get the
information out quickly. More intrinsically motivated media outlets are more likely
to do further research independent of the competition. However, by sharing with all
the media outlets and creating competitive pressures, additional time pressure can be
created. Thus, politicians with propaganda may still hold media outlets hostage even
without explicitly capturing or buying them off.
There are, however, situations when such a source shares information only with one
media outlet for the quick release of information. The source is likely to do so when
media outlets are not intrinsically motivated, and the information is not urgent. When
the information is not urgent, there is a general tendency for competing media outlets to
investigate further independent of their intrinsic motivation. In this situation, sharing
information with just one outlet gets the information out more quickly.
It is worth emphasizing that our model generally covers settings that have elements
of preemption and career concerns. For instance, competing researchers working to
solve similar problems and hoping to convince a market about their ability face a
similar newsroom dilemma. Technology firms face a speed-accuracy tradeoff as they
build products and technology to match consumer preferences. Our main results have
a natural interpretation in these situations. Notably, better research in competitive
environments requires that the initial research idea is not too well-developed.
3.1.1 Stylized facts and new media studies literature
The speed vs. accuracy tradeoff is commonly recognized in the media studies literature.
The BBC Academy website observes that “every journalist has to resolve the conflicting
demands of speed and accuracy. [...] If you are working on a breaking news story, it is
important to remember that first reports may often be confused and misleading. [...]
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That is why it is important to weight the facts you have.”
The terms of this tradeoff hinge on the surrounding environment. The literature high-
lights two critical determinants of the rise of “speed-driven journalism” in the modern
digital environment. The first one is increasing competitive pressure. Lionel Barber,
the Editor of Financial Times, points out, “Technology has (also) flattened the digital
plain, creating the illusion that all content is equal. It has made it possible for everyone
to produce and distribute content that looks equally credible”. Thus, outlets cannot
only count on their pre-existing reputation to attract readers, and being the first to
break the news is increasingly important. Rosenberg and Feldman (2008) note, “Why
do experienced journalists telecast unscreened material in volatile situations? Because
they can, and because they are driven by powerful, rush-to-report hard instinct, the
one commanding them to beat or at least keep astride of the competition and not be
left behind”.
The second is the 24-hour news cycle (Lee 2014, Starbird et al. 2018), which leads
to the possibility of being preempted at any point in time. Newspapers used to have
editions making it possible to verify information up until the night before publication,
almost without fear of someone else breaking the news. That is no longer the case.
As Howard Kurtz from Washington Post describes, “In the last year, the pendulum
has swung in our newsroom to putting things on the Web almost immediately [...]
everybody wants it now-now-now. [...] But the sacrifice (clearly) is in the extra phone
calls and the chance to briefly reflect on the story that you are slapping together”
(Rosenberg and Feldman 2008).
Importantly, however, reputational concerns remain relevant. Reuters Handbook of
Journalism states “Reuters aims to report facts, not rumors. Clients rely on us to
differentiate between fact and rumor, and our reputation rests partly on that”. Note
that reputation is based on the ability to check the facts before releasing them, which
is also how we model it. Knobel (2018) summarizes her interviews with the editors
by saying that they realize that readers can be induced to pay for quality journalism.
She quotes Rex Smith, editor of the Albany Times Union, “What can separate great
journalism from everything else is our commitment to the journalism of verification and
watchdog reporting. It will give us credibility that other organizations do not have.”
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Some new literature from media studies paints a more positive image of the future of
watchdog reporting. While not exactly the same as reporting accurate stories, watchdog
reporting, which includes investigative journalism and fact-checking, takes time. We
show here the data from Knobel’s study in support of our theoretical results in Table
3.1. The table shows an increasing share of accountability reporting among a sample
of 9 US newspapers for 1991-2011. 2001 in her sample marks the year that the Internet
and social media took off in a big way, and became an essential source of news for the
audience. We can see how almost all newspapers have increased their accountability
reporting since then. The increase is visible for both deep and simple accountability
reporting, and across newspaper groups. While the increase may be due to several
reasons, her data together with the interviews hint at similar path to that which we
outline in this paper.
Table 3.1: Deep (first row) and simple (second row) accountability reporting (as a % of total front-page
stories in April) in a sample of 9 newspapers in the US for 1991-2011 in five-year gaps
Newspaper group Newspaper 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 Average
Large
Wall Street Journal 1.28 2.33 5.88 5.26 4.85 4.03
30.77 22.09 23.53 22.11 27.18 25.06
Washington Post 1.51 3.55 4.23 2.72 7.74 3.80
25.63 27.41 31.92 37.50 36.13 31.43
New York Times 0.34 0.93 4.35 5.43 3.19 2.46
10.51 9.29 18.26 19.57 28.72 15.82
Metropolitan
dailies
Albany Times Union (NY) 6.35 1.22 3.45 4.12 3.61 3.64
47.62 23.17 28.74 17.53 36.14 26.37
Denver Post 0.00 4.85 1.80 3.06 5.13 2.92
23.33 22.33 28.83 29.59 43.59 28.96
Minneapolis Star Tribune 2.46 1.15 1.83 2.86 5.00 2.68
31.97 36.78 22.02 34.29 41.00 32.89
Atlanta Journal-Constitution 1.20 0.00 1.06 1.75 11.84 2.30
14.97 11.11 13.30 30.70 48.68 20.52
Small
Bradenton Herald (FL) 0.93 1.61 1.14 1.27 1.44 1.26
19.44 33.87 32.95 21.52 19.42 24.16
Lewiston Tribune (ID) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.45 0.32
22.22 15.25 40.74 28.33 23.19 25.80
Average 1.26 1.81 2.92 3.25 4.46 2.69
21.52 19.78 24.46 27.26 32.59 24.94
Source: The Watchdog Still Barks: How Accountability Reporting Evolved for the Digital Age. Knobel
(2018). The author analyzed the content of every front-page story that was published in the month of April
(randomly selected) in five-year gaps starting 1991 in a select sample of 9 newspapers. The stories chosen
for deep and simple categories involved the following procedure. First, the author eliminated stories that
were breaking news. Second, she eliminated stories that had no relation to public policy or politics. In
all, she analyzed 1,491 stories in depth using content analysis. Simple accountability reports/stories are
those that took a few hours or days to complete, relying on straightforward reporting such as interviews or
reviewing published documents. Deep accountability reports/stories are those that took weeks or months
to develop and would have remained secret without the journalists’ work.
The model we build tries to combine these insights into a unified analysis of the speed-
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accuracy tradeoff and the competing forces that determine its direction.
3.1.2 Contributions to related economics literature
We primarily contribute to the literature on media competition and quality of news
by explicitly modeling the newsroom dilemma. The newsroom dilemma, or the speed-
accuracy tradeoff, is surprisingly understudied in the field despite agreement among
media scholars on its importance. One exception is Andreottola and De Moragas
(2017). They look at the political economy impact of a similar speed-accuracy tradeoff
and find that competition leads to a release of less accurate information. Our paper
differs because we explicitly model the reputational concerns of media outlets. We
identify conditions where the additional information transmitted by the presence of
competitors overcomes the preemption concerns.
Some new literature has also started exploring theoretically the effect of the Internet
on the media landscape. In Angelucci and Cagé (2019), for instance, the authors show
that an Internet-driven drop in the advertising revenues leads to a smaller newsroom,
decrease in prices and a move towards “soft” information. Similarly, Armstrong (2005)
looks at the relative effect of advertising-only with a subscription-based funding mecha-
nism on journalistic quality. All of these papers and others (Ellman and Germano 2009,
Gentzkow 2014) build on two-sided market models (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Rochet
and Tirole 2006) and are concerned with pricing decisions. We do not explicitly model
advertising and pricing concerns. We instead subsume them under either preemption
or reputational concerns.
Some recent papers that do not look at pricing explicitly but explore the political
consequences of new media or of media competition are Sobbrio (2014), Allcott and
Gentzkow (2017), Barrera et al. (2017), Chen and Suen (2016), Perego and Yuksel
(2018) and Vaccari (2018). For instance, Chen and Suen (2016) look at media com-
petition and endogenous attention allocation. They do not have the speed-accuracy
tradeoff, but they show that increased competition reduces outlets’ investment in re-
porting quality, increasing the overall influence of the media industry. Perego and
Yuksel (2018) and Vaccari (2018) look at the distortive effect of competition on infor-
mation provision by biased outlets, and as a consequence on the level of information
121
voters can acquire. In both cases, competition can increase distortions. In this paper
we abstract from outlets’ political motivations to focus on their incentives to provide
good quality journalism.
Focusing more on the reputation-building and signaling in media markets, Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006) model media bias and reputation building, showing that compe-
tition reduces bias. The model explores an entirely different tradeoff looking at the
content of the reporting directly, rather than the timing. Also, the “positive” effect
of reputation comes from a different channel – with competition the reader is more
and more likely to learn the actual state eventually. Our model does not have this
feature as the audience eventually learn the actual story, and competition does not
affect the revelation incentives in this way. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) later provide
an outline of a model that may incorporate reputation-building incentives like ours but
they do not consider preemption. Shapiro (2016) shows that reputational concern for
unbiasedness may induce journalists to report evidence as ambiguous even when it is
not. Preemption concerns and endogenous choice of research are not considered there.
Our modelling strategy shares some features with Hafer et al. (2018) and Hafer et al.
(2019). Like us, they have a two period model where competing outlets can acquire
information about a politically relevant state of the world and choose when to release
it. However, we do not focus on media bias and on the possibility of claiming credit for
a story, but rather on the trade off between time pressure and quality of journalism.
See Prat and Strömberg (2013) and Strömberg (2015) for recent developments in the
political economy of media literature, and other related papers.
We also contribute to the literature on strategic information release. We differentiate
from Guttman (2010) and Guttman et al. (2014) by adding reputational concerns and
endogenizing the information acquisition choice. Therefore, our results are driven by
completely different incentives. Relatedly, Aghamolla (2016) looks at a model of (anti-
)herding between financial analysts with endogenous information acquisition. While
observational learning is critical in such herding models, reputation building drives
such incentives in our model. Observational learning is relevant for the audience in
our model because it signals the type of the outlet. Gratton et al. (2017) look at
a model in which a sender strategically releases a stream of information to influence
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perceptions about herself. They show that better sender types release the information
earlier and expose themselves to scrutiny. This is in contrast with our model, where
better outlets release information later. Preemption concerns drive the incentives in
our model, which produces our different result.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on preemption games and R&D races by
adding reputational concerns. Preemption games have long been studied in economics
(Fudenberg et al. 1983, Fudenberg and Tirole 1985), but our paper contributes to the
more recent literature on preemption games with private information (Hopenhayn and
Squintani 2011, Hopenhayn and Squintani 2015, Bobtcheff et al. 2016). It is worth
noting that Bobtcheff et al. (2016) have a similar “separating” result for different
types of firms, but in a set up without reputation. Here we point out that reputation,
combined with actions that partially reveal an opponent’s type, can be a different force
leading to separating strategies in preemption games.
3.2 A model of the newsroom dilemma
We build a simple two-period model indexed by t = 1, 2 featuring three players: two
strategic media outlets i, j and a fixed mass of audiences. We also consider a version
with just one media outlet.
State of the world. The state of the world ω is binary and unknown to the players.
Formally, ω ∈ Ω := {a, b} with common prior Pr(ω = a) = 12 . Ω pertains to the topic
on which the media outlets are digging a story, and the relevant information for the
audience. This could be, for instance, who is responsible for a terrorist attack, whether
a senior government official is involved in corruption or not, who is an appropriate
candidate to vote for in the election, etc.
Media outlets. Initially, each outlet privately observes a signal si about the state of
the world in t = 1. We call this the story that the outlets have. We assume that si






The two outlets decide simultaneously at this stage whether to publish their signals, or
conduct further research. The decision di for outlet i in t = 1 is, therefore, to choose
from {pub, res} where pub is publish immediately, i.e. in t = 1, and res is do more
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research and then publish in t = 2.
Publishing is equivalent to endorsing a particular state of the world (independent of
whether published in t = 1 or 2). When an outlet publishes its story it sends a message
m ∈M = {ã, b̃} where ω̃ means endorsing state ω.
Conducting further research (and then publishing in t = 2) is costly. In particular,
there is a type specific cost of research that perfectly reveals the true state of the
world in t = 2. Outlets can be of two types, high or low quality, depending on how
efficient they are at digging into stories, and this is the private information of each
individual outlet. Formally, the type of outlet i is θi ∈ {h, l} with a common prior
Pr(θi = h) = q = 12 . The types are independent.
θ = l faces an infinite cost of conducting research. The low quality outlet never digs
stories further and chooses d = pub in t = 1. The cost c for the high quality outlet
is private information of that outlet, and is story-specific. It comes from a uniform
distribution F with support [−ε, c̄] and is drawn independently for each high quality
outlet. ε is greater than zero but small to capture the idea that some high quality
outlets may still want to conduct research even in the absence of other rewards.4 We
assume c̄ ≥ 2 so that the support of the distribution F is sufficiently large.
Finally, the assumption on q is just for analytic convenience. A generic q ∈ (0, 1) would
not alter the results, qualitatively. We show this case in Appendix C3.
Audience. The audience enters the game when one or both of the outlets publish their
story, and their story is revealed (i.e. m). They only rationally form beliefs about the
types of the outlets. They enter with the knowledge of the priors and an understanding
of the competition between the outlets. Other than this, the precise information of the
audience at the time of belief formation is denoted by the set I.
We assume that the audience observes the sequence of publication but not the ac-
tual time of publication, or whether the outlets conducted research. The sequence, as
distinguished from the timing, shows whether the outlets moved sequentially or simul-
taneously. Under this assumption, the audience will be able to determine the actual
4Interviews with editors often confirm such motivations; often they feel a sense of responsibility
in their positions. For instance, Knobel quotes Marcus Brauchli, Washington Post ’s former editor,
“Doing investigative journalism is in the Post ’s DNA and has been as long as any of us have been
around in journalism.” Similarly, Kevin Riley, the Editor of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution explains,
“People want us to do this. They don’t think anyone else will if we don’t.”
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time of publication (i.e. t = 1, 2) only if the outlets moved sequentially. It can be
summarized by t̃i ∈ {I, II,∅}, which shows whether outlet i was first, second, or it
moved simultaneously with j. This assumption is discussed in more details in Section
3.2.2 and its implications are described in the main analysis (section 3.3).
In addition, after both the outlets publish their stories, the state is revealed exoge-
nously. If mi = ω, then outlet i is said to be right, or R. Otherwise, the outlet is
wrong, denoted by W . We call this the outcome O of verification. The audience sees
the outcome. Therefore, the information of the audience I at the end of the game is




) that consists of four pieces of information, i.e. the position
of each outlet in the sequence of publication and their outcomes. Using I, the audience
updates its beliefs about each outlet’s type. Denote the posterior belief about θ = h
by γ(I) when the information held by the audience is I.
Payoffs. Currently, we do not illustrate the payoffs of the audience as they only form
beliefs. We will, however, place more structure on its preferences at a later stage and
explain the source of outlets’ payoffs. For the time being, we only focus on the outlets’
payoffs, which are composed of three elements.
1. The first is a scoop value v to the first outlet publishing the story. It captures
the preemptive nature of the media market, highlighted for example in Besley
and Prat (2006). v can be interpreted as the mass of audience that is drawn to
the first media outlet breaking the story.
2. The second is a reputation value of γi or the audience’s posterior on the quality
of outlet i calculated after revelation of the true state. This captures the extent
to which the outlets care about their reputation. For instance, future audience of
the outlets might depend on their reputations. We assume that reputation enters
linearly in the outlets’ payoffs. Importantly, the audience cares about whether
the outlet is high or low type, not about c. A new c is drawn for every new story
and only the high type has the ability to conduct further research.
3. The third is the cost c that the high type outlet chooses to pay if it does research
in period 1.
Timing. The timing of the game can now be summarized as follows:
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0. Nature draws ω, θi and θj . θ is privately observed by each outlet. ω is unobserved.
1. At t = 1 each outlet privately observes si. A cost c of digging into the story is
drawn from a uniform distribution F [−ε, c̄] for the high type.
2. The outlets simultaneously decide di ∈ {pub, res} and if di = pub then also choose
m. As stated before, this is a relevant decision only for the high type. The low
type always chooses pub.
3. If both outlets publish, the game ends. Otherwise, the game goes to period 2.
4. At t = 2, the state is revealed to every outlet that chose di = res. Those who
did not publish in t = 1, publish now by choosing m.
5. Once both the outlets have published, the state ω is revealed to the audience.
They observe I and update beliefs on the type of each outlet. Payoffs are realized.
3.2.1 Solution concept and equilibria selection
The solution concept we use is the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
We focus on equilibria where outlets optimally follow the signal they receive, i.e they
endorse the state that is more likely to be the true one given their signal. We call such
equilibria signal-based equilibria.5 For the rest of the paper, we use “equilibrium” and
“signal-based equilibrium” interchangeably.
3.2.2 Discussion of assumptions
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth discussing our assumptions in detail.
The first assumption we make is regarding what the audience observes about the timing
of the game. The fact that the audience only observes the content of what was published
(i.e, m) and the sequence of publication (i.e., t̃ but not the actual t) captures the idea
that it is unaware of how much the outlets researched story. We believe this is a
realistic assumption in that the amount of research is hardly observable from outside
5This means that we ignore equilibria where outlets choose to endorse one particular state to
signal their type. Those equilibria may exist, but we argue that they do not make much sense given
the environment we are considering. Alternatively, we can assume that signals are hard information,
but the reader cannot infer the level of precision: the result would be exactly the same.
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the newsroom. Of course, the amount of research conducted maps in a probabilistic
way into the accuracy of a story, which the audience can check more easily. We allow
for such a possibility by letting the audience observe whether the story is true or false.
The important consequence of this assumption is that player i’s decision to publish/not
publish can potentially convey information about player j’s type. For example, if the
two outlets move sequentially and only a high type is expected to conduct research,
moving later is a signal of the first outlet being a low type. We show how relaxing this
assumption changes our result in Section 3.3.4.
The second assumption we make is about who possesses stories on a topic. In reality,
competing media outlets are often unaware of whether their competitors are also ex-
ploring the same story. We assume that both of the media outlets are aware that their
competitor also possesses the story. Doing so pushes the incentives of the outlets the
most towards speed. Still, we show that more research is possible under competition.
Including such a possibility further adds to the complications of the model.
The third assumption we make is that outlets build a reputation on their consistent
types, and not on the cost of digging into each independent story. Given that different
outlets usually have different expertise, it is reasonable to assume that they face dif-
ferent costs when exploring different stories. For instance, The Wall Street Journal is
a business-centric daily and has invested in building sources and methods for dealing
with business stories (such as avoiding lawsuits when potentially sensitive corporate in-
formation is published). However, in general, some outlets have a culture of researching
while others do not. Their type captures this.
We also make a few assumptions for tractability reasons. First, we do not allow for
the outlets to “sit on information” or wait for a period before publishing.6 Second, we
assume that the audience correctly finds out the state at the end of the game. Third,
we assume that the media outlet correctly finds out the state upon choosing to research.
3.2.3 Preliminary observations and strategies
We start with a few simplifying observations. All the proofs are in Appendix A3.
6We can show that for a sufficiently high v and relevant off-path beliefs, the outlets never choose
to wait.
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Observation 3.1 Suppose there are reputational gains in matching the state. If an
outlet decides to publish in t = 1, it follows its signal s, i.e sends m = s. If an outlet
decides to do research and then publish in t = 2, it follows the outcome of research.
Observation 3.1 follows from the fact that in t = 1 the most informative signal is s.
Therefore, the most likely state is the one given by the signal. This is a standard result
in this type of environment and follows from the flat priors on the state. Moreover,
in t = 2 the outlet choosing to research has learned the actual state and therefore,
publishes it (independent of what the original signal s stated). Thus, as long as there
is a gain in matching the state, each outlet follows its last signal, which is also the most
informative one.
There is also a useful result arising from our particular signal structure and flat prior
over the state.
Lemma 3.1 If each outlet follows its last signal when publishing, the following results
hold:
1. The probability of matching the state after only s is π.
2. Regardless of whether i decides to publish or research, from its point of view the
expected probability of player j matching the state without research is π.
Lemma 3.1 will be helpful in writing the incentive compatibility conditions for the
players. Doing so will require each outlet to consider whether the other will do research
and the subsequent probability of matching the state.
It is useful to define precisely the strategies we will focus our attention on. Note first
that the only relevant and meaningful decision that deserves our attention is the one
of the high type outlet in period 1. From the the outlet’s point of view, this will be a
threshold strategy where the threshold is defined on the cost c of research. The high
outlet conducts research if the realized cost c is less than some threshold cD (where
subscript D represents the case of a two firm duopoly).7 From the other outlet’s (and
the audience’s) point of view, define σi, the conjectured probability that outlet i chooses
7Similarly, the case of single firm monopoly is denoted by a threshold cM and in general, by a
subscript M .
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to research further in t = 1, conditional on outlet i being a high type. Therefore,
σi = Pr(c ≤ cD) = F (cD) =

0 cD < −ε
cD+ε
c̄+ε −ε ≤ cD ≤ c̄
1 cD > c̄
We are now ready to move to the equilibrium analysis arising in different market
configurations.
3.3 Competition leads to better reporting
3.3.1 Newsroom dilemma with a single firm: Monopoly
Let us start with the simplest case: there is a single media outlet and its type is known
to the audience.
Proposition 3.1 If there is one media outlet and θ is known to the audience, then the
high quality outlet conducts research with probability F (0) = εc̄+ε .
In this case, none of the aforementioned incentives are at play. There is obviously no
preemption risk and there is nothing to do in terms of reputation. Every type of outlet
gets v+1{θ = h} so it is pointless to pay any cost for researching. The outlet is driven
to research only because of its intrinsic motivation.
The case of monopoly with unknown type is more interesting. Proposition 3.2 summa-
rizes the main result.
Proposition 3.2 If there is one media outlet and θ is not known to the audience, there
exists a unique equilibrium in which the high quality outlet conducts research in t = 1
if
c ≤ (1− π)(γ(R)− γ(W )) := cM
where γ(R) and γ(W ) are the audience beliefs about the outlet’s quality after it gets the





Note that the preemption risk is absent in this case as there is only one outlet. v
does not play any role in the threshold above. But a high outlet is incentivized to do
research to build a reputation for being a high quality. However, this reputation cannot
be based on the observation of sequence or timing. The only relevant thing that the
audience observes is whether the outlet is right or wrong, i.e. whether m = ω or not
after the state is verified. Therefore, if the high outlet is expected to choose to research
with probability σ, the two relevant belief updates are
γ(R) =
σ + (1− σ)π
σ + (1− σ)π + π
and γ(W ) =
(1− σ)(1− π)




from Bayes’ rule. Now, it must be that the additional cost c of choosing d = res is
more than compensated by the expected reputational gains from endorsing the correct
state. This is captured in cM of Proposition 3.2.
3.3.2 Newsroom dilemma with two firms: Duopoly
The main effect of competition is the introduction of preemption risk. When preemp-
tion is relevant and reputation building is not, then the equilibrium where the high
quality outlet conducts research becomes even rarer than in Proposition 3.1. Proposi-
tion 3.3 below highlights this.
Proposition 3.3 If there are two media outlets and θ is known to the audience, there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in which the high quality outlets conduct research





Intuitively, there is nothing to gain from conducting research in terms of reputation as
θ is known. The only reason to investigate further is if there is an intrinsic motivation
to do so. But now there is a preemption risk that reduces the incentives to investigate.
However, if v is sufficiently small relative to the intrinsic motivation (i.e. if v < 2ε),
there will still be some high outlets willing to investigate.
The case of competition plus hidden types is the most interesting one. In this case,
both the preemption and reputation building concerns are simultaneously relevant and
interact with each other. Before we present the key proposition, we discuss how the
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audience updates beliefs in this environment. Recall that the audience observes both
the outcome of verification O ∈ {R,W} and the sequence of publication t̃ ∈ {I, II,∅}
for both i and j. Suppose now that a high quality outlet chooses to research with
probability σi. Then, for a given conjectured level of σi and σj , the relevant audience’s
on-path beliefs need to be defined for the following events:
{(R∅, R∅), (R∅,W∅), (W∅,W∅), (W∅, R∅), (RI, RII), (WI, RII), (RII, RI), (RII,WI)}
where the first outcome-sequence element in each information set is outlet i’s and the
second is outlet j’s.8
It can be shown that there are three relevant set of events for belief updating. The
first is when both the outlets get the state correct and they publish simultaneously.
γi(R∅, R∅) =
σiσj + (1− σi)(2− σj)π2
σiσj + (2− σi)(2− σj)π2
:= γi(∅)
Here the audience is unable to determine the actual timing of publication. It cannot
distinguish as to whether both conducted research (which happens only if both are
high types) or both published immediately (either because they are both low types, or
because there is only one high type and it faced a high cost, or because both are high
types but they faced high costs). With some abuse of notation, we denote the updated
belief under “no information about timing” event by γ(∅).
The second is when the audience is able to determine that outlet i moved in t = 1.
γi(R∅,W∅) = γ
i(W∅,W∅) = γ
i(W∅, R∅) = γ





This, of course happens when i moves first and j moves second (independent of whether
i gets the state correct or not). But the audience is also able to understand it when
the outlets move simultaneously and at least one of them gets the state incorrect
(since researching further perfectly reveals the state). Here the only uncertainty for
the audience is whether the outlet is a high quality one that faced a high cost or a low
quality one. We denote the updated belief under the “published in period 1” event by
8Note that it never happens that an outlet moves second in the sequence and gets the state incorrect.
Any outlet that moves second has conducted research and matches the state perfectly. Therefore, any
event with WII does not occur on-path.
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γ(1). Observe how in these events the presence of a competitor conveys to the reader
some additional information about the type of each outlet.
Finally, the third is when the audience is able to determine that outlet i moved in
t = 2.
γi(RII, RI) = γ
i(RII,WI) = 1 := γ
i(2)
This only happens when outlet i moves second and gets the state correct, which in
turn is only possible if it is a high quality outlet. Therefore, the updated belief under
“published in t = 2” event is γ(2) = 1.9
Using these updated beliefs, a high quality outlet’s incentive compatibility can be
written as follows. For any given conjectured σj and audience’s beliefs, a high quality
outlet i with cost ci chooses to research further if


















σj(v + γi(1)) + (1− σj)
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+ π2γi(∅) + (1− π2)γi(1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payoff from publication












v := ciD (3.1)
Proposition 3.4 then follows:
Proposition 3.4 If there are two media outlets and θ is not known to the audience,











where γ(∅) = (σ
∗)2+(1−σ∗)(2−σ∗)π2
(σ∗)2+(2−σ∗)2π2 and γ(1) =
1−σ∗
2−σ∗ .
Looking now at the cost threshold cD of Proposition 3.4, we can see the negative effect
of v. If preemption concerns are very salient (i.e. v is high), then separation happens
for a smaller range of c making research less likely. On the other hand, the positive
9This is off path if, in equilibrium, every high quality outlet chooses not to research. However, we
assume that off path beliefs are γ(2) = 1 in this case as well.
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side of the condition is given by the expected reputational gains of matching the state
(and publishing second).
3.3.3 Competition may lead to better reporting
The comparison between monopoly and duopoly when reputation building is relevant
(Propositions 3.2 and 3.4) provides interesting insights.
Lemma 3.2 The reputational gains are always higher in duopoly than in monopoly.
The reason lies in the availability of additional information in the case of duopoly.
First, the presence of two outlets allows the audience to compare their contents, i.e.
which states outlets i and j endorsed. Second, it allows the audience to observe the
sequence of publication of the two outlets. Together, these two factors allow outlet
i to publish after outlet j, match the state correctly, and signal its type more easily.
In turn, this makes outlet i more willing to pay the cost of research. However, the
additional preemption concerns in duopoly counterbalance this positive information
effect, and makes cD decreasing in v. The two effects combined yield our first main
result pertaining to the effect of Internet-driven competition on reporting.
Proposition 3.5 There exists a nonempty interval of v values where σ∗D > σ
∗
M .
Basically, what Proposition 3.5 says is that there is a nonempty set of parameters where
research is more likely in duopoly than in monopoly. Therefore, competition may lead
to better reporting.
A good way to illustrate Proposition 3.5 is Figure 3.1. The orange line is F (cD), the
green line is F (cM ) and the blue one is the 45 degree line. The equilibrium probability
of research is given by the point of intersection of Fc(cD) and Fc(cM ) with the 45 degree
line. It is clear that σ∗D > σ
∗
M for sufficiently small v.
Intuitively, reputational gains in monopoly are given by the increased probability of
getting the state right. In duopoly, the audience can use one extra piece of information
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium σ∗D and σ
∗
M for when π = .6, v = .3, c̄ = 2 and ε = .1.










– the action of the other outlet, which includes the outcome of verification and the
sequence of publication. Hence, competition induces a trade off between those two
forces pushing in opposite directions. Importantly, this trade off is not obvious. The
main point of Proposition 3.5 is precisely to point out that, contrary to the wisdom of
the crowd in media studies literature, competition does not necessarily lead to a faster
release of less accurate information.
3.3.4 The role of audience’s information
The previous results relied critically on what the audience observes from the compe-
tition, or simply the “transparency”. To build further intuition, here we analyze how
changing the transparency affects our result. In general, the effect of transparency
on the possibility that competition induces better reporting is non-monotonic. To see
why, consider the two other possibilities – nothing about the timing is observable and
the timing of research is fully observable. Our original assumption lies in the middle of
this increasing transparency spectrum. Of course, the content of publication is always
visible to the audience, i.e. the audience observes m.
Unobservable timing or zero transparency. Suppose the audience observes nei-
ther the timing of publication nor the sequence of publication. It simply consumes the
content of the outlet publishing the story. In this case, the behavior of the monopolist
is exactly as before. Hence, cM = (1−π)(γ(R)−γ(W )) does not change. In the case of
134
duopoly, however, the endorsement of the other outlet does not matter anymore in the
updating. The audience considers each outlet separately because nothing about the
timing is observed. Therefore, γ(R, .) = γ(R) and γ(W, .) = γ(W ). The consequence
is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 If neither time nor the sequence of publication are observable,




and therefore, c′D < cM for every strictly positive v.
Intuitively, there are no additional reputational gains because it is not easier to “look
good” in the presence of a competitor. In fact, the reputational part of the cost
threshold is exactly the same. But the additional risk of preemption pushes cD down.
Observable timing or full transparency. If the timing of publication is observable,
the monopolist can fully differentiate itself by publishing in period 2. This is possi-
ble because the audience can now perfectly distinguish between period 1 and 2, and
therefore, is fully aware of whether research was conducted or not. Moreover, this is
true in duopoly as well. In fact, the actual content of the publication does not matter
for the reputation-building, and differentiation is driven entirely by the timing. As
a consequence, the logic applies as before. The reputational part of the threshold is
the same, but preemption concerns reduce the incentives to investigate and conduct
research.
Corollary 3.2 If the timing of publication is observable,








M for every strictly positive v.
Note that now the cost thresholds are bigger than in the previous information envi-
ronments. This is so because now maximum distinction is possible between the two
outlets. Therefore, the actual levels of reputational benefits are also higher. This is
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but now γ(2) = 1.
It is worth emphasizing that both of these extreme transparency assumptions are some-
how problematic. Completely unobservable timing clashes with the idea of a scoop
value, or more generally with the preemptive nature of the media market. If the au-
dience has no understanding of when the publication happened, there is nothing to
gain from being first. There are only gains from ultimate publication. This is obvi-
ously not true in reality. Completely observable timing, on the other hand, implies
that the reader perfectly understands exactly how much research went into an article.
Therefore, the whole differentiation happens on the time dimension, rather than on the
truthfulness of the story. Again, this hardly seems true in reality.
3.4 Stories and the effect of better initial information
We are now in a position to discuss what kinds of stories are susceptible to more speed-
driven journalism and what aren’t. To do so, we place more restrictions on audience
preferences.
Let there be a unit mass of audience. The audience decides on whether to take an
action or not. Let this action be denoted by α ∈ {a, b} and interpreted as “matching the
state”. The audience seeks out the information published by the outlets and consumes
their content to the extent it wants to match its action to the story. Examples include
decisions on who to vote or to form opinions. Note that the audience also has an option
not take the action at all and therefore, not opt for any outlet.
For any given story, a fraction u of this audience requires the information urgently.
The preferences of members of the urgent audience is given by
Vu =

1 if deciding today and α = ω,
0 if deciding today and α 6= ω,
−k if remaining undecided or deciding tomorrow
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where ‘today” happens for the audience when the first outlet publishes its content. So,
when the outlets publish sequentially, there is a clear notion of today and tomorrow.
However, when the outlets publish simultaneously, today happens at that time period.10




1 if α = ω,
−k if α 6= ω,
0 if remaining undecided.
Observe that the patient audience does not care about when it makes the decision.
Taking an accurate decision matters more. Notably, the difference between the urgent
and the patient audience lies in how they value making a wrong decision. Assuming
k to be sufficiently large, it matters more to the urgent audience to make a decision
as soon as the first outlet publishes. For the patient audience, on the other hand,
it matters more to not make an incorrect decision. Therefore, it chooses to remain
uninformed (i.e. does not consume the content) if it is unsure about whether the story
has been researched or not. Specifically, when the outlets publish simultaneously, the
patient audience prefers to remain undecided and uninformed than to take the wrong
action.11
Given these preferences, the audience picks its most preferred outlet. Type u audience
always consumes content from the first outlet to publish the story, and 1− u picks the
second one, if there is one. When both of the outlets publish simultaneously, then only
u types are available. This audience chooses one of the outlets randomly. Therefore,
u is akin to v, or the scoop value from the previous analysis. In addition, we assume
that the entire mass of audience is available for reputation building.
u is story-specific and when the outlets get a story they also learn perfectly the value
of u. The idea is that those stories with a relatively high u are more urgent than
others. These could include, for example, information about whether a company has
10Today and tomorrow are essentially defined along t = 1 and 2. They both happen before the true
story in eventually revealed.
11We treat each of the two subgroups that compose the audience as a single entity, as the preferences
of their members are identical. If they have different information, e.g. because half of the group
consumes one outlet and half the other, and outlets endorse different states, we assume they choose
the action by tossing a fair coin. Note that subgroup payoffs depend on the decision of the subgroup,
not on the collective decision of the audience as a whole.
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gone bankrupt, or whether the police caught the terrorists, etc.
First, observe that nothing changes relative to the monopoly case discussed in Propo-
sition 3.2. As there is no sense of time order, the audience preference for urgency
does not alter the equilibrium. However, now the duopoly case looks different. Noting
that the belief updating remains the same, the new condition for outlet i conducting
research becomes


















σj(u+ γi(1)) + (1− σj)
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+ π2γi(∅) + (1− π2)γi(1)
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︸ ︷︷ ︸


















Observe in condition (3.4) that the incentives to research have increased. By research-
ing and being the second one to publish the story, the outlet gets an additional 1− u
readers on top of building a perfect reputation. Said another way, this dilutes preemp-
tion concerns as both the first and the second mover have their respective markets.
Therefore, we first need to check if a symmetric and unique equilibrium c̄D exists à la
Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.6 Let there be a fraction u of audience available to the first outlet
publishing and let c̄ ≥ 2.5. If there are two media outlets and θ is not known to the
audience, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium where σ̄i∗ = σ̄j∗ := σ̄∗ =











where γ(∅) = (σ̄
∗)2+(1−σ̄∗)(2−σ̄∗)π2
(σ̄∗)2+(2−σ̄∗)2π2 and γ(1) =
1−σ̄∗
2−σ̄∗ .
Note that while v was unbounded, u ∈ [0, 1]. But an increase in the fraction of urgent
audience u still has a negative effect on c̄D and decreases σ̄
∗. Therefore, a high fraction
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of impatient audience pushes the outlets towards speed. The next proposition compares
the probabilities of research in the no-competition monopoly case with the duopoly case
on the basis of u.
Proposition 3.7 There exists an interior u, ū ∈ (0, 1) such that
 for stories with u < ū, c̄D > cM so that research by high outlets in duopoly is
more likely than in monopoly (σ̄D > σM );
 for stories with u > ū, c̄D < cM so that research by high outlets in duopoly is less
likely than in monopoly (σ̄D < σM ); and
 for stories with u = ū, c̄D = cM so that research by high outlets in duopoly is
equally likely as in monopoly (σ̄D = σM ).
We can therefore see that competitive environments are better for research on non-
urgent topics. A good example is the recent New York Times exposé on sexual abuse
in Hollywood. It is reasonable to believe that sexual abuse in the movie industry
does not directly impact a large fraction of society. Yet, it was an important finding
that will have a long-run impact as women come forward and demand justice, and
organizations respond. On the flip side, investigations and research on urgent topics is
less likely in competitive environments. The example of terrorist attacks fits perfectly
in this setting. In fact, after the Boston Marathon Bombings in April 2013 there was
much confusion in the media and articles were published without fact-checking. The
intuition is simple: when a large fraction of the audience seeks information quickly,
outlets compete to be the first one to publish the news.
We can now also make assessments about the audience’s welfare.12 The audience’s
































σ̄∗(2− σ̄∗)(1− u) + 1
4
(1− (1− σ̄∗)2)u.
12Note that even if the audience knows that outlets may be publishing without research, it is still
better to listen to the outlets rather than to follow the priors in decision-making.
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The first term is the probability that the two outlets move together but do not research
further, i.e. they publish in t = 1. As a result, the probability of matching the state is π
and only fraction u of the audience gets this payoff. The second term is the probability
that the outlets move sequentially, in which case the fraction 1 − u match the state,
but fraction u only match it with probability π. Finally, the third is when both outlets
move together in t = 2 after researching further. In this case, they match the state
perfectly but fraction 1− u does not receive this payoff.
As discussed in Section 3.1, another important effect of the Internet has been to make
it easier to conduct preliminary research. Emails and social media make it particularly
easy to share pictures, video and text from any part of the world. One way to interpret
it is as an increase in π or the precision of s. This, Knobel (2018) argues, should
lead to better reporting. We show below that that is not necessarily true. Our next
proposition shows that the overall effect of an increase in π on V is dependent on the
kind of story u being explored.
Proposition 3.8 There exists an interior u, ūV ∈ (0, 1), such that if u < ūV an
increase in precision π of initial signal s decreases the overall welfare V .
The intuition for this somewhat surprising result is easy. The equilibrium probability
of research falls as precision π increases. This is because a higher π reduces the reputa-
tional gain that comes with separation. The audience attributes correctly matching the
state more to better initial information that comes costlessly due to better technology
rather than actual research. Preemption concerns, therefore, become more salient and
push the outlets towards speed. In turn, it hurts the average audience if it is composed
of more patient types, i.e. u is low and then π increases.





























When the fraction of urgent audience is low enough, an increase in π hurts an average
audience member. Better preliminary research is good news for the audience only if
separation does not happen and is not desired. However it also discourages separation,
which hurts the audience when it is desired.
3.5 Information dissemination by a source
We now turn back to our original model and discuss the case of a strategic source. We
can use our model to determine how a source can share information with media outlets.
In general, our strategic source’s preferences are summarized by the following objective
function,
1{publication in t = 1}+ µPr(matching the state).
Therefore, the source has a preference for speed vs. accuracy. The parameter µ ≥ 0
captures the weight that the source places on accurate information from at least one
outlet vis-à-vis having at least one outlet publishing in period 1. For instance, a
concerned citizen or an employee in a firm witnessing some wrongdoing might have
a high preference for accuracy. On the flip side, a politically-motivated source who
merely wants to get some potentially incorrect information out quickly will have a
low preference for accuracy. We want to determine whether a source wants to share
information with one or both the outlets to fulfill her objective.
In line with our model, we will assume that if the source shares a story with both of
the outlets, both are aware that the other also possesses the same story. Therefore,
the information is shared “publicly”.13 But when the source shares information with
just one outlet, we will assume that the other is unaware. This allows the outlet with
a story to effectively behave as a monopolist from our analysis in Section 3.3.1. In
addition, we assume that the source possesses a story of a fixed precision π. She makes
her decision about who to share the story with at the beginning of the game before
time 0. The type of the outlet is still each outlet’s private information; the source does
not have this information when making her decision.
13One may imagine a politician revealing some negative evidence about a competitor on Twitter as
an example. It is common for news outlets to pick up this information and relay it, either as is or after
further fact-checking and investigations.
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First, we make a simple observation that follows from our analysis of monopoly and
duopoly. (In what follows, we drop the star notation for convenience with an under-
standing that we are talking about equilibrium values.)
Corollary 3.3 The equilibrium probability of research by a high outlet in monopoly is
σM > 0 while in duopoly is σD ≥ 0.
Corollary 3.3 is an important one. It highlights that while in monopoly the probability
of research is always positive; in duopoly it might be zero if v is sufficiently high. This
corollary will help us outline the behavior of a source who is aware of how high v is
associated with her story.
Second, we write down the expected utility of the source for the equilibrium research
probabilities that will be induced in the following subgame. The expected payoff from
sharing information with one outlet is
1
2
(1 + µπ) +
1
2
[σMµ+ (1− σM )(1 + µπ)] (3.3)
The first term reflects what the source gets if she gives the story to a low quality outlet,
and the second term is for giving it to a high quality outlet. Similarly, the expected











Again, the first term reflects the source’s payoff from facing two low type outlets. The
second is the payoff from facing one high type and one low type outlet. Note that in
this case the story is always published in the first period, but the high outlet matches
the state only if it does research. The third term is the payoff from facing two high
type outlets. Here, the possible situations are that neither researches; one researches,
or both research. The following lemma helps simplify the source’s optimal response for
a given σM and σD.
Lemma 3.3 The source’s best response can be summarized as follows:
 The source prefers to share the story with both the outlets unambiguously for any
µ ≥ 0 if σ
2
D




 Otherwise, the source prefers to share the story with both outlets if
µ(1− π)(2σM − σD(4− σD)) ≤ 2σM − σ2D
The lemma shows that there is a range of equilibrium σM and σD for which the source
always prefers to send information to both the outlets independent of µ. Interestingly,
this region lies around the σD = σM line. Therefore, the lemma shows that for σM and
σD close to each other there is reason to prefer both outlets. To understand why, let
us break this down into two further statements.
First, there are parameters where one outlet alone is more likely to research than
when it is competing with another (i.e. σM > σD) and µ is very large, and yet the
source prefers to share the story with two outlets. This happens because a lower σD is
compensated by a higher probability of investigation from more firms. But this requires
σD and σM to be close to each other. To see this, let us compare the total probability
of research (and matching the state) from sharing the story with one vs. both the




[σ2D + 2σD(1− σD)] +
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Second, there are parameters where one firm is less likely to research than two (i.e.
σM < σD) and µ is very low, and yet the source prefers to share the story with two
outlets. This, on the other hand, happens because competition between two firms
ensures the story comes out quicker despite each independent outlet researching with a
higher probability. To see this, we now compare the total probabilities of the story being
published in t = 1 under the two scenarios. When shared with one, this probability is
equal to 12 +
1
2(1− σM ) = 1−
σM














So, now despite σM < σD the source shares the story with both outlets if 1 −
σ2D
4 ≥





giving us our lower bound. But note again that for this argument to work σD and
σM should not be too different from each other. When this is the case, then what the
source does depends on her preference µ (captured in the second bullet point of Lemma
3.3).
In Figure 3.2, the shaded gray region shows the combinations of σD and σM where the
source always prefers to share stories with both outlets. The region is enclosed between
σM =
σD(4−σD)
2 (green) and σM =
σ2D
2 (orange), which includes σM = σD (blue).
Figure 3.2: Equilibria in σD − σM space and the behavior of the source.





























We now look at possible equilibria that can arise in the σD − σM space relative to the
source’s preferences. We begin by plotting an equilibrium frontier for a given c̄ and ε.
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Definition 2 (Equilibrium frontier) The equilibrium frontier is given by the com-
bination of equilibrium σD and σM generated by varying π ∈ [.5, 1] for v = 0 and a
fixed c̄ and ε.
The equilibrium frontier, therefore, shows the maximum equilibrium value that σD can
take for any equilibrium σM (since σD is decreasing in v from Corollary 3.3 and we
are setting v = 0 ). As proved in Lemma 3.2, when v = 0, σD > σM . Therefore,
the frontier lies to the right of the 45 degree line. In addition, note that it is upwards
sloping. The positive slope is a result of the fact that both σM and σD are decreasing
functions of π.14 A north-east movement along the frontier arises due to a decrease in
π. Figure 3.2 plots the equilibrium frontier for c̄ = 2 and ε = 1 in red.15
Once we have the equilibrium frontier, it is easy to see the set of all possible equilibrium
values that might arise for different parameter ranges. Particularly, increasing v is a
leftward movement from the frontier along the same σM . For v sufficiently high, σD = 0
while σM > 0 (see Corollary 3.3). We are now left with comparing these equilibrium
values with what the source wants.
Proposition 3.9 For a source with preferences given by µ ≥ 0,
 there exists an ε > 0 small enough and two thresholds v̄ > v such that if v < v





(1−π) , if v̄ ≥ v ≥ v the
source always sends the story both, and if v > v̄ the source sends the information






 there exists an ε > 0 large enough and a threshold v̄ such that if v ≤ v̄ the source







Our third main result follows by setting µ = 0 in the above proposition. It pertains
to the situation where the source only cares about getting the story out quickly inde-
pendent of whether it is accurate or not. Political actors are often interested in doing
so to highlight their achievements or to bring out potentially damaging information
14The proofs have been omitted from the main text for the sake of brevity.
15We choose a high value of ε for graphical representation only. When ε is low, the range of σM
and σD is also small, and it becomes difficult to clearly see the equilibria graphically.
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about their competitors. Twitter and other social media platforms are one way to
communicate such stories, which are then picked up by media outlets and relayed to
the public without further research.
Corollary 3.4 When the source does not care about accuracy, i.e. µ = 0,
 there exists an ε > 0 small enough and v̄ such that for v < v̄, the source sends
the story to one outlet, and sends to two in all other cases, and
 there exists an ε > 0 large enough such that the source sends the story to both
outlets.
The proof of both Proposition 3.9 and its corollary is by construction. The idea is that
when ε is small, (at least a part of) the frontier lies below the orange line in Figure 3.2.
Therefore, there arise two thresholds on v where only the middle part lies between the
two curves. For a ε high enough, there is only one threshold on v as depicted in the
figure. One can easily get the result of Corollary 3.4 by setting µ = 0 in Proposition
3.9.
Consider the intuition for the case of µ = 0. When the intrinsic motivation to conduct
research is high then independent of whether only one outlet has the story or both, the
outlets are more likely to conduct research. This is, however, not something a µ = 0
source desires. By sending to both, she is able to create preemption risk as well (even
for a low v). This improves on the situation of sending to one as the outlets are more
driven towards speed. On the other hand, when intrinsic motivation is low, outlets
are less likely to research. Now, the source does not always want to share the story
with both. Notably, when v is low the source wants to share information with just
one. Sending to both risks the outlets trying to separate by doing research, thereby
increasing the overall probability of research. However, again when v is high, the source
is happy to share the story with both as preemption concerns will become salient for
the outlets.16
16The intuition for the general case presented in Proposition 3.9 is similar but it is not easy to make
sharp predictions like we could with µ = 0 case. However, some additional predictions can be made
by choosing specific µ values. For instance, when v is very high so that σD = 0, the source prefers to
send to one outlet only if µ > 2.
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3.6 Conclusion
There have been increasing concerns in the past decade about how the Internet has
altered the incentives of media outlets. Notably, media critics have argued that increas-
ing competition in the Interent era has pushed outlets towards speed-driven journalism.
Our model shows that conventional wisdom about the effect of competition and the
modern digital environment on the media market should be taken cum grano salis. We
prove that competition in itself may make it easier for high quality outlets to engage in
more research-driven journalism to separate themselves from the low quality outlets.
For this to happen, it must be that the action of one of the outlets is somehow infor-
mative about the type of the other. This result and intuition finds support in some of
the new media studies literature such as in Knobel (2018) and Carson (2019).
It is, however, worth emphasizing the importance of a “sophisticated” audience in
generating the better-reporting result. We need the audience to place importance on
the accuracy of stories, and not always seek quick information. Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2008) suggest that scoop value is usually not too high in the media markets. But
at the same time, some media scholars have argued that the audience usually seeks
information earlier on social media. Similarly, our model shows the importance of
the audience observing the sequence of publication. This might also be an issue if
technology perfectly “flattens the digital plain” (see Section 3.1.1).
Our paper is one of the first to incorporate preemption and reputation concerns in
a single model by thinking of a natural setting where both incentives play a role.
However, there is further scope for research here. For instance, one may expand the
model to include news media bias. Bias and the speed-accuracy tradeoff can interact
in interesting ways. If bias makes reputational gains less salient (e.g. because future
readership does not depend on reputation) then it should push toward speed. On the
other hand, if bias implies a less informative publication and hence a smaller “scoop
value”, then it may actually push toward accuracy.
Our model also produces important testable predictions about how the modern digital
environment has altered the media landscape. First, we should see better reporting
of non-urgent issues in the Internet-age as the outlets try to build a reputation on
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such stories. Second, the effect of the Internet on the reporting of breaking-news type
stories is ambiguous. It might improve because of better source information but might
deteriorate because of more time pressure.
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Appendices
A3 Proofs from the main text
Proof of Observation 3.1.
Suppose that the outlet chooses d = pub. Without loss of generality, suppose that
si = a. It is easy to see that Pr(ω = a|si = a) > Pr(ω = b|si = a) because
π 12





π 12 + (1− π)
1
2
which is true because π > 12 .
Proof of Lemma 3.1.
First part. Without loss of generality, suppose that si = a. Then, if i chooses to
publish, it will endorse state a, i.e. send message m = a. by Bayes’ rule,
Pr(ω = a|si = a) =
π 12





Second part. We are interested in the probability that j matches the state from choosing
d = pub when i has received a signal si. This is equal to
Pr(sj = a|si)Pr(ω = a|sj = a and si) + Pr(sj = b|si)Pr(ω = b|sj = b and si) (A3.1)




Pr(ω = sj |sj and si) = Pr(s
j and si|ω = sj)Pr(ω = sj)
Pr(sj and si)
As a consequence, (A3.1) can be simplified to
Pr(sj = a and si|ω = a)Pr(ω = a)
Pr(si)
+




However, since signals are independent conditional on the state,
Pr(sj and si|ω = sj) = Pr(sj |ω = sj)Pr(si|ω = sj)
Moreover, Pr(sj |ω = sj) = π. Hence, (A3.2) becomes
π




Proof of Proposition 3.2.
Suppose that a high type outlet chooses d = res with probability σ. Reminding
ourselves from the main text that
γ(R) =
σ + (1− σ)π
σ + (1− σ)π + π
γ(W ) =
(1− σ)(1− π)




from Bayes’ rule and using the fact that a low type outlet always chooses pub.
A high type outlet optimally chooses res if
γ(R)− c ≥ πγ(R) + (1− π)γ(W ) =⇒ c ≤ (1− π)(γ(R)− γ(W )) := cM
In equilibrium the conjectured σ must be equal to the actual one, hence it must be
that






We need to check if such a fixed point exists. To do so, three observations are in
order. First, note that both the LHS and RHS of the above are continuous in σ∗.
Second, LHS(σ∗ = 0) = 0 < RHS(σ∗ = 0) = εc̄+ε (as cM = 0 at σ
∗ = 0). Third,
LHS(σ∗ = 1) = 1 > RHS(σ∗ = 1) = F (1−π1+π ). Therefore, the above is true.
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is not clear immediately. ∂
2RHS
∂(σ∗)2 > 0 requires
− π(1− π)2(2− σ∗)3 + (σ∗ + (1− σ∗)π + π)3 > 0 (A3.4)
It is easy to see that the LHS of (A3.4) is strictly increasing in σ∗ for all π ∈ (0.5, 1].
Moreover, the LHS of (A3.4) when we substitute σ∗ = 0 is −1 + 2π > 0. As a conse-
quence, the RHS of (A3.3) is strictly increasing and convex. Combined with the above,
it means that there is only one fixed point in the [0, 1] interval.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.














+ 1{θ = h},
where σ is the (symmetric) probability that the high quality competitor engages in
more research. By instead choosing res and publishing in t = 2 a high type outlet gets
a payoff of 12σ
v
2 + 1{θ = h} − c. Comparing the two, each outlet is willing to investi-






in symmetric equilibrium. Research
happens with positive probability when −v2 > −ε, which can be rearranged to v < 2ε.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
We complete this proof in several steps. To begin with, we conjecture that whenever
an outlet chooses to publish, it is optimal to endorse the state suggested by the signal.
This will be verified at the end of the proof.
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Step 1: We begin by showing that in any signal-based equilibria outlets’ period 1
decisions on whether to research or publish is described by a threshold on c. This
follows from the discussion in the text. Let σi and σj be the conjectured strategies.












v := ciD (3.1)
where γ(∅) = σ
iσj+(1−σi)(2−σj)π2
σiσj+(2−σi)(2−σj)π2 and γ(1) =
1−σi
2−σi . The problem is identical for player
j.
Step 2: Next, we show that for any σj there is only one σi that solves the equilibrium
fixed point for player i.
Given that cost is uniformly distributed in [−ε, c̄] and that, in equilibrium the conjec-
tured probability of investigation must be equal to the actual probability, the equilib-
rium levels of σi and σj must be the solutions of
σi = F (ciD(σ







i, σj) < −ε
ciD(σ
i,σj)+ε
c̄+ε −ε ≤ c
i
D(σ
i, σj) ≤ c̄
1 ciD(σ






i, σj) < −ε
1
c̄+ε −ε ≤ c
i
D(σ
i, σj) ≤ c̄
0 ciD(σ
i, σj) > c̄
We want to show that, for every σj , there is only one σi that solves σi = F (ciD(σ
i, σj)).
1. The LHS is linear, with slope equal to 1, starting at 0 and ending at 1.
2. As ciD(σ
i = 1, σj) < 1 < c̄, the RHS evaluated at σi = 1 < 1 = LHS at σi = 1;
152
3. The RHS evaluated at σi = 0 is greater than or equal to zero.
4. For any σj , both LHS and RHS are continuous in σi.
Hence, they cross at least once and there is at least one solution to this fixed point
problem.
To show that they cross only once, we need to show that the slope of the RHS is never








(σiσj+(2−σi)(2−σj)π2)2 , whose sign depends on the sign of (σ






















≥ 0. As a consequence, the second derivative is always increasing






|σi=0, and ciD reaches






which further simplifies to
(σj + (2− σj)π2)2(2− σj − 2 + σj) ≥ −4σj(2− σj)2π4.
This latter condition is always verified (strictly for positive σj , weakly when σj = 0).
Now, combining the above with the fact that ciD(σ
i = 1, σj) < 1, implies that they
cannot cross more than once.
Step 3: Third, we show that if an equilibrium exists, it is unique for c̄ ≥ 2.
Define σ̂i(σj) the optimal σi for a given σj . In equilibrium, it must be that
σ̂i(σ̂j(σi)) = σi (A3.5)
Rearranging, the equilibrium is the solution of σ̂i(σ̂j(σi))−σi = 0. Differentiating with





− 1 = 0. For the equilibrium to be unique (conditional
on its existence), it is now sufficient to show that the LHS is negative. This implies
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between −1 and 1. As the players are identical, it is enough to show that this holds
for one of them.
To show the above, begin by noting that σi(σj) is implicitly defined by the unique
solution of σi − F (ciD(σi, σj)) = 0. (Going forward we drop the ˆ notation with an












Consider first the denominator of (A3.6). From Step 2, we know that it is always
positive. Moreover, it will be smaller the bigger is
∂F (ciD)
∂σi











. As this reaches its maximum for σi = 1, we simply replace it and look for a








(σj − (2− σj)π2)2π2(2− σj)
(σj + (2− σj)π2)2








(σj + (2− σj)π2)2
]
= 1
where the second equality is a rearrangement and the third one follows from the fact
that this is maximized for σj = 0.
As a consequence, maxσi,σj
∂F (ciD)
∂σi
= 1c̄+ε and the smallest the denominator can be is
1
c̄+ε .
Second, consider the numerator.
∂F (ciD)
∂σj
is either zero or 1c̄+ε
∂ciD
∂σj









(σj − (2− σj)π2) + γi(∅) + π2(γi(∅)− γi(1))− 1
]
. (A3.7)
Finding the overall maximum and minimum is complicated, so we look for sufficient
conditions. We start out by looking at ∂γ
i(∅)
∂σj






(σiσj + (2− σi)(2− σj)π2)2
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−4(σi − (2− σi)π2)σiπ2
(σiσj + (2− σi)(2− σj)π2)3




12(σi − (2− σi)π2)2σiπ2
(σiσj + (2− σi)(2− σj)π2)4
which is positive. This implies that (for any σi) ∂γ
i(∅)
∂σj
is a convex function in σj which










(σi + (2− σi)π2)2


































(σi + (2− σi)π2)2
)
=
2π2(σi + (2− σi)π2)− 4(1− π2)σiπ2
(σi + (2− σi)π2)3
(A3.8)
Note that the relevant expression in (A3.8) is always positive for σi ≤ 2π2
1−π2 . For a
sufficiently high π, this includes the whole range of values of σi. Hence, the function












requires 1 + 2π2−3π4 ≥ 0, which is always














1−π2 ∈ [0, 1]. In partic-
















)2 requires π2 ≤ 23 , i.e. it is always the case in the range of parame-







Since we want ∂γ
i(∅)
∂σj
as big as possible, we can set it as 1
2π2
for our sufficiency condi-
tions.
Given this, the lowest value the numerator of ∂σ
i
∂σj
from (A3.6) can be found by making

















To see this, note thatminσi,σj (σ
j−(2−σj)π2) = −2π2, minσi,σjγi(∅) ≥ 0, minσi,σj (γi(∅)−





which simplifies to c̄ ≥ 2, as assumed.






















To see this, note that maxσi,σj (σ
j − (2 − σj)π2) = 1 − π2, maxσi,σjγi(∅) ≤ 1,
maxσi,σj (γ
i(∅)− γi(1)) ≤ 1. Therefore, our second sufficient condition for the unique-










The numerator is maximised at π = 12 , hence the condition simplifies to c̄ + ε >
15
16 .
Again, this is satisfied for c̄ ≥ 2.
Step 4: Fourth, we show that a symmetric equilibrium where σi∗ = σj∗ = σ∗ always
exists. Therefore, it is also unique among the set of signal-based equilibria.
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Because of symmetry, the equilibrium must be the fixed point of








(σ∗)2 + (1− σ∗)(2− σ∗)π2










Looking at (A3.9), note that both LHS and RHS are continuous on the [0, 1] interval.
Moreover, RHS(σ∗ = 0) ≥ 0 = LHS(σ∗) and RHS(σ∗ = 1) < 1 = LHS(σ∗ = 1). As a
consequence, there exists a solution in the [0, 1] interval. From the previous steps, we
know that this solution is unique.
Step 5: Finally, we show that in the symmetric equilibrium it is optimal to endorse
the state suggested by the most informative signal.
Assume that player j behaves as in the equilibrium described above. Now, by endorsing
the wrong state in period 2 player i shifts beliefs from γi(2) = 1 to γi(1) if it is the
only one publishing in that period, and from γi(∅) to γi(1) if both outlets publish in
period 2. In both cases, sticking to the correct state is at weakly dominant.
If outlet i chooses to publish in period 1, by endorsing the least likely state outlet i is
indifferent if it is the only one to publish in that period. If instead outlet j publishes in
period 1 as well, the expected reputation of outlet i by endorsing the state suggested
by the signal is π2γi(∅) + (1−π2)γi(1). By endorsing the opposite state, the expected
reputation is πγi(1) + (1 − π)
[
πγi(∅) + (1− π)γi(1)
]
. Again, the former is strictly
bigger than the latter because γi(∅) ≥ γi(1).
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
To show this, we compare the cost threshold in monopoly and duopoly shutting down
the preemption concerns, i.e. assuming v = 0. We want to show that in this case




(γ(∅)− γ(1)) (σ − (2− σ)π2) + 1
]
> (1− π)(γ(R)− γ(W )) (A3.10)
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Observe that γ(1) = γ(W ) = 1−σ2−σ . Moreover, define γ(∅) − γ(1) := A. We can now
rearrange equation (A3.10) so that it becomes
1
2











2σ(2− σ)(σ2 + (2− σ)2π2)− σ2(σ2 + 3(2− σ)2π2 − 2σ(2− σ))
((2− σ)(σ2 + (2− σ)2π2))2
(A3.12)
Signing (A3.12) is not easy in its current form. However, it is clear that limσ→0
∂A
∂σ = 0.
Moreover, we can rearrange A in a more tractable way. In particular, A = 1
(2−σ)(1+π2B2)









1 + π2B − 2π2B ∂B∂σ (2− σ)
((2− σ)(1 + π2B2))2
> 0.
The sign of ∂
2A
∂σ2
is even more complicated, but as A is defined over just two parameters,
σ ∈ [0, 1] and π ∈ (0.5, 1], we can prove graphically that ∂2A
∂σ2
> 0. In particular, Figure
A3.1 shows that ∂
2A
∂σ2
(the orange plane) is always strictly above the zero (blue plane)
for the entire set of relevant parameters.




the LHS is strictly increasing and convex. Moreover, ∂RHS∂σ > 0.












which further simplifies to
1− 3π + 2π2 − 2π3 < 0
Noticing that the LHS of the above is strictly decreasing in π, and it remains negative
for both π = 12 and π = 1, completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
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Proof of Lemma 3.2: Proving ∂
2A
∂σ2
> 0. Orange plane: ∂
2A
∂σ2
, blue plane: 0.σ + 0.π in
π − σ space.
This follows directly from the strict inequality of equation (A3.10) and the fact that v
only reduces its LHS, without affecting the RHS.
Proof of Corollary 3.1.
The behavior of the monopolist is unchanged with respect to Section 3.3.1. Looking
at the duopoly case, by Bayes’ rule
γi(R, .) =
(1− σi)π + σi












































c ≤ (1− π)(γi(R)− γi(W ))− 1
2
v := c′D (A3.13)
Note that the first part of (A3.13) is the same as cM , and the only term that changes
is −12v, making it smaller than cM .
In terms of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in this set up, note that σi∗
and σj∗ are the solution of the same fixed point problem, i.e.
σ∗ = F (c′D(σ
∗))
where c′D = cM −
1
2v. The same logic of the proof of Proposition 3.2 applies here as
well. Hence the equilibrium exists and it is unique and symmetric.
Proof of Corollary 3.2.
Consider first the case of monopoly. Here, only the high quality outlet can publish in





The monopolist chooses to investigate when c ≤ 1− γ(1) := c′′M .
In duopoly, the beliefs are updated the same way. Each outlet is considered indepen-












































In terms of existence and uniqueness, note that σ∗ is the solution of
σ∗ = F (c′′(σ∗))
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The RHS is continuous on the [0, 1] interval and, irrespective of the market structure, it
is either strictly increasing and convex or flat. Moreover, RHS(σ∗ = 0) ≥LHS(σ∗ = 0)
and RHS(σ∗ = 1) < 1 =LHS(σ∗ = 1) since c̄ > 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
We proceed in steps as outlined in Proposition 3.4. We drop the bars from σ for
convenience.
Step 1: We begin by showing that in any signal-based equilibria outlets’ period 1
decision on whether to research or publish is described by a threshold on c. This
follows from the discussion in the text. Let σi and σj be the conjectured strategies.
















where γ(∅) = σ
iσj+(1−σi)(2−σj)π2
σiσj+(2−σi)(2−σj)π2 and γ(1) =
1−σi
2−σi . The problem is identical for player
j.
Step 2: Next, we show that for any σj there is only one σi that solves the equilibrium
fixed point for player i.
All of the definitions from Proposition 3.4 remain unaltered.
We want to show that, for every σj , there is only one σi that solves σi = F (c̄iD(σ
i, σj)).
1. The LHS is linear, with slope equal to 1, starting at 0 and ending at 1.
2. Now, c̄iD(σ
i = 1, σj) = ciD(σ
i = 1, σj , v = 0) + (1 − u)(1 − σj2 ), where each term
is less than or equal to 1. But since c̄ ≥ 2.5, therefore c̄iD(σi = 1, σj) < c̄. As a
result, the RHS evaluated at σi = 1 < 1 = LHS at σi = 1;
3. The RHS evaluated at σi = 0 is greater than or equal to zero.
4. For any σj , both LHS and RHS are continuous in σi.
Hence, they cross at least once and there is at least one solution to this fixed point
problem.
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Further, note that c̄iD behaves the same way as c
i
D with respect to σ
i. Therefore, the
rest of the proof in this step is as before.
Step 3: Third, we show that if an equilibrium exists, it is unique for c̄ ≥ 2.5.
















Again, the rest of the proof remains unaltered until we find the first sufficient condition.
The lowest value of the numerator of ∂σ
i
∂σj
from (A3.6) can be found by making the





























which simplifies to c̄ ≥ 5−u2 . The highest value possible of
5−u
2 is 2.5 at u = 0, which
is assumed.



































The numerator is maximised at π = 1√
2
, hence the condition simplifies to c̄+ ε > u+22 .
Again, this is satisfied for c̄ ≥ 2.5 since 5−u2 >
u+2
2 for u ∈ [0, 1].
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Step 4: Fourth, we show that a symmetric equilibrium where σi∗ = σj∗ = σ∗ always
exists. Therefore, it is also unique among the set of signal-based equilibria.
Because of symmetry, the equilibrium must be the fixed point of








(σ∗)2 + (1− σ∗)(2− σ∗)π2












Looking at (A3.15), note that both LHS and RHS are continuous on the [0, 1] interval.
Moreover, RHS(σ∗ = 0) ≥ 0 = LHS(σ∗) and RHS(σ∗ = 1) < 1 =LHS(σ∗ = 1). As a
consequence, there exists a solution in the [0, 1] interval. From the previous steps, we
know that this solution is unique.
Step 5: Finally, we show that in the symmetric equilibrium it is optimal to endorse
the state suggested by the most informative signal.
This is true because now there is more incentive to build a reputation. Since reputation
requires matching the state, there is even less reason to not endorse the state suggested
by the most informative equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.7.
We drop the bars for convenience. First, note that c̄D is strictly decreasing in u. This




















2 > 0 for any σ
∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Also, cM and σ∗M do not change with u.
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Proof of Proposition 3.7: Proving LHS < RHS. Orange plane: RHS, blue plane: LHS
and green plane: 0.σ + 0.π in the π − σ space.




(γ(∅)− γ(1))(σ − (2− σ)π2)
]
< (1− π)(γ(R)− γ(W )).
Using the terminology introduced in Lemma 3.2, we can rewrite the above as
1
2
Aσ < (1− π)(γ(R)− γ(W )) + 1
2
A(2− σ)π2.
Now, both the LHS and the RHS of the above equation are only functions of two
variables, π and σ. Therefore, we can plot them in a graph (see Figure A3.2) and
check that the above is true.










> (1− π)(γ(R)− γ(W )).
We showed in Lemma 3.2 that cD(v = 0) > cM . It is easy to check that c̄D(u = 0) =
cD(v = 0) + 1− 12σ where 1−
1
2σ > 0 for all σ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, c̄D(u = 0) > cD(v =
0) > cM .
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Combining the three parts above, our result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.8.







σ(2− σ)(1− u) + 1
4
(1− (1− σ)2)u,
we first take the first derivative of V with respect to π (we drop the stars and D in




























Now, we need to show under what conditions ∂σ∂π < 0. Reminding that σ is implicitly
defined by (A3.15) define
















Further, using the definitions in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we can rewrite K as
K = σ − 1
2(c̄+ ε)
[












−2πB2(σ − (2− σ)π2)






































where cD is the cost threshold we derived in Proposition 3.4.
We can now show that ∂cD∂σ ≤ 1 in the neighborhood of the equilibrium σ. The proof for
this is presented in Proposition C3.2 (Appendix C3) for a generic prior q. Therefore,
it is also true in our special case of q = 12 .
Putting these two facts together and using the Implicit Function Theorem, we can now
conclude that ∂σ∂π < 0.













:= σπ > 0. Now, the LHS of the above equation is linearly increas-
ing in u. Similarly, the RHS is linearly decreasing in u. In addition, for u = 0,
LHS < RHS and the condition is verified. And for u = 1, LHS > RHS. To see this,
LHS(u = 1) = 2 − σ22 > 1, while RHS(u = 1) = (1 − σ(1 + π))σπ < 1. Therefore, ū
V
exists and lies between 0 and 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.
Comparing the source’s expected utility given by expressions in (3.3) and (3.4) and
simplifying gives the following condition to prefer two firms:
µ(1− π)(2σM − σD(4− σD)) ≤ 2σM − σ2D (A3.18)
Now we discuss different cases based on possible values of σM and σD.
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Case 1: v is very high so that σD = 0. Substituting in A3.18 gives that the source




Therefore, if v is very large it is possible that µ > 1 (so that the source cares relatively
more about matching the state) and σD = 0 (so that in duopoly no one does research),
but still the source prefers to share information with both the outlets. This happens
because π > .5 and the source still cares about getting the information out quickly.
Case 2: v is high enough so that σD < σM . Now, the RHS of equation (A3.18) is
greater than zero. But first, σD might not be too small so that in the LHS < 0 i.e.
2σM ≤ σD(4−σD). In this case, sending to both is always preferred independent of µ.
Therefore, sending to both is preferred if




Second, σD might in fact be very small so that on the LHS > 0 i.e. 2σM > σD(4−σD).
In this case, sending to both is preferred only if
µ ≤
2σM − σ2D




Case 3: v is small so that σD > σM . Again there are two possible situations. First,
consider the case in which σD is not too large so that the RHS of equation (A3.18)
is still positive, i.e. 2σM ≥ σ2D =⇒ σM ≥
σ2D
2 . Now, in this case we want to see
whether the LHS can be negative i.e. if σM <
σD(4−σD)
2 . But this must be true because
σD > σM and we know that
σD(4−σD)
2 > σD. Therefore, the LHS is negative and the




≤ σM < σD.
Second, σD might in fact be very large so that the RHS is negative, i.e. σM <
σ2D
2 .




contradicts σM < σD. Therefore, LHS must also be negative. From condition (A3.18),







Case 4: v is such that σD = σM := σ. When this is the case, the condition (A3.18)
reduces to
−µ(1− π)(2− σ) < (2− σ)
which is always true. Therefore, sending to both is preferred.
Our result follows from combining all the above cases.
Proof of Proposition 3.9.
The proof is by construction. We have already constructed the equilibrium frontier
and the set of all possible equilibria for a given c̄ and ε.
We now show what happens as ε → 0. Consider σM first. From Proposition 3.2,
observe that as ε → 0 LHS(σ = 0) = 0 ≈ RHS(σ = 0) = εc̄+ε → 0 in equation (A3.3).
Therefore, for any π the only fixed point equilibrium → 0.
Now, consider σD at v = 0. Fix a π. We know that as ε → 0, since cD(σ = 0) = 12 ,
we have that RHS(σ = 0) → 12c̄ in equation (A3.9). But this is strictly greater than
LHS(σ = 0) = 0. Therefore, the equilibrium fixed point σD > 0 and also
σ2D
2 > 0.
Moreover, this is true for any π.




Now, let us look at what happens as ε → ∞. Given that the fixed point is defined
by σ∗ = c
∗+ε
c̄+ε , both σM and σD approach 1 (without ever being exactly equal to 1).
However, because the frontier is defined for v = 0 case, the frontier lies close to and to
the right of the σM = σD line.
Combining the two observations above with Lemma 3.3, we get our proposition.
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B3 Allowing for sitting on information
In this appendix, we show that allowing outlets to “sit on information” (i.e. just
refrain from publishing until period 2 without acquiring the additional signal) does
not preclude the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 3.4. We prove it formally for
sufficiently low π and then use mathematical simulation to argue that it holds more
generally. Uniqueness of such an equilibrium (among signal-based equilibria), however,
is not obvious anymore. We make only one change with respect to the model described
in Section 3.2. Now di ∈ {res, pub, wait}, where di = wait means that the outlet does
not acquire the second signal but still publishes in period 2.
This addition poses some challenges in the tractability of the model because the choice
is no longer just between two options and strategies are not necessarily just thresholds
in c. However, even in this more complicated setup we can show a few results. First, for
sufficiently low π, it is possible to find values of v such that the equilibrium described
in Proposition 3.4 exists; waiting is never a best response if the other player never waits
and σ∗D > σ
∗
M . Second, we can simulate the model showing that we can assign values
to v such that, for the resulting equilibrium σ∗D, publishing in period 1 is better than
waiting and at the same time σ∗D > σ
∗
M .
We begin with the following lemma considering that we are interested in the (candidate)
equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 3.4 where di = wait is never played in
equilibrium.
Lemma B3.1 It is always possible to find off path beliefs such that, for sufficiently
high v, Eui(di = wait) ≤ Eui(di = pub).
Proof of Lemma B3.1.
Note that γ(WII, .) is off path in the equilibrium we are considering. For any γ(∅) and












(1− σj) + 1
2
)
(π + (1− π)γ(WII, .)) (B3.1)
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On the other hand, the expected utility from publishing immediately is given by
1
2










+ π2(γ(∅)− γ(1)) + γ(1)) (B3.2)
Comparing (B3.1) and (B3.2) and solving for v, we find that Eui(di = wait) ≤
Eui(di = pub) when
v ≥ σjπ(γ(∅)−γ(1))−(2−σj)
[
π2γ(∅) + (1− π2)γ(1)− π − (1− π)γ(WII, .)
]
(B3.3)
Therefore, it is possible to find v and γ(WII, .) such that the above condition is satisfied.
This makes intuitive sense as a sufficiently high scoop value should always deter sitting




π2γ(∅) + (1− π2)γ(1)− π
]
.
We can now move to the main proposition.
Proposition B3.1 For sufficiently low π, it is possible to find values of v such that the
equilibrium described in Proposition 3.4 exists. In such an equilibrium, waiting is never
a best response if the other player follows the equilibrium strategies and σ∗D > σ
∗
M .
Proof of Proposition B3.1. ]
Suppose that player j always publishes when low type and chooses just between pub-
lishing or researching when high type. Moreover, suppose that the audience conjectures
that both players use the equilibrium strategies described by Proposition 3.4. For this
to be an equilibrium in the new setup, it is sufficient to prove that, given the correct
audience’s beliefs updating, for every σ, Eui(di = wait) ≤ Eui(di = pub). To show
this, first we prove through Figure B3.1 that ∂v̄∂π > 0. Moreover, Figure B3.2 shows
that there exists a range of π such that argmaxσv̄(π) = 1. In the figure, it happens for
π ∈ [.5, .6]. As a consequence, for every v ≥ v̄(σ = 1, π ∈ [0.5, 0.6]) it is true that, for
every σ, Eui(di = wait) ≤ Eui(di = pub). In other words, if the audience conjectures
an equilibrium where no types and no players choose to wait and the choice for the
high type is just between publishing and researching described by a threshold strategy
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Figure B3.1: Proof of Proposition B3.1: Proving ∂v̄∂π > 0.
Proof of Proposition B3.1: Proving ∂v̄∂π > 0. Orange plane:
∂v̄
∂π , blue plane: 0.σ + 0.π
in the π − σ space.
Figure B3.2: Proof of Proposition B3.1: Proving argmaxσv̄(π) = 1.
Proof of Proposition B3.1: Proving argmaxσv̄(π) = 1. Orange plane: v̄(π), blue plane:
0.σ + 0.π in the π − σ space for π ∈ [0.5, 0.6].
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Figure B3.3: Proof of Proposition B3.1: Proving cD(v̄(σ = 1)) > cM .
Proof of Proposition B3.1: Proving cD(v̄(σ = 1)) > cM . Orange plane: cD(v̄(σ = 1)),
blue plane: cM in the π − σ space for π ∈ [0.5, 0.6].
on c, behaving in this way is an equilibrium strategy for the outlets.
Finally, Figure B3.3 plots cM and cD(v̄(σ = 1)) for sufficiently small π, proving that
we can still increase v from v̄(σ) maintaining the necessary condition for σ∗D > σ
∗
M , i.e.
cD ≥ cM .
When π > 0.6, we can show the existence of our candidate equilibrium through math-
ematical simulations. Consider for example the following set of parameters: π = 0.75,
v = 0.7, c̄ = 2, ε = 0.1. In this case, the equilibrium described in Proposition
3.4 (assuming it still exists) gives a solution σ∗D = 0.118219.
17 Suppose now that
player i expects player j to never wait and choose to research (if it is high type) with
probability 0.118219. Further, suppose the audience think that both outlets never
wait and research (if they are high types) with probability 0.118219. In this case,
Eui(di = wait) = 0.754218 and Eui(di = pub) = 0.841236. Hence, there is no incen-
tive to choose waiting instead of publishing, and the meaningful choice is just between
17We simulated the model with Mathematica. The code is available upon request.
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Figure B3.4: cD > cM for π = 0.75 and v = 0.7.








cD > cM for π = 0.75 and v = 0.7. Orange line: cM , blue line: cD as a function of σ)
researching and publishing. The solution to this problem is the same as that described
by Proposition 3.4. Finally, Figure B3.4 shows that, for π = 0.75 and v = 0.7, it is still
true that cD ≥ cM for every σ. More generally, Figure B3.5 plots cM and cD (in the
π−σ space) by replacing v with the corresponding v̄. Still, cD is above cM throughout
the entire range of parameters of our model.
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Figure B3.5: cD(v = v̄ > cM for every combination of σ and π.
cD(v = v̄) > cM for every combination of σ and π. Orange plane: cD(v = v̄), blue
plane: cM in the π − σ space.
C3 Generic prior on the type
This appendix shows that our main results are qualitatively unaffected by the assump-
tion of Pr(θi = h) = 12 . In this section, we assume a generic Pr(θ
i = h) = q ∈ (0, 1),
leaving the rest of the model unchanged. We consider monopoly, duopoly and their
comparison for when θ is unknown to the reader.
Monopoly
The proposition of the main result is unchanged in monopoly, as q enters only in the
readers’ beliefs updating.
Proposition C3.1 If there is one media outlet and θ is not known to the audience,
there exists a unique equilibrium in which the high quality outlet conducts research in
t = 1 if
c ≤ (1− π)(γ(R)− γ(W )) := cM
where γ(R) and γ(W ) are the audiences’ beliefs about the outlet’s quality after it gets
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Proof of Proposition C3.1.
Suppose that a high type outlet chooses d = res with probability σ. Reminding
ourselves from the main text that by Bayes’ rule,
γ(R) =
q(σ + (1− σ)π)
q(σ + (1− σ)π) + (1− q)π
γ(W ) =
q(1− σ)(1− π)





A high quality optimally chooses res if
γ(R)− c ≥ πγ(R) + (1− π)γ(W ) =⇒ c ≤ (1− π)(γ(R)− γ(W )) := cM (q)
In equilibrium the conjectured σ must be equal to the actual one, hence it must be
that
σ∗ = F (cM (q, σ
∗)). (C3.1)
We need to check if such a fixed point exists. To do so, three observations are in
order. First, note that both the LHS and RHS of the above are continuous in σ∗.
Second, LHS(σ∗ = 0) = 0 < RHS(σ∗ = 0) = εc̄+ε (as cM (q) = 0 at σ
∗ = 0). Third,





, so the equilibrium is the solution of
σ∗ = cM (q,σ
∗)+ε
c̄+ε and LHS and RHS must cross at least once.
Finally, we need to check for the uniqueness of the fixed point. To show this, it is





























It is easy to see that, in the range of parameters of the model, (1 − π)q(1 − q) ≤ 18 ;
π(1−π)
(q(σ+(1−σ)π)+(1−q)π)2 ≤ 1 because π(1− π) is at most
1
4 and q(σ + (1− σ)π) + (1− q)π










[1 + 1] < 1
and this completes the proof.
Duopoly
For the case of duopoly, we look directly at symmetric equilibria, showing that there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition C3.2 If there are two media outlets and θ is not known to the audience,









where γ(∅) = q((σ
∗)2q+(1−σ∗)(1−qσ∗)π2)
(qσ∗)2+(1−qσ∗)2π2 and γ(1) =
q(1−σ∗)
1−qσ∗ .
Proof of Proposition C3.2.
We focus directly on symmetric equilibria where each high type outlet uses a threshold
strategy on c in the decision on whether to publish or investigate. Define σ as the
probability (from the point of view of the other players) that a high quality outlet








v := cD(q) (3.1)
where, by Bayes’ rule, γ(∅) = q(σ
2q+(1−σ)(1−qσ)π2)
q2σ2+(1−qσ)2π2 and γ(1) =
q(1−σ)
1−qσ .
Given that cost is uniformly distributed in [−ε, c̄] and that in equilibrium the conjec-
tured probability of investigation must be equal to the actual one, the (symmetric)
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equilibrium level of σ, if it exists, must be the solution of
σ = F (cD(q, σ)) (C3.2)
where
F (cD(q, σ)) =

0 cD(q, σ) < −ε
cD(q,σ)+ε
c̄+ε −ε ≤ cD(q, σ) ≤ c̄




0 cD(q, σ) < −ε
1
c̄+ε −ε ≤ cD(q, σ) ≤ c̄
0 cD(q, σ) > c̄
Note that:
1. The LHS of equation (C3.2) is linear, with slope equal to 1, starting at 0 and
ending at 1;
2. RHS(σ = 0) ≥ 0 =LHS(σ = 0);
3. RHS(σ = 1) < 1 =LHS(σ = 1);
4. Both LHS and RHS are continuous in σ.
Hence, they cross at least once and there is at least one solution to this fixed point
problem.
To show uniqueness, we can rewrite cD(q) as




where A := γ(∅)− γ(1) = q
2(1−q)
(1−qσ)[q2+π2B2] , B :=
1−qσ
σ and E := qσ − (1− qσ)π
2. It is
easy to see that ∂E∂σ ≥ 0. Moreover, it is also true that
∂A






−q(q2 + π2B2) + 2π2B ∂B∂σ (1− σq)
]
((1− qσ) [q2 + π2B2])2
≥ 0
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σT . We claim that the following two conditions are sufficient for uniqueness:





≥ 0 for σ ≥ σT ;
The argument is as follows: as RHS(σ = 0) ≥ 0 =LHS(σ = 0) and RHS(σ = 1) <
1 =LHS(σ = 1), the fixed point is:
1. Only at σ = 0, as RHS(σ = 0) =RHS(σ = σT ) and below that in between.
Moreover, there cannot be any additional crossing point above σT because the
RHS would be coming from below, and, as it is convex, it cannot be that they
cross and RHS(σ = 1) < 1 =LHS(σ = 1).
2. If the solution is not at 0, the first time they cross it must be that the LHS comes
from below. There are two sub-cases:
 If the first crossing point is in σ ≤ σT , then there cannot be others in the
same interval as ∂cD(q)∂σ ≤ 1. Moreover, there cannot be any other crossing
point above σT because the RHS would be coming from below, and, as it is
convex, it cannot be that they cross and RHS(σ = 1) < 1 =LHS(σ = 1).
 If the first crossing point is above σT , it must be unique as a second solution
would violate RHS(σ = 1) < 1 =LHS(σ = 1).
We now prove that the two sufficient conditions outlined above apply to our model.
First, a sufficient condition for ∂cD(q)∂σ ≤ 1 for σ ≤ σ
T is ∂E∂σA ≤ 1. This implies
(1 + π2)q3(1− q) ≤ (1− qσ)(q2 + π2B2). As the RHS is decreasing in σ, this condition
must hold for the highest possible σ, i.e. for σ = σT . Substituting and simplifying,
this requires q(1 − q) ≤ 1
π2(1+π2)
. The LHS is at most 14 while the RHS is at least
1
2 ,
hence the condition is always satisfied.
Second, a sufficient condition for convexity of cD(q) for σ ≥ σT is ∂
2A
∂σ2
≥ 0. To show















, ∂D∂σ = −q(q
2 + π2B2) + π22B ∂B∂σ (1 − σq) < 0 and
∂2D
∂σ2











(1− σq)− qB ∂B∂σ
]
> 0. A sufficient condition




By substitution, this implies
2
[
−q(q2σ2 + π2(1− qσ)2) 1
σ2

















(1− qσ)(q2 + π2B)
σ2
[





3π2(1− qσ)2(q2σ2 + π2(1− qσ)2)
σ2q2(q2σ2 + π2(1− qσ)2)2 + 4π4(1− qσ)4 + 4π2(1− qσ)2qσ(q2σ2 + π2(1− qσ)2) ≥
3π2(q2σ2 + π2(1− qσ)2)(1− qσ)2
where the second line follows by multiplication of both sides by σ4 and the third by
dividing both sides by 2 and working out explicitly the square on the LHS. Note that
σ and q always appear together in the last line of (C3.4). As a consequence, we can
redefine σq := x and check whether the condition holds for x ∈ [0, 1] and π ∈ [0.5, 1].
We prove this graphically using figure C3.1. It plots the difference between LHS and
RHS of (C3.4) for the whole range of possible values of x and π, showing that this
difference is always positive. This completes the proof.
Monopoly-Duopoly comparison
Finally, we show that sufficient conditions for competition leading to more research
than monopoly can be found in this set up as well.
Proposition C3.3 There exists a nonempty interval of v values where σ∗D(q) > σ
∗
M (q).
Proof of Proposition C3.3.
A sufficient condition for the proposition to hold is that, for some values of v, cD(q) >
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Figure C3.1: Proof of Proposition C3.2: Proving LHS > RHS in (C3.4).
Proof of Proposition C3.2: Proving LHS > RHS in (C3.4). Orange plane: LHS−RHS,
blue plane: 0 ∗ x+ 0 ∗ π in the π − x space.
cM (q). Setting v = 0, and defining B =
1−qσ
σ note that:
cD(q) = (γ(∅)− γ(1))(qσ − (1− qσ)π2) + 1− q (C3.5)
= qσ
q2(1− q)
(1− qσ)(q2 + π2B2)
− π2(1− qσ) q
2(1− q)













q2 + (1− qσ)π2B2















where the first equality follows by substitution and the rest is a series of rearrangements.
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Note that, as q ∈ (0, 1), neither 1− q nor 1− qσ are ever 0. Similarly, by substitution,
cM (q) = (1− π)
(
q(σ + (1− σ)π







σ + (1− σ)π






(1− qσ)(qσ(1− π) + π)
As a consequence, by comparison of (C3.5) and (C3.6), cD(q) > cM (q) implies




(qσ(1− π) + π)
(C3.7)
Note that both LHS and RHS of (C3.7) are decreasing in π. The case of RHS is
straightforward. For the LHS, a sufficient condition is
(1− σq)2π(B2 − q2)(q2 + π2B2 − 2πB2(q2 + (1− qσ)π2(B2 − q2)) < 0
This simplifies to −σq2πq2B2 − (1− σq)2πq4 that is always negative.
As a consequence, a sufficient condition for cD(q) > cM (q) is LHS(π = 1) >RHS(π =
0.5). By substitution, this implies













A sufficient condition for this to hold is
1− 3qσ + 2q2σ2 + q3σ3 > 0
Noticing that qσ is bounded between 0 and 1, the condition is always satisfied and this
completes the proof.
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D3 Monopoly with public signal
In this appendix we assume that the audience learns the actual timing with positive
probability z in monopoly. This helps us establish that additional learning in our
benchmark duopoly model happens not only because the timing is revealed with some
probability but also because the audience uses additional information from outlets
matching the state. In this set up, the outlet does not know whether the audience
has learned the timing or not when taking its decision. Then, the condition for doing
research is
zγM (2) + (1− z)γM (∅)− c ≥ zγM (1) + (1− z)(πγM (∅) + (1− π)γM (1)) (D3.1)




σ + (1− σ)π
σ + (1− σ)π + π
6= γ(∅) = σ
2 + (1− σ)(2− σ)π2
σ2 + (2− σ)2π2
because in duopoly the audience can learn also from the other player getting the state
wrong. Hence, it is confused only if both outlets publish simultaneously and they both
get the state right.
For comparison, we can write the duopoly condition for v = 0 a bit differently. Define
χ the probability that the opponent behaves in a way that reveals the timing to the
reader. Note that χ is “artificial” because it is the probability that j does not research
when player i does (i.e. 12(1−σ
j)+ 12 on the LHS) and vice-versa (i.e.
1
2σ on the RHS).
In such cases, the action of player j is fully revealing of the timing, irrespective of the
endorsement. The duopoly condition for research is then
χγ(2) + (1− χ)γ(∅)− c ≥ χγ(1) + (1− χ)(π2γ(∅) + (1− π2)γ(1)) (D3.2)
Comparing (D3.1) and (D3.2) reveals that they are similar, but not identical. Even if we
set z = χ, the difference in γ(∅) and in the π2 term of the RHS is still there. Hence, our
result is not just due to the fact that the publication timing of the opponent reveals
information about the timing of the other player. The content of the endorsements
plays a role as well.
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Chapter 4
Ora et guberna. The economic
impact of Benedict’s rule in
medieval England
4.1 Introduction
The claim that “institutions matter” has become overwhelmingly popular in economics
in the last few decades, supported by an increasing amount of empirical evidence tying
good institutions to better economic performance (e.g. Glaeser et al. 2004, Acemoglu
et al. 2019). In this paper we exploit the historical case of Benedictine monasteries in
medieval England, at the turn of the Norman conquest, to study the economic effect of
institutional differences in societies where only few of the elements that now constitute
a democracy are in place.
English Benedictine monasteries were part of the medieval feudal organisation of the
society, playing an important role as landlords at a time when ownership and political
power were overlapping (Aston 1958). Quite often, monasteries were not only con-
trolling the land where they stood, but also other holdings located in different places.
Moreover, this role as big landlords, alongside secular noblemen and bishops, remained
salient after the Norman conquest (Finn 1963, Knowles 1966). At the same time, their
institutional structure was determined by Benedict’s rule, prescribing, for example, the
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election of their leader. Were monasteries governing their land more or less efficiently
than secular landlords? And, if so, for what reason?
In this paper we address these questions exploiting a unique historical setting in which
different institutional features can be compared at a very disaggregated level: we focus
on the biggest land reshuffling in British history to identify the economic effect of being
controlled by a Benedictine monastery (vis-à-vis secular landlords). We consistently
find a positive effect of Benedictine control on productive capacity.
Exploring different potential channels, we argue that at least part of this effect is due
to an important difference in the institutional structure: the Benedictine’s ability to
elect their leader.
Benedictine monasteries are an interesting case study because they had a very well
defined institutional structure: they were abiding to the “Rule” established by Benedict
of Nursia1 in 529 AD. This vast and comprehensive document was (and still is) supposed
to regulate monastic life, including its governance. And it did so in a way that scholars
defined “monastic democracy” (Judson 1898, Moulin 2016): the head of a monastery
(called abbot) was an elective office, elected for life by the community of monks and
he had an obligation to consult with the community on important decisions. However,
the ultimate decision power was in his own hands only. This was happening at a time
where secular landlords had complete discretionary power on their own land. As a
consequence, we are comparing economic outcomes of very small and geographically
close political units whose governance changes depending on whether the landlord is
a secular noblemen, appointed (or heir of a previous landlord) and with substantially
absolute power on the land, or a Benedictine monastery, with an elected leader.
Different contributions highlight a higher (Postan 1973, Ekelund et al. 1996, Rost
2017) or a lower (Heldring et al. 2017) level of efficiency in monastic management of
lands, with various potential channels. To identify precisely whether a causal effect
of Benedictine control can be found, we exploit the unique historical context of the
Norman conquest and the change in land ownership that followed, focusing only on
holdings that were assigned to monasteries (or to new secular landlords) by the King
after the Conquest.
1Nursia, Norcia in Italian, is a small village in central Italy where Benedict was born around 480
AD.
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Our dataset merges information from the Domesday Book,2 the English Monastic
Archive and a variety of other sources for geographic and historical controls. All these
data are at holding level, i.e. the smallest available unit.3 As we have information on
the economic performance of these holdings (in terms of productive capacity) and on
the landlord name, we can compare the productivity of land controlled by Benedictine
monasteries with that of land controlled by secular landlords.
A first, rough comparison can be obtained in a cross sectional regression, where we
use as outcome variable the growth rate between 1066 and 1086, i.e. the two data
points available in the Domesday Book. A dummy for Benedictine-controlled holdings
is the main explanatory variable. We can control for a rich set of potential confounding
factors, ranging from the historical importance of the location (its distance to Roman
roads and Roman settlements), its geography (latitude, longitude, ruggedness, ter-
rain suitability to pasture and agriculture etc.), its access to marketplaces (distance to
markets, London etc.), to other specific characteristics of the individual holding (size,
number and dispersion of holdings controlled by the same landlord, productive capac-
ity in 1066). Moreover, we include county or hundred fixed effect, hence effectively
comparing Benedictine and non-Benedictine holdings within small and homogeneous
geographic units.
As we are worried about selection (i.e. monasteries being able to pick better areas ex
ante) and about the differential effect of the Norman conquest, we exploit the panel
structure of our dataset and the “natural experiment” induced by William’s replace-
ment of the Anglo-Saxon elite, causing the re-allocation of most of the holdings. In
particular, we focus our attention on the subsample of holdings that were controlled
by Anglo-Saxon secular landlords in 1066 and changed owner in 1086. Our “treat-
ment” group is made of holdings controlled by Benedictine monasteries in 1086, and
the “control” group is made of all the others, that ended up in the hands of Nor-
man noblemen or bishops. Applying a difference-in-difference approach, we find that
Benedictine holdings experienced a 20 years productive capacity growth rate at least
4 percentage points higher than holdings controlled by secular landlords.
2An extensive survey of productivity and land allocation of its reign, commissioned by William in
1086. More in Section 4.2.
3Most of these holdings are manors, i.e. the smallest administrative unit and the basic unit of
inquest of the Domesday Book (Finn 1963).
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The effect we identify may be due to several channels, but we argue that the institu-
tional structure played an important role. To support our claim, we provide several
tests to take into account and rule out alternative potential explanations. In partic-
ular, we can show that Benedictine holdings are not superior in terms of population
measured in 1086 or in terms of technology-related variables, such as the number of
ploughs and of mills in 1086. Moreover, we show that the distance from a generic Bene-
dictine monastery has no effect on productive capacity, suggesting that, at least in the
short-run perspective we are considering, our effect is not due to cultural transmission.
Also, it does not seem to be a matter of economies of scale, as we can control for both
the size of the holding and the number and dispersion of holdings controlled by the
same landlord, nor an effect due to the historical roots of the places. Moreover, we are
able to rule out the hypothesis that our effect is due to the comparison of religious with
secular institutions. In particular, we show that holdings controlled by Anglo-Saxon
nobility in 1066 and passed to bishops in 1086 are not statistically different from those
controlled by Anglo-Saxons and then assigned to Norman noblemen in the same period.
This is an interesting result because bishops are religious institutions sharing the same
cultural and religious roots of Benedictine monasteries but that were (and are) not
constrained by Benedict’s Rule. On top of that, we show that Benedictine-controlled
holdings over-perform Anglo-Saxon controlled holdings as well, so our effect is not due
to their better knowledge of the land when compared with the newly arrived Normans.
Further, more ancient monasteries are not better rulers than more recent ones, reduc-
ing the concern that our effect is due to better/longer investments in human capital.
Finally, the effect is substantially unchanged when we exclude holdings that are closer
than 5km to a monastery, thus ruling out that it is due to the monks actively working
the land.
Overall, our contribution is twofold. First, we are able to identify the short-term effect
on productivity of being governed by a Benedictine monastery, in medieval England.
We show that this effect is positive and relevant, as it is able to switch the 20-years
growth rate of holdings’ productive capacity from negative to positive. Secondly, we
provide a more general contribution on the effect of institutional arrangements on
economic outcomes.
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On top of that, we think our results can shred some light on the role of (relatively)
democratic selection in contexts where other tools to keep the leader accountable are
very weak, hence isolating as much as possible the specific role of democratic selection
from other elements (absent at that time) of the democratic process. This is related
with the literature on democracy and economic outcomes4, but we take into account
that democracy is a multidimensional concept, composed by several elements. It in-
volves selection of officials, tools that keep them accountable, the rule of law et cetera.5
Empirically, it is very hard to disentangle the elements that constitute a democracy, and
to explore their effect separately. Usually, the comparison is between appointed and
elected officials (Martinez-Bravo et al. 2014, Burgess et al. 2015, Fetzer and Kyburz
2018), but appointed officials are different from elected ones because they are non-
selected (by the voters) and also non-accountable (again with respect to the voters),
and it is usually very hard to separate the two elements.6 In this paper, we compare
institutional structures that are fairly similar, being both characterised by very weak
accountability mechanisms (i.e. leaders in charge for life with the ultimate decision
power in their own hands), with the important difference that abbots are elected and
secular landlords are not. Our results suggest that the possibility of selecting a leader,
even when accountability is weak, may result in better economic performance.
Related literature Two papers are particularly close to this one: Heldring et al.
(2017) and Andersen et al. (2017).
Heldring et al. (2017) looks at the impact of monastic dissolution on the industrial
revolution in England. They find that pre-dissolution monastic income is positively
correlated with agricultural yields, patenting and the number of gentry in a parish,
and negatively with the share of labour force in agriculture. Similarly with the present
4Most of the recent empirical literature finds a positive, causal effect of democracy on growth
(e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2005 and Acemoglu et al. 2019), with some noteworthy exceptions (Gerring
et al. 2005). Moreover, at the local level, democracy is associated with reduction in violence (Fetzer
and Kyburz 2018), better long term outcomes (Angelucci et al. 2017) and more efficient public good
provision (Acemoglu et al. 2014, Martinez-Bravo et al. 2014, Martinez-Bravo et al. 2017).
5The interplay of those elements is not trivial: for example, it has been shown theoretically that
there can be a trade-off between accountability and selection (Ashworth et al. 2017). Moreover,
unaccountable (non-selected) officials may do better than accountable (non-selected) ones (Maskin
and Tirole 2004, Alesina and Tabellini 2007) and a more inclusive decision making structure does not
necessarily lead to better decisions (Persico 2004).
6Term-limited elected officials have weaker re-election concerns than non term-limited. However,
they have more experience than non-selected leaders and they could care about their future career. In
our case, we are able to compare selected and non-selected leaders that are both in charge for life.
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work, they control for geographic specific factors and hundred fixed effects. However,
our research question is different, as we look at the contemporaneous effect of different
institutions on economic outcomes. Moreover, they look at a different period and we
are able to identify a historical event that changed the institutional structure of land
holding in a quasi-experimental fashion.
Andersen et al. (2017) use county-level English data to show the long-run impact of
Cistercian monasteries on cultural values and population growth. We use variation at
a much finer level (our unit of analysis is the individual holding and we control for hun-
dred fixed effects or even for holding fixed effect) to test the contemporaneous impact
of different institutional structures, looking at an earlier historical period. Similar to
us, they do not find any effect of Benedictine presence on population growth, but we
show that there is a strong and positive effect on productive capacity, visible in the
short term (less than 20 years). As the “work-ethic factor” takes time to develop, our
results suggest that other mechanisms were at play, such as a different institutional
decision making process.
We are also not the first one comparing outcomes of secular and ecclesiastical holdings,
but other studies focus on much smaller and less representative samples (McDonald and
Snooks 1986) and they usually do not have an identification strategy. Results are very
mixed. Heldring et al. (2017) note that “the most obvious explanation for any impact
of the Dissolution is that the land held by the Church was initially utilised inefficiently”,
pointing toward a lower productivity of ecclesiastical holdings. Campbell (1983) finds
no significant differences between ecclesiastic and lay holdings, and Campbell (2006)
points out that there are two competing effects, going on. On the one hand, “on
conventual and collegiate estates inertia rather than enterprise could all too easily
rule” (p. 421). On the other hand, “such landlords were also in a uniquely privileged
position to develop the management of their estates on a long-term sustainable basis”
(p. 421). Ekelund et al. (1996) stresses the superior efficiency of the Cistercian order
due to their cheap labour and the use of conversi,7 but they still highlight an interesting
trade off between this fact and the efficiency losses related with team production and
difficult monitoring.
7Note that the period we are considering precedes the creation of the Cistercians and the intro-
duction of conversi within monastic communities.
188
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first one to use the entire Domesday Book
for our analysis, and to suggest an identification strategy that controls for geographic
proximity and economic determinants, together with the quasi experimental set up
given by the post-Conquest re-assignment. Angelucci et al. (2017) look at the long-
term effect of farm grants (i.e. basically self-governing municipalities) on political
support for more inclusive institutions. They also use data from the Domesday Book,
but they focus only on boroughs, while we look at countryside holdings. Moreover,
Norman conquest is the starting point of their long-term analysis, while we look at
short term impact before and after that event.
Few papers (Acemoglu et al. 2014, Martinez-Bravo et al. 2014, Burgess et al. 2015,
Fetzer and Kyburz 2018) look at local variations in the degree of “democracy”, but in
a fairly different way. In particular, they compare elected and appointed officials.
4.2 Historical background
4.2.1 “Monastic democracy”: Benedictine monasteries and the Rule
The Benedictine order was (and still is) composed by the set of monasteries committed
to follow the Rule wrote by Benedict of Nursia in the Early middle age (Knowles 1966).
They quickly became the most important monastic order in Europe, at least until the
Cistercian reform of the XII century. They arrived in England in 597 AD, when they
built a monastery in Canterbury. English Benedictine monasteries grew rapidly, as
shown in Figure 4.1, and acquired control over a number of holdings: partially because
of endowments and partially because of direct assignment of the Anglo-Saxon kings.8
Importantly, the management of those holdings was highly centralised and kept in the
hand of the monastic community until the XII c. (Knowles 1966).
Each individual monastery was an autonomous entity (there was not a “head of the
order”) run by an abbot: therefore, the common membership to the same order was
granted by the adherence to the same rule. As Knowles (1966, p. 101), notes, by the
time of the Conquest monastic houses were substantially independent to each other,
with nothing like a federation or a formal interdependence into place. Further, the
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Figure 4.1: Diffusion of Benedictine monasteries in medieval England
internal organisation of a Benedictine monastery became explicitly independent to the
interference of the local bishop after the council of Hertford launched by Archbishop
Theodore in 672 AD (Lapidge 1995, Dell’Omo 2011). Independence from the King was
granted usually by papal provisions.9
Even though the main purpose of the Rule was ascetic, it contains detailed and com-
prehensive instructions for the community of monks (prayer times, kitchen duties etc).
Its importance for the efficiency of monastic life has been noted by scholars in manage-
ment science (Rost and Graetzer 2013, Ehrmann et al. 2013, Rost 2017). Inevitably,
some of those rules where dedicated to the way the community was governed. In par-
ticular, Chapter 64 explains that the abbot is an elective office (elected for life by the
monks) and that majority rule can be used if there is no unanimity in the community.
In particular, it states:
At the election of an abbot let this principle be always observed, that he be
appointed whom the whole community, being of the same mind and in the
9“Epistulae privilegii”, as witnessed by some records in Beda’s Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis An-
glorum (Dell’Omo 2011).
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fear of God, or even a part albeit a small part of the community shall with
calmer deliberation have elected.10
On top of this, Chapter 3 states that the abbot had an obligation to routinely consult
with the senior members of the community.
And if any less important business has to be transacted on behalf of the
monastery, let counsel be taken, but with the seniors only, as it is written:
‘Do everything with counsel and having so done thou wilt not repent.’ 11
Finally, the whole community, including its most junior members, has to be consulted
for important decisions.
As often as any special business has to be transacted in the monastery, let
the abbot convoke the whole community [...] And we have thus said that
all are to be called to council because it is often to a junior that the Lord
reveals what is best.12
However, it is important to stress that this does not mean that the community can act
as a sort of “parliament”. Chapter 3 clarifies that the decision making power lies in
the hands of the abbot only:
And having listened to the counsel of the brethren, let him settle the matter
in his own mind and do what seems to him most expedient.13
On top of this, Chapter 4 clarifies that the monks should “yield obedience in all things
to the abbot’s precepts, even if he himself act contrary to their spirit”.
Obviously, peasants were not allowed to vote or to participate into the political decision
process and the accountability of the abbot to the community was limited, as he was
expected to be in charge for the rest of his life. However, the set of rules mentioned
above seems quite different with respect to the standard feudal institutional arrange-
ments, where a landlord has absolute power on his land, he is not elected and has no
10Benedict’s Rule, Ch. 64.
11Benedict’s Rule, Ch. 3.
12Benedict’s Rule, Ch. 3.
13Benedict’s Rule, Ch. 3.
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obligation to consult with anyone in his decision. Interestingly, Moulin (2016) finds
that the appropriate words to summarise this set of rules is “monastic democracy”.
4.2.2 Land ownership in medieval England
The manor is the basic unit of analysis of the Domesday Book (Finn 1963), and it was
also the basic unit of the feudal structure14 of the society, whose importance can be
traced back to the Anglo-Saxon era (Aston 1958, McDonald and Snooks 1986, Roffe
2000, Roffe 2007).15 Landlords had absolute control over their land, granted by the
King, or by the Tenant in Chief (Aston 1958). Kings granted land to churchmen or
monasteries directly, while other were received from secular landlords as endowments
or donations (Ayton and Davis 1987).
Landlords, usually, rented out part of the land. The rest, usually around 30% of
the total (Kosminsky 1961), called demesne, was kept under the direct control of the
landlord. Peasants had to spend a certain number of days per year working on that
land, in a “security for labor” contract that attracted attention from economists (such
as North and Thomas 1971, Jones 1972, North and Thomas 1973). As a consequence,
the landlord was deriving income from two sources: the output of production from the
demesne and the rents he was receiving for the rest of the land (Postan 1973).
According to Kosminsky (1961), manors varied greatly in size and organisation, some
of them having no villages at all and other having very big demesnes. Overall, Church
manors seemed to be bigger, but not very different from manors of comparable size
controlled by secular landlords (Kosminsky 1961, p. 103-113). Postan (1973) points
out that Benedictine manors seem to mirror more closely the traditional structure of
manors. Swanson (1979) highlights the similarity in terms of manorialism between the
holdings of the Church and those of contemporary secular landlords.
While the manor was essentially a unit based on ownership of land, the country was
also organised into “administrative” units used by the monarchy to implement royal
14Among historians the nature of the pre-Conquest structure of English society has been debated.
Nonetheless, as Roffe (2007, p. 150) states: “it is probably true to say that there is now a universal
appreciation of a significant role for forms approximating to ‘feudal’ lordship in pre-Conquest society.”
15The vast majority of the observations in our sample are manors, or other pieces of land associated
with a manor (e.g. a dependency). There are also some “non manorial units” (Palmer 1987) that albeit
being not legally part of a manor, they where still constituting holdings with a landlord in charge of
them.
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laws and to collect taxes, namely Shires, renamed Counties after the Conquest, and,
at a more local level, Wapentakes, or Hundred.16
4.2.3 The Norman Conquest and the Domesday Book
In 1066 William, the duke of Normandy, invaded England and conquered it after the
Battle of Hastings. He claimed he was the legitimate heir of the Anglo-Saxon King
Edward17, who was his first cousin once removed. Upon Edward’s death, however, the
kingdom passed to his brother-in-law Harold, triggering as a consequence the Norman
invasion and the end of the Anglo-Saxon era.
The advent of William was not good news for Benedictine monasteries: generally
speaking, they were historically well aligned with the Anglo-Saxon monarchy (Knowles
1966, Barlow 1979) and “the initial effect of the Norman conquest was greatly to disturb
the monasteries” (Barlow 1979, p. 190). This is suggestive evidence against the idea
of them being systematically favoured by the new king.
After seizing power, William replaced the Anglo-Saxon elite with his own people in
order to secure his position (Finn 1963). Anglo-Saxon noblemen that fought with
Harold were considered as traitors of the legitimate king. Therefore, they were killed
and their land was redistributed mainly to Norman noblemen loyal to William and, in
some cases, to monasteries. In this enormous redistributive endeavour, William was
not in favour of increasing the power of the Church. On the contrary, Finn (1963)
notes that William “did not materially increase the church possession under his reign”,
and it seems that the main reason driving re-assignments was military protection.
In particular, Fleming (1991) and Thomas (2008) discuss the methods behind the
redistribution, pointing out that it is hard to say in what proportion of the assignment
it was due to each of those. According to Thomas (2008, ch. 3), the four methods
were:
1. Direct succession, i.e. William designing a Norman landlord as successor of a
16Hundreds fairly correspond to contemporary local districts. They were centred upon a local court,
responsible for tax collection and military service obligations. As McDonald and Snooks (1986, p. 23)
note, the social and economic hierarchical structure within these units had a long history, although it
was “probably intensified during the Scandinavian invasions”.
17Interestingly, the Domesday Book collect data for 1086 and for 1066 as well, i.e. the last point in
time where King Edward was alive, precisely for this reason.
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dispossessed Anglo-Saxon landlord;
2. Military protection: “in militarily sensitive regions, the King gave blocks of prop-
erties, sometimes entire counties such as Cheshire, to individual lords”;
3. “in some areas, William lumped together all or most of the lands of minor land-
holders that were ‘left over’ after the redistribution of major estates and gave
them to a single Norman lord”;
4. “Norman nobles, particularly sheriffs, also simply grabbed new lands”;
Overall, it seems that William was concerned with two things. First, foreign invasions.
Hence his closest allies and family members received control of lands located in regions
of strategic importance, either to defend the kingdom against Viking invasions or to
protect communication lines between England and Normandy (Finn 1963). Second, he
wanted to make sure that none of the nobles was sufficiently strong to rebel successfully
(Thomas 2008). As a consequence, he made sure that the new Norman nobility was
richer than the Anglo-Saxon one, on average, but none of them was individually able
to challenge his power. In all of this, we could not find any historical source pointing
out a strategic re-assignment of holdings to monasteries.
Twenty years after the Conquest, he commissioned a complete survey of the land
ownership in his reign. The result is known as Domesday Book, “because its decisions,
like those of the last judgement, are unalterable”.18
Several scholars, both in humanities and in economics (Darby 1977, McDonald and
Snooks 1987, McDonald 1997), looked in detail at the content of the Domesday Book
and at the way those data were gathered. The objective of such an intense data collec-
tion ordered by William is still debated, but according to McDonald and Snooks (1986)
it was a combination of two instances: assessing the ability to pay taxes and clarifying
the feudal structure of the kingdom. William sent royal commissioners everywhere
in his kingdom, and the data they gathered (holding’s “value to its owner”, i.e. our
measure of productive capacity, in 1066 and 1086, landlord in 1066 when King Edward
was alive and in 1086 etc etc) were then verified in open court (McDonald and Snooks
1987). Valuations, corresponding to holding productive capacity (Roffe 2000), where
18Richard Fitz Nigel (treasurer of Henry II), Dialogus de Scaccario, cited in Roffe (2000, p.5).
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collected in pounds and shelling that, at the time, existed only as a unit of accountancy
(Finn 1963). Overall, the Domesday Book seems to provide a reliable measure of land
“value” and tax assessment (McDonald and Snooks 1986), and its data are suitable for
cliometric analysis (McDonald and Snooks 1987).
4.3 Data
We assembled an original dataset by gathering information from a variety of different
sources, as briefly outlined in Table 4.1, creating a dataset accruing to more than 9,000
observations at holding level.19 The main source of information is the Domesday Book,
DDB henceforth.20
The most important information included in the DDB is the name of the lord of the
holding in 1066, at the time of King Edward (i.e before the Norman conquest), and
the name of the lord in 1086, at the time the DDB was compiled under the reign of
King William. The Domesday Book reports 48 different landlord names referring to a
monastery in 1066 (before the Conquest) and 80 in 1086 (after the Conquest).21
To identify whether the lord is a Benedictine monastery, we matched lord names, as
recorded in the DDB, with the names of Benedictine houses, retrieved from the English
Monastic Archive (D’Avray 2015). Through the investigation of lord names we also
identified holdings held by a Catholic bishop. Therefore, we classify all the entries in
our dataset according to the following three types, at two point in times (before and
after the Norman conquest):
 Benedictine, when the lord is a Benedictine monastery;
 Bishop, when the lord is either a Bishop or the canons of a cathedral church;
 Secular, when the lord is none of the above, mostly a lay nobleman or the King
himself.
19The actual number of observations in the analysis depends on sparse missing data within each
individual variable.
20The Domesday Book has been digitised by Palmer and colleagues and a downloadable version is
freely available at the Hydra repository of the University of Hull. Please see http://www.domesdaybo
ok.net/ and https://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:domesdayDisplaySet.
21In our analysis we use 31 and 60 monasteries as we have to restrict the sample to observations
where the outcome variable is available for both 1066 and 1086.
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We excluded from the sample about 0.2 percent of holdings that were attributed to
non Benedictine monasteries and about 0.4 percent that were attributed to Benedictine
Nuns, in order to obtain a homogeneous “treatment” group solely composed by male
Benedictine monasteries.22 Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide a graphical outlook of the






Figure 4.2: Holdings of Benedictine monasteries in England (1066)
4.3.1 Outcome variables
As explained in Section 4.2.3, some of the information in DDB are available at two
points in time: the first one refers to the last moment before the Norman conquest,
thus we label it 1066; the second information refers to the time DDB was actually
written, after the Conquest, in 1086. Exploiting this feature, we gather from the DDB
the main outcome variable of our analysis, i.e. the holding’s “value” in 1066 and 1086,
from which we calculate the overall growth rate.23 Historians have widely debated the
22Alternatively, we included these two small groups of observation in the control group, obtaining
substantially unchanged results. We further excluded from our sample 38 observations (about 0.38
percent of total “raw” observations) whose property was shared among lords of different types.






Figure 4.3: Holdings of Benedictine monasteries in England (1086)
actual meaning of the information about “values” recorded in the DDB (McDonald and
Snooks 1986, Roffe 2000). After a thorough survey of the most recent developments
on the issue, Roffe (2007, p. 241) concludes that the prevailing current opinion is
that: “Domesday values are a more or less accurate index of the productive capacity
of estates”, and we stick to this interpretation throughout the paper. Further, these
data have been shown to be highly consistent with all the variables reported in the
DDB (McDonald and Snooks 1987, Roffe 2000, Roffe 2007), as well as when compared
to subsequent historical surveys of some regions of England (Wareham 2000).
To study additional economic and social mechanisms we also collected information
about total population in the holding, as recorded in the Domesday Book.24 Further,
we collected information about the presence of mills and ploughs as recorded in the
DDB.
24This information is available only at one point in time and only for a limited subsample, therefore
it cannot be used to fully replicate our main analysis. Population is calculated as the sum of all
categories of people living in the estate, as recorded in the DDB, namely: villagers, smallholders,
freemen, cottagers, slaves, burgesses and cases listed as “other population”.
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4.3.2 Geography
The most important difference across holdings is likely to depend on their geographical
location. The digitised version of the DDB includes important geographical information
related to each entry:
 Ordinance Survey Grid positions, that we converted into Latitude and Longitude;
 County and Hundred (local district), that we exploited to include geographical
fixed effects in our analysis (see “Geographical fixed effect” section in Table 4.1).
Latitude and longitude have been included to account for the uneven distribution of
monastic estates throughout England. Further, following Becker et al. (2015), all
our models also include an interaction term between Latitude and Longitude. Since
all holdings in our dataset have been geolocated we can also match them with geo-
graphical information about the features of the terrain, that are likely to affect soil
productivity and hence potential productivity. For this reason we include the median
altitude of terrain, retrieved from the GAEZ dataset at a very high resolution, which
roughly corresponds to grid cells of about 10 km. Higher terrain are expected to be less
productive hence median altitude is expected to be negatively correlated with value,
as it is the case in our sample. Further, since not all terrain may be equally fertile
and suitable for farming, we include a measure of crop suitability, retrieved again from
GAEZ. This database provides alternative measures of crop suitability: we decided
to include suitability related to cereals for low input level rain-fed terrains, since we
expect that such an index better approximate the actual conditions of farming faced
around XI c. and the same measure is used in Angelucci et al. (2017). Moreover, we
include an index for terrain ruggedness, as proposed by Nunn and Puga (2012). This
index targets the potential detrimental effect on soil productivity (and hence on the
value of the estate) driven by sharp elevation differences within small areas. Finally, we
include agriculture suitability, pastoralism suitability and sedentary animal husbandry
suitability, retrieved from Beck and Sieber (2010). These three indices are constructed
on a high spatial resolution using raster cells of about 5km and provide indicators of the
suitability of land for alternative use in primary economic activities. With the inclusion
of these controls we can account for ex-ante advantages in the holdings’ productivity.
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All the geographic controls illustrated in this paragraph have been included in our
dataset by superimposing the original raster files on our map of geolocalised holdings.
4.3.3 History
To account for potential heterogeneity in the historical roots of holdings we include
two measure to control for proximity to ancient Roman settlements and road network.
To obtain the first measure we calculated the geodesic distance from each holding to
Roman rural settlements in Britain by relying on the geolocated information provided
by Allen et al. (2018). This database provides geographical coordinates of rural place-
ments of Roman Britain, identified through a vast range of archaeological sources.
Areas of more ancient settlement may benefit from higher levels of development. The
second measure is calculated as the geodesic distance to the nearest Roman road. We
retrieved information and maps of the Roman road network in Britain in McCormick
et al. (2010). All distances are expressed in kilometres.
4.3.4 Market access
Our measure of productive capacity could be affected by better access to markets. To
control for this feature we included a set of (geodesic) distance measures. Firstly, we
retrieved historical maps of Britain in the Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman
World (Talbert 2000) to calculate distance to rivers and coasts. Both distances ap-
proximate market access since waterways were an extremely important transportation
network in the Early Middle Ages. Further, distance to coast also approximate the
strategic position of the holding and its possible vulnerability due to Vikings raids.
Secondly, we include measures of distance to actual markets approximated by distance
to the nearest borough (as identified in the DDB), to the Tower of London and to the
closest fair or market, as recorded in Letters (2005). The latter dataset provide valu-
able information about the location of markets and fairs in early medieval England.
Since the date of the first appearance of chartered markets might be uncertain, we
consider all markets or fairs that were recorded before 1066, or that were recorded in
a range of time including 1066 or whose mint date was recorded in an analogous way.
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4.3.5 Holding-specific
To account for further potentially omitted variables that are specific to individual hold-
ings we include three further controls, retrieved from the DDB. The first one is holding’s
value at the time of King Edward the Confessor (i.e. 1066). This variable constitutes a
proper baseline measure, something extremely rare to be found in historical databases.
The second one is a measure of the size of the holding, to account for the high het-
erogeneity in holdings’ features and sizes.25 Moreover, we calculated the number of
holdings held by each individual landlord, as identified in the DDB, to account for
the potential effects on governance for landlords owning a large number of properties.
Finally, we also acknowledge that more spatially concentrated holdings may be easier
to govern and might give rise to economies of scale for the landlord. Therefore, if Xi
and Yi are the spatial coordinates of holding i, we compute the geographic dispersion
of the n holdings belonging to the same landlord by calculating the standard distance,






n where Xc and Y c are the coordinates of
the centre with respect to the n holdings. Standard distance is the spatial equivalent
of standard deviation of a distribution and provide an approximation of the degrees of
concentration (or dispersion) of a group of spatial units.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
Objective of this paper is the estimation of the effect of being governed by a monastery
vis-à-vis a secular landlord on economic outcomes. The main explanatory variable
is a dummy equal to 1 if an holding was controlled by a Benedictine monastery; the
outcome variable is the growth rate of holding’s value between 1066 and 1086, as a
measure for its change in productive capacity.
Clearly, the relationship between these two variables is likely to be spurious for many
reasons. Monasteries (and hence their estates) tend to be located more often in the
southern part of England, and they tend to be located in the most ancient settled areas
(Postan 1973). Moreover, monasteries may have been granted systematically better (or
25To ensure comparability across holdings we only keep observations whose size has been measured
in “geld”, as recorded in Palmer (2008). According to Palmer, this is the best proxy for the size of
estates.
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Table 4.1: Variables description
Description Source
Benedictine (1066) or (1086) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the holding’s lord is a Bene-
dictine monastery at the time of King Edward, i.e. before
the Conquest (1066), or at the time of King William (1086),
DDB1and EMA2
Bishop (1066) or (1086) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the holding’s lord is a Bishop
or the Canons of a cathedral church at the time of King




Growth rate (log) Natural log of growth of holding’s value between 1086 and
1066
DDB1
Population (1086) Number of households settled in the holding DDB1
Mills (1086) Number of mills recorded in the holding DDB1
Ploughs (1086) Number of ploughs in the holding DDB1
Geography
Latitude Latitude of the holding, decimal degrees DDB1
Longitude Longitude of the holding, decimal degrees DDB1
Median altitude Median altitude of terrain, resolution 5 arc-minutes GAEZ3
Crop suitability Index of cereals suitability for low input level rain-fed cere-
als, baseline period 1961-1990, resolution 5 arc-minutes
GAEZ3
Ruggedness Index for rugged terrain, measured in hundreds of meters of
elevation difference for grid points 30 arc-seconds apart.
Nunn and Pulga (2012)
Agriculture suitability Probability of occurrence of agriculture estimated through
maximum entropy modelling, baseline period 1961-1991, res-
olution 2.5 arc minutes
Beck and Sieber (2010)
Pasture suitability Probability of occurrence of pasture estimated through max-
imum entropy modelling, baseline period 1961-1991, resolu-
tion 2.5 arc minutes
Beck and Sieber (2010)
Animal suitability Probability of occurrence of animal husbandry estimated
through maximum entropy modelling, baseline period 1961-
1991, resolution 2.5 arc minutes
Beck and Sieber (2010)
History
Dist. Roman settl. (log) Geodesic distance to nearest Roman settlement, as identified
in the Rural settlements of Roman Britain database
Authors’ calculations based on
ADS4
Dist. Roman roads (log) Geodesic distance to nearest Roman road Authors’ calculations based on
McCormick et al. (2010)
Market access
Dist. rivers (log) Geodesic distance to nearest river Authors’ calculations based on
BA5
Dist. coast (log) Geodesic distance to coastline Authors’ calculations based on
BA5
Dist. London (log) Geodesic distance to the Tower of London (latitude 51.5048,
longitude -0.0723)
Authors’ calculations
Dist. borough (log) Geodesic distance to nearest borough, as defined in DDB Authors calculations based on
DDB
Dist. to markets Geodesic distance to closest market or fair Authors calculations based on
Letters (2005)
Holding-specific
Holding’s value, 1066 (log) Natural log of value to the lord of the value of the holding
in 1066, as recorded in DDB
DDB1
Size (log) Natural log of holding’s size as recorded in DDB DDB1
Holdings number (log) Natural log of the number of holdings held by same lord
of the observed holding in 1066 and 1086 (as indicated in
parentheses), as recorded in DDB
Authors’ calculations based on
DDB1
Holding’s dispersion Dispersion of holdings of the same Lord calculated both








Authors’ calculations based on
DDB1
Geographic fixed effects
County FE Dummies that uniquely identifies holdings w.r.t. their
county
DDB1
Hundred FE Dummies that uniquely identifies holdings w.r.t. their local
district, named Hundred, as reported in DDB
DDB1
IV for diff-in-diff
Dist. Benedictine lord Geodesic distance to the nearest Benedictine Monastery that
is enlisted among the land holders in 1066.
DDB1and EMA2
Other variables
Dist. to Benedictine Monastery Geodesic distance to any nearest Benedictine Monastery, re-




1 Domesday Book Statistics, Palmer (2008);
2 English Monastic Archive, D’Avray (2015);
3 Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0), IIASA/FAO (2012);
4 Archaeology Data Service, The Rural Settlement of Roman Britain: an online resource, Allen et al. (2018);
5 The Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World, Talbert (2000). Digital maps retrieved at http://awmc.unc.edu/wordp
ress/map-files/;
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Benedictine (1066) 0.054 0.227 0.000 1.000 9643
Outcome variables
Growth rate (log) −0.033 0.398 −3.892 2.818 9643
Population (1086) 15.834 26.232 0.000 1145.000 9638
Mills (1086) 1.419 1.113 0.000 13.500 2494
Ploughs (1086) 4.871 6.987 0.000 173.000 9592
Geography
Latitude 52.319 0.846 50.502 54.611 9643
Longitude −0.638 1.145 −4.074 1.742 9643
Latitude*Longitude −33.529 59.999 −205.757 91.468 9643
Median altitude 70.197 49.895 −1.000 404.000 9642
Crop suitability 4.047 1.384 0.000 7.615 9642
Ruggedness 14.855 19.857 0.000 208.646 9643
Agricultural suitability 0.518 0.064 0.351 0.789 9641
Pasture suitability 0.151 0.076 0.049 0.532 9641
Animal husbandry suitability 0.463 0.165 0.189 0.816 9641
History
Dist. Roman settl. (log) 1.439 0.556 0.000 3.989 9643
Dist. Roman roads (log) 1.672 0.754 0.002 3.982 9643
Market access
Dist. rivers (log) 2.993 0.996 0.006 5.209 9643
Dist. coast (log) 3.420 1.061 0.065 4.921 9643
Dist. London (log) 4.766 0.633 0.865 5.919 9643
Dist. borough (log) 3.307 0.726 0.000 4.800 9643
Dist. markets (log) 2.675 0.628 0.044 4.286 9643
Holding-specific
Holding value, 1066 (log) 1.255 0.831 0.000 5.707 9643
Size (log) 1.253 0.740 0.000 4.646 9643
Holdings of the same lord in 1066 (log) 3.255 1.632 0.693 6.880 9643
Holdings’ Dispersion (1066) 0.852 0.664 0.000 3.933 9643
202
worse) holdings. Indeed, historical evidence has shown that among the most strenuous
opponents William faced after he landed on England were some Benedictine monas-
teries, since most of the monks were part of the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy (Knowles
1966).
To isolate the effect of the institutional structure from everything else, we employ two
different strategies. The first one exploits the geographical information contained in our
dataset, that allow us to compare holdings of different ownership located in the same
small administrative area, controlling for a wide range of geographic and economic
factors. The second one uses the post-Hastings re-assignment of holdings formerly
owned by the Anglo-Saxon nobility as an historic “natural experiment”.
4.4.1 Geographic fixed effects
Since we know the geographic location of every estate, we are able to collect a num-
ber of controls, described in Section 4.3, related with geographic conditions (latitude,
longitude, altitude, ruggedness, terrain suitability to cereal, agriculture and pasture),
history (distance to Roman roads and Roman settlements), market access (distance to
marketplaces, boroughs, coasts, rivers and London) and holding-specific (size, number
of holdings controlled by the same landlord, their dispersion, value in 1066). Moreover,
we exploit information on the administrative structure of the Norman kingdom to in-
clude dummies for each county or each hundred. In practice, we estimate by OLS the
following specification:
Yi,g = γg + δBenedicti,g + β
′
xi,g + εi,g (4.1)
where Yi,g is the growth rate of value over 20 years for holding i located in the geographic
unit g, γg are geographic (county or hundred) dummies, Benedicti,g is a dummy equal
to one if holding i was controlled by a Benedictine monastery in 1066 and xi,g is the
vector of holding-varying controls mentioned above.
The coefficient of interest is δ and, in the most demanding specification, we are com-
paring monastic and secular estates located within small administrative units. The
combination of this feature with the holding specific controls we collected should ad-
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dress most of the endogeneity concerns coming from pure geographic considerations.
It remains possible, however, that monasteries managed to systematically select the
best land (in terms of unobservable characteristics we are not accounting for) within
each hundred. Moreover, the Norman conquest affected the land controlled by non-
monastic lords in a disproportionate way, because of the complete annihilation of the
Anglo-Saxon elite. Section 4.4.2 tries to address those concerns as well.
4.4.2 Ownership change and diff-in-diff estimation
With the Norman conquest, holdings belonging to Anglo-Saxon landlords were re-
assigned by King William after the Battle of Hastings. Some of them were assigned
to new secular landlords, other were assigned to monasteries. In this specification, we
focus on the sub-sample of holdings owned by Anglo-Saxon landlords that changed
ownership with the Norman conquest, using those that ended up to be controlled by
Benedictine monasteries as “treatment group” and the rest as “control group”.
The fact that every holding, in this sample, has been reassigned, allows us to disentangle
the effect of ownership change from the effect of being controlled by a Benedictine
monastery.
Using the panel structure of the dataset, we are substantially estimating a diff-in-
diff (DID) specification, where we compare pre- and post-Conquest (log of) value for
holdings moving from an Anglo-Saxon secular landlord to a Benedictine monastery
and holdings moving from an Anglo-Saxon secular landlord to a Norman landlord. In
practice, we estimate
Yi,t = τt + µi + φBenedicti,t + λ
′
xi,t + εi,t (4.2)
where Yi,t is the (log of) annual value of holding i at time t, τt time fixed effect, µi
is holding fixed effect, Benedicti,t is a dummy for holdings controlled by Benedictine
monasteries and xi,t is a vector of time varying and time invariant controls interacted
with time fixed effect. Under the assumptions of parallel trends and that nothing
else happens at the same time affecting treatment and control group in a different




Secular to other secular
Monastery
Figure 4.4: Ownership change
Note: Holdings whose landlord changed between 1066 and 1086. Grey dots are those switching from
a secular landlord to another secular landlord (presumably, from an Anglo-Saxon to a Norman
nobleman), green dots are those switching from a secular landlord to a bishop and purple dots are
those switching from a secular landlord to a monastery. Black crosses represent monasteries.
our measure of land productive capacity. Note that we are taking care of every time
invariant holding specific characteristic.
Given the fact that we are using historical data and we have only two time periods,
unfortunately we cannot test the parallel trend assumption directly. However, as ex-
plained in Section 4.2, there is no historical evidence we are aware of reporting King
William systematically favouring monasteries in the re-assignment. Consistently with
this, the balance table we show in section 4.5.2 looks fairly good, as the main significant
difference in observables between treatment and control group comes from the tendency
of the former to be located in Southern England. This is clearly due to pre-existing his-
torical reasons, that are time invariant and hence unlikely to induce a systematic bias
in the coefficient. New monasteries spread all over England starting from Canterbury,
keeping cultural and religious ties with Rome and the continental Europe application
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of Benedict’s Rule.26 Not only treatment and control estates are fairly balanced in
terms of observables: the value level pre-Conquest is also not statistically different so,
in terms of outcome, they start from the same point.
Overall, the data are consistent with the idea that William decided the re-assignment
without discriminating in favour of monasteries, as the land they received was very
similar, on average, to the land assigned to secular landlords. Moreover, our results
are robust to the introduction of all the aforementioned controls interacted with time.
Finally, we are not aware of other events systematically affecting one of the two groups
of holdings27. In particular, it is worth pointing out that the rebellions that followed
Hastings involved monasteries as well, and William had to re-conquer the monastery
of Ely during the most challenging one (Thomas 2008, ch. 2).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Geographic fixed effects
At first we compare the 20-years value growth rate of holdings that were controlled
by Benedictine monasteries in 1066 and holdings controlled by secular landlords at
the same time. The idea is that those estates were probably in the same (monastic
or secular) hands way before the last day of King Edward, hence we want to test
whether there is some persistence of a “monastic effect” in our data. Obviously, the
vast majority of secular holdings also changed owner during this period, a concern that
will be addressed in Section 4.5.2.
Table 4.3 summarises the main findings. Table A4.2 performs the same exercise with a
less demanding specification in terms of geographic controls (i.e. county fixed effects)
and again everything remains stable and consistent.
Column (1) of Table 4.3 shows the correlation between the Benedictine dummy and
the productive capacity growth rate, with only Hundred FE. Hence, we are comparing
26During the reign of Louis the Pious (814-840) the application of Benedict’ Rule became mandatory
in every monastery throughout his Empire, a provision ultimately affecting also monasteries lying
outside the Carolingian Empire, due to cultural and affiliation ties among Benedictine monasteries
(Dell’Omo 2011).
27A number of Viking raids are known to hit the North-Western part of England around 1070,
but the potential detrimental effects of these events are already captured by the geographical control
variables we include in our models.
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Table 4.3: Growth rate of holding value: Benedictine and secular landlords compared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine (1066) 0.057 ∗ ∗∗ 0.054 ∗ ∗ 0.057 ∗ ∗∗ 0.058 ∗ ∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.037∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Included controls:
Geography1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market access2 No No Y es No No Y es
History3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding specific4 No No No No Y es Y es
Hundred FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Obs 9287 9285 9287 9287 9287 9285
Notes. Dependent variable: value growth rate. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1066). Shared holdings and
outliers (i.e. 7 estates recording growth rate larger than 30) are excluded from the sample.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude,
median altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest
borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman
settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include holding’s value in 1066, size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding
dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Benedictine and non-Benedictine holdings located within the same small geographic
unit. On top of that, columns (2) to (6) add different sets of control variables, as
outlined above. The most restrictive specification, in column (6), includes all the
controls as well as hundred dummies. Even in that case, Benedictine estates exhibit a
3.7 percentage points higher growth rate in the 20 years after the Norman conquest.
Together with overall productive capacity, there are few other outcomes that we can
test with this cross sectional approach: population, presence of mills and number of
ploughs.28 Table 4.4 reports the results in the most demanding specification, the same
as in column (6) of Table 4.3. Interestingly, Benedictine holdings are not different (or
worse) from the others in terms of technology (ploughs and mills) or population. Of
course, since we are dealing with levels we cannot test whether there was a change with
respect to the pre-Conquest period.
4.5.2 Ownership change and Diff-in-diff estimation
Table A4.4 describes the subsample used for this section and group-specific summary
statistics are in Table 4.5. As mentioned, we keep only estates that were held by secular
landlords in 1066 and that changed owner between 1066 and 1086. In this case, we
are exploiting the panel structure of our dataset and the outcome variable is the log of
28Unfortunately, data for these outcomes are available for 1086 only, hence we cannot use them in
the panel approach.
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Table 4.4: Other outcomes: Benedictine and other landlords compared
(1) (2) (3)
Population Ploughs Mills
Benedictine (1066) 0.134 −0.019 −2.210 ∗ ∗
(0.971) (0.336) (0.898)
Included controls:
Geography1 Y es Y es Y es
Market access2 Y es Y es Y es
History3 Y es Y es Y es
Holding specific4 Y es Y es Y es
Hundred FE Y es Y es Y es
Obs 9280 9236 227
Notes. Dependent variable: Population (column 1), Ploughs (col. 2), Presence of Mills (col. 3).
Standard errors clustered at lord level (1066). Shared holdings and outliers (i.e. 7 estates recording
growth rate larger than 30) are excluded from the sample.
† Logit model, estimated margins reported in table.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude,
latitude×longitude, median altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suit-
ability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast,
London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in
km) to Roman settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding’s
dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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value in 1066 and 1086. Therefore, we can interpret the result as the differential effect
on the productive capacity growth rate calculated over 20 years induced by Benedictine
control. As most of the control variables are time-invariant (with the exception of the
number of holdings controlled by the same lord and their dispersion), we add them
to the specification after multiplying them by time fixed effect. From Table 4.5 it is
clear that “treated” holdings tend to have a positive 5% growth rate over 20 years and
“control” holdings have a negative 5% growth rate over the same period.
Table 4.5: Summary statistics (subsample) by groups
Control Treatment
Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs
Outcome variables
Holding’s value, 1066 (log) 1.224 0.802 0.000 4.727 7612 1.455 0.897 0.049 4.466 175
Holding’s value, 1086 (log) 1.173 0.856 0.000 4.987 7612 1.501 0.874 0.000 4.615 175
Geography
Latitude 52.363 0.864 50.502 54.611 7612 52.013 0.581 50.777 53.608 175
Longitude -0.616 1.157 -4.074 1.742 7612 -0.405 1.154 -2.861 1.709 175
Latitude*Longitude -32.411 60.659 -205.757 91.468 7612 -21.015 60.156 -151.033 89.981 175
Median altitude 69.871 50.187 -1.000 404.000 7611 70.486 48.708 1.000 259.000 175
Crop suitability 4.063 1.383 0.000 7.615 7611 4.136 1.289 0.000 7.565 175
Ruggedness 14.998 20.065 0.000 208.646 7612 11.776 16.097 0.000 91.389 175
Pasture suitability 0.148 0.073 0.049 0.529 7610 0.153 0.074 0.061 0.416 175
Agricultural suitability 0.516 0.063 0.351 0.789 7610 0.520 0.072 0.383 0.776 175
Animal husbandry suitability 0.459 0.162 0.189 0.816 7610 0.456 0.164 0.222 0.775 175
History
Dist. Roman settl. (log) 1.458 0.557 0.000 3.989 7612 1.408 0.479 0.361 2.570 175
Dist. Roman roads (log) 1.690 0.754 0.002 3.982 7612 1.588 0.746 0.015 3.181 175
Market access
Dist. rivers (log) 3.040 0.980 0.006 5.209 7612 3.117 0.944 0.395 4.510 175
Dist. coast (log) 3.385 1.068 0.065 4.908 7612 3.517 0.944 0.116 4.772 175
Dist. London (log) 4.798 0.618 0.865 5.919 7612 4.562 0.578 2.396 5.484 175
Dist. borough (log) 3.339 0.712 0.000 4.800 7612 3.323 0.687 0.882 4.636 175
Dist. markets (log) 2.700 0.623 0.132 4.286 7612 2.532 0.534 0.589 3.571 175
Manor-specific
Size (log) 1.211 0.714 0.012 4.646 7612 1.383 0.767 0.095 4s.407 175
Holdings of the same lord in 1066 (log) 3.096 1.550 0.693 6.332 7612 3.404 1.527 0.693 6.332 175
Holdings of the same lord in 1086 (log) 3.192 1.616 0.693 7.141 7612 3.080 1.422 0.693 4.990 175
Holdings’ dispersion (1066) 0.890 0.692 0.000 3.933 7612 0.930 0.632 0.000 2.380 175
Holdings’ dispersion (1086) 0.850 0.645 0.000 3.348 7612 0.602 0.418 0.000 2.326 175
The results of (4.2) are reported in Table 4.6. We report only the estimated values
for φ. The estimates are pretty consistent across all the columns: holdings that, after
the re-assignment, end up being controlled by Benedictine monasteries experience a
20-year productive capacity growth rate that is between 4 and 10 percentage points
higher, depending on the specification. Moreover, as shown in Table A4.5, excluding
ecclesiastical holdings from the control group does not change the result, and the same
is true when we exclude holdings that end up under the direct control of the King, as
shown in Table A4.6.
As we have only two time periods, unfortunately we cannot perform the usual test
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Table 4.6: Holding value: Benedictine and other lords compared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.098 ∗ ∗∗ 0.048 ∗ ∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ 0.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.039∗
(0.030) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.022)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15574 15570 15574 15574 15574 15570
Notes. Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086). Shared holdings and outliers are excluded
from the sample;
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median
altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements
and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
for the parallel trend assumption. The best proxy we could find is a set of balance
tests between treatment and control groups on the sample we are using. Results are
reported in Table 4.7. Treatment and control groups are statistically different only
with respect to few dimensions. Two of them (distance to London and latitude) have
a clear interpretation based on the development of monasteries in England. As there
were more monasteries in the south, it seems reasonable that holdings in the south are
more likely to end up under the control of a monastery, after the re-assignment. The
effect of this feature on the growth perspective is likely to be time invariant, hence it
is taken care of by the holding fixed effect.
The third dimension is the number of holdings controlled by the same lord in 1066. As
the measure is time varying, we can take care of it directly in the regression. More-
over, this seems consistent with the idea that holdings re-assigned to monasteries were
probably a “residual” of big pre-existing holdings divided in different ways for rea-
sons related with internal or external security. In fact, the two groups are no longer
significantly different on this dimension in 1086. Fourth, holdings assigned to Benedic-
tine monasteries are closer to marketplaces. Finally, note that the outcome variable
“pre-treatment” is not statistically different between the two groups, hence there is no
evidence of selection in terms of observable ex ante productive capacity.
As the re-assignment procedure was clearly not random, however, it is possible that
the King could have chosen not to re-assign to his allies holdings with a higher growth
prospect. Obviously we cannot enter in King William’s mind, but historians seem to
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agree that the main reasons were internal and external security. On top of that, the
King could have assigned those high-prospect estates to himself directly. However,
this seem not to be the case, as a comparison between King’s and secular landlords’
holdings, summarised in Table 4.8, shows a consistently negative (or close to zero) sign.
Table 4.7: Balance test (subsample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Value (1066) Size Holdings same lord (1066) Holdings’ dispersion (1066)
Benedictine (1086) 0.231 0.172 0.308 ∗ ∗∗ 0.041
(0.185) (0.145) (0.116) (0.097)
Constant 1.224 ∗ ∗∗ 1.211 ∗ ∗∗ 3.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.890 ∗ ∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.049) (0.015)
Obs 7787 7787 7787 7787
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Latitude Longitude Lat × Lon Median altitude
Benedictine (1086) −0.350 ∗ ∗∗ 0.211 11.396 0.615
(0.103) (0.319) (16.633) (6.230)
Constant 52.363 ∗ ∗∗ −0.616 ∗ ∗∗ −32.411 ∗ ∗∗ 69.871 ∗ ∗∗
(0.041) (0.039) (2.073) (1.216)
Obs 7787 7787 7787 7786
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Crop suitability Agr. suitability Past. suitability Anim. suitability
Benedictine (1086) 0.073 0.005 0.005 −0.002
(0.193) (0.009) (0.011) (0.038)
Constant 4.063 ∗ ∗∗ 0.516 ∗ ∗∗ 0.148 ∗ ∗∗ 0.459 ∗ ∗∗
(0.030) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Obs 7786 7785 7785 7785
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Ruggedness Dist. to Roman roads Dist. to Roman settl. Dist. to markets
Benedictine (1086) −3.223 −0.102 −0.050 −0.168 ∗ ∗∗
(2.295) (0.068) (0.036) (0.055)
Constant 14.998 ∗ ∗∗ 1.690 ∗ ∗∗ 1.458 ∗ ∗∗ 2.700 ∗ ∗∗
(0.428) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020)
Obs 7787 7787 7787 7787
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Dist. to rivers Dist. to coast Dist. to London Dist. to borough
Benedictine (1086) 0.077 0.131 −0.236 ∗ ∗∗ −0.016
(0.164) (0.102) (0.078) (0.130)
Constant 3.040 ∗ ∗∗ 3.385 ∗ ∗∗ 4.798 ∗ ∗∗ 3.339 ∗ ∗∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.029) (0.023)
Obs 7787 7787 7787 7787
Notes. Regression of the dependent variable stated in each column on Benedictine (1086) dummy. Sample limited to
non-Benedictine holdings in 1066 that switched owner, excluding shared and outliers. Distances, value and holdings
of the same lord are all in logs. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.6 Mechanisms
As discussed in Section 4.2, there are few possible reasons economic historians have
highlighted and that may explain our results. However, we are able to rule out those
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Table 4.8: Holding value: King vs secular landlords
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
King −0.081 ∗ ∗∗ −0.020 −0.043 ∗ ∗∗ −0.078 ∗ ∗∗ −0.019 0.013
(0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.025) (0.025)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 14666 14662 14666 14666 14666 14662
Notes. Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086). Shared holdings and outliers are
excluded from the sample, as well as holdings controlled by monasteries or bishops in 1086;
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, me-
dian altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest
borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman
settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
that are not related with the institutional elements of the Rule. In particular, we
control for the historical presence of Roman settlements in the area and for a wide
range of other geographic characteristics, hence the effect we find is not due to those
elements (whose importance has been stressed, for example by Postan 1973). Moreover,
the effect is still present when we control for the number of holdings owned by the same
landlord and for their dispersion, hence it is not due to learning or economies of scale,
as proposed by Campbell (2006). The availability of cheap labour as a channel for
prosperity, stressed by Ekelund et al. (1996), plays no role here, as conversi were not
there yet. On top of this, monastic holdings seem not to be different from the others
in term of population or technology, as highlighted by Table 4.4.
Another mechanism could be cultural proximity, meaning that it is not being governed
by a monastery that matters, but just being close, so that people can acquire the
related “hard work” mentality. This is the mechanism broadly suggested by Andersen
et al. (2017), for example. In order to test this idea, we geo-coded the location of
every English Benedictine monastery, irrespective of whether it was a landlord or not.
Then, for all our holdings, we can calculate the distance between them and the closest
monastery, and see whether it can explain productive capacity growth. Table 4.9
shows that it is not the case: the distance to the nearest monastery has no statistically
significant effect on the growth rate, irrespective of whether we use hundred (column
2) or county (column 3) dummies.
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Table 4.9: Growth rate of holding value: Benedict’s rule and proximity to monastery
compared
(1) (2) (3)
Benchmark Excl. Bened. Excl. Bened.
(HFE) (CFE)




Hundred FE Y es Y es No
County FE No No Y es
Included controls:
Geography1 Y es Y es Y es
Market access2 Y es Y es Y es
History3 Y es Y es Y es
Holding specific4 Y es Y es Y es
Obs 9285 8761 8762
Notes. Dependent variable: value growth rate. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1066).
Shared holdings and outliers (i.e. 7 estates recording growth rate larger than 30) are excluded from
the sample, as well as holdings held by Female and Non-Benedictine monastic orders.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude,
latitude×longitude, median altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural
suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers,
coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in
km) to Roman settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding
dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.10 helps ruling out two further channels, i.e. the possibility that the effect
we find comes from better human capital or that it is due to the different incentives
that may arise when the estate is controlled by a religious institution. We estimate the
same model as described in Section 4.4.2, but now the “treatment” dummy becomes
one when the land owned by an Anglo-Saxon nobleman in 1066 is controlled by a
bishop in 1086. We test the same specifications as in Section 4.5.2 and we find no
statistically significant difference, meaning that being re-assigned and controlled by a
bishop does not lead to a statistically significant change in productive capacity growth
rate. The dimension of the coefficients is halved with respect to those associated with
monasteries. Note that bishops where usually educated figures and their authority was
based on a religious element, as much as in the case of abbots.
Table 4.10: Holding value, bishops vs secular landlords
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bishop 0.052 0.026 0.027 0.051 0.051 0.022
(0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.048) (0.049) (0.036)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15056 15052 15056 15056 15056 15052
Notes. Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086). Shared holdings and outliers are
excluded from the sample, as well as estates with a Benedictine owner in 1086;
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median
altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest
borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements
and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Another way to assess the importance of human capital is through the comparison
of monasteries of old and more recent foundation. Older monasteries may have had
more time to develop specific skills, learn about specialisation, acquire expertise, in-
vest in training etc. If those factors are important for the result we find, we should
expect holdings assigned to old monasteries to perform better than holdings assigned
to more recently-founded monasteries. We test this hypothesis adding to equation
(4.2) an interaction term between the Benedictine dummy and a dummy equal to 1 if
the landlord-monastery was founded before year 900 AD.29 The results of Table 4.11,
29The number of observations drops because we do not have the foundation date for every monastery
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however, point towards the opposite direction: the coefficient of the interaction term
is never statistically different from zero and its sign is always negative. We interpret
this result as further suggestive evidence against the “human capital” channel.
Table 4.11: Holding value, old vs new monasteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.110 ∗ ∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.069 ∗ ∗∗ 0.111 ∗ ∗∗ 0.116 ∗ ∗∗ 0.039
(0.043) (0.032) (0.027) (0.043) (0.044) (0.029)
Benedictine*Pre900 −0.062 −0.032 −0.051 −0.066 −0.075 −0.025
(0.066) (0.048) (0.055) (0.067) (0.070) (0.054)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15448 15444 15448 15448 15448 15444
Notes. Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086). Shared holdings and outliers are excluded from the sample;
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median altitude, crop suitability,
ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.12 compares values of holdings controlled by Benedictines in both 1066 and
1086 and holdings that were secular in 1066 and did not change landlord, hence that
probably remained Anglo-Saxon throughout the period. Again, we see a positive and
significant effect of Benedictine control, and this suggests that - in the main specification
- we are not capturing just an “Anglo-Saxon effect”, or the consequence of a better
knowledge of the territory by Benedictine decision makers when compared with the
newly arrived Norman conquerors. They were better than Anglo-Saxon landlords as
well.30
Table 4.13 ensures that our effect is not due to the monks working the land directly.
They may have different incentives, motivations and a different “hard work ethic” with
respect to ordinary peasants so, since we want to isolate the effect of a better decision
making structure, it makes sense to exclude places where they could work directly. In
particular, Table 4.13 excludes all the holdings that are closer than 5km to a monastery,
and the coefficients are basically unaffected.31
in our sample.
30Importantly, none of those holdings has been re-assigned, hence we do not need to worry about
the effect coming from a replacement of the landlord.
31Results are very similar using 4km and 6km as thresholds.
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Table 4.12: Holding value, Benedictines vs Anglo-Saxon landlords
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.262 ∗ ∗ 0.171 0.156∗ 0.258 ∗ ∗∗ 0.207∗ 0.073
(0.107) (0.112) (0.086) (0.096) (0.114) (0.096)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812
Notes. Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086). Shared holdings and outliers are excluded
from the sample. We keep only holdings that where either always Benedictine or that remained in Anglo-Saxon hands after the
Conquest.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median
altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements
and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.13: Holding value, Benedictines vs secular landlords (excluding holdings close
to a monastery)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.103 ∗ ∗∗ 0.050 ∗ ∗ 0.057 ∗ ∗ 0.102 ∗ ∗∗ 0.101 ∗ ∗∗ 0.040∗
(0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.029) (0.030) (0.022)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15182 15178 15182 15182 15182 15178
Notes. Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086). Shared holdings and outliers are excluded from the sample. We
keep only observations whose distance from a monastery is bigger than 5km.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median altitude, crop suitability,
ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper suggests that a certain degree of democratic selection, even in absence of
full accountability, positively impacts economic outcomes. We exploit the historical
case of Benedictine monasteries in England at the turn of Norman conquest to show
that they were more efficient landlords than their secular counterparts: Benedictine
monasteries were abiding Benedict’s Rule which prescribes, among other provisions,
the election of the abbot. We obtain this result at a very disaggregated level, compar-
ing a contemporaneous measure of productive capacity of medieval English holdings
controlled by Benedictine monasteries and by secular landlords.
In order to address the selection concerns, we exploit the massive re-assignment of
land possession that followed the Norman Conquest, focusing on estates that switched
ownership from Anglo-Saxon secular lords to Norman secular lords or to monasteries.
Benedictine-controlled holdings experienced, in the most conservative estimation, a
3.9 percentage points higher growth in productive capacity over the 20 years period
1066-1086.
In terms of mechanisms, we are able to rule out many alternative stories, showing -
among others - that our effect is not due to geographic proximity to a monastery, that
it does not depend on holdings where the monks could have worked directly and that
religious institutions unaffected by Benedict’s Rule (i.e. bishops) have an economic
performance that is indistinguishable from that of secular landlords. In this way, we
prove (indirect) evidence of the importance of the Rule and of its institutional features.
These results suggest ways for further research. First of all, having information about
abbots’ tenure and the number of monks in each monastery, one could measure freedom
and competitiveness of the elections. Further, it could be interesting to look at long
term outcomes, particularly before the suppression of monasteries ordered by Henry
VIII (as the long term effect of this policy are already considered by Heldring et al.
2017).
While all these questions certainly deserve further research, our paper sets a first step
in shedding new light on the economic effect of democratic selection, even when ac-





Table A4.1: Growth rate of holding value: Benedictine and secular landlords compared,
full table displaying all coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine (1066) 0.057 ∗ ∗∗ 0.054 ∗ ∗ 0.057 ∗ ∗∗ 0.058 ∗ ∗∗ 0.039∗ 0.037∗







Median altitude −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)




Agricultural suitability −0.285∗ −0.369 ∗ ∗
(0.159) (0.164)
Pasture suitability 0.646 ∗ ∗∗ 0.674 ∗ ∗∗
(0.187) (0.190)
Animal husbandry suitability −0.468 ∗ ∗∗ −0.410 ∗ ∗∗
(0.134) (0.122)
Dist. rivers (log) −0.010 −0.014
(0.010) (0.012)
Dist. coast (log) −0.010 0.007
(0.013) (0.016)
Dist. London (log) −0.023 0.134 ∗ ∗∗
(0.063) (0.048)
Dist. borough (log) 0.017 0.012
(0.018) (0.017)
Dist. markets (log) −0.049 ∗ ∗∗ −0.046 ∗ ∗∗
(0.016) (0.014)
Dist. Roman settl. (log) −0.021 ∗ ∗∗ −0.017 ∗ ∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Dist. Roman roads (log) 0.007 0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
Holding’s value, 1066 (log) −0.232 ∗ ∗∗ −0.234 ∗ ∗∗
(0.019) (0.019)
Size (log) 0.233 ∗ ∗∗ 0.234 ∗ ∗∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Holdings of the same lord in 1066 (log) 0.003 0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Dispersion of holdings (1066) 0.001 −0.000
(0.012) (0.012)
Hundred FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Obs 9287 9285 9287 9287 9287 9285
Dependent variable: value growth rate. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1066). Shared holdings and outliers (i.e. 7 estates recording growth rate
larger than 30) are excluded from the sample.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.2: Growth rate of holding value: Benedictine and secular landlords compared,
county FE, full table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine (1066) 0.091 ∗ ∗ 0.081 ∗ ∗ 0.090 ∗ ∗ 0.090 ∗ ∗∗ 0.065 ∗ ∗ 0.055∗
(0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.035) (0.030) (0.028)
Included controls:
Geography1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market access2 No No Y es No No Y es
History3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding specific4 No No No No Y es Y es
County FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Adj. R-sq. 0.273 0.277 0.277 0.274 0.340 0.346
Obs 9288 9286 9288 9288 9288 9286
Dependent variable: value growth rate. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1066). Shared holdings and outliers (i.e.
7 estates recording growth rate larger than 30) are excluded from the sample.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.3: Growth rate of holding value: Benedict’s rule and proximity to monastery
compared
(1) (2) (3)
Benchmark Excl. Bened. Excl. Bened.
(HFE) (CFE)




Latitude −0.152∗ −0.149∗ −0.002
(0.087) (0.088) (0.034)
Longitude −2.768 −3.020 0.682
(2.286) (2.290) (0.856)
Latitude*Longitude 0.055 0.059 −0.013
(0.044) (0.044) (0.016)
Median altitude −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 ∗ ∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crop suitability −0.003 −0.004 −0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ruggedness −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Agricultural suitability −0.369 ∗ ∗ −0.403 ∗ ∗ −0.343 ∗ ∗∗
(0.164) (0.174) (0.107)
Pasture suitability 0.674 ∗ ∗∗ 0.720 ∗ ∗∗ 0.353 ∗ ∗
(0.190) (0.225) (0.145)
Animal husbandry suitability −0.410 ∗ ∗∗ −0.410 ∗ ∗∗ −0.166 ∗ ∗
(0.122) (0.129) (0.072)
Dist. rivers (log) −0.014 −0.015 −0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.008)
Dist. coast (log) 0.007 0.009 0.016∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.009)
Dist. London (log) 0.134 ∗ ∗∗ 0.121 ∗ ∗ −0.045 ∗ ∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.021)
Dist. borough (log) 0.012 0.026 0.019∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.010)
Dist. markets (log) −0.046 ∗ ∗∗ −0.049 ∗ ∗∗ −0.033 ∗ ∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.009)
Dist. Roman settl. (log) −0.017 ∗ ∗ −0.017 ∗ ∗ −0.021 ∗ ∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Dist. Roman roads (log) 0.009 0.014 ∗ ∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Holding’s value, 1066 (log) −0.234 ∗ ∗∗ −0.234 ∗ ∗∗ −0.217 ∗ ∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Size (log) 0.234 ∗ ∗∗ 0.232 ∗ ∗∗ 0.218 ∗ ∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Holdings of the same lord in 1066 (log) 0.004 0.005 0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Dispersion of holdings (1066) −0.000 −0.001 −0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Obs 9285 8761 8762
Dependent variable: value growth rate. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1066). Shared holdings and outliers
(i.e. 7 estates recording growth rate larger than 30) are excluded from the sample, as well as holdings held by
Female and Non-Benedictine monastic orders.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Diff-in-diff: robustness checks
Table A4.4: Summary statistics (subsample)
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Benedictine (1086) 0.022 0.148 0.000 1.000 7787
Outcome variables
Holding’s value, 1066 (log) 1.229 0.805 0.000 4.727 7787
Holding’s value, 1086 (log) 1.180 0.858 0.000 4.987 7787
Geography
Latitude 52.356 0.860 50.502 54.611 7787
Longitude −0.611 1.157 −4.074 1.742 7787
Latitude*Longitude −32.155 60.668 −205.757 91.468 7787
Median altitude 69.885 50.151 −1.000 404.000 7786
Crop suitability 4.065 1.381 0.000 7.615 7786
Ruggedness 14.926 19.989 0.000 208.646 7787
Pasture suitability 0.148 0.073 0.049 0.529 7785
Agricultural suitability 0.516 0.063 0.351 0.789 7785
Animal husbandry suitability 0.459 0.162 0.189 0.816 7785
Market access
Dist. rivers (log) 3.042 0.979 0.006 5.209 7787
Dist. coast (log) 3.388 1.065 0.065 4.908 7787
Dist. London (log) 4.793 0.618 0.865 5.919 7787
Dist. borough (log) 3.339 0.712 0.000 4.800 7787
Dist. markets (log) 2.696 0.622 0.132 4.286 7787
History
Dist. Roman settl. (log) 1.456 0.556 0.000 3.989 7787
Dist. Roman roads (log) 1.688 0.754 0.002 3.982 7787
Holding-specific
Size (log) 1.215 0.715 0.012 4.646 7787
Holdings of the same lord in 1066 (log) 3.103 1.550 0.693 6.332 7787
Holdings of the same lord in 1086 (log) 3.190 1.612 0.693 7.141 7787
Holdings’ dispersion (1066) 0.891 0.690 0.000 3.933 7787
Holdings’ dispersion (1086) 0.844 0.642 0.000 3.348 7787
Table A4.5: Holding value: Benedictine and secular landlord (bishops excluded)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.099 ∗ ∗∗ 0.050 ∗ ∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ 0.098 ∗ ∗∗ 0.098 ∗ ∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.030) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.022)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15092 15088 15092 15092 15092 15088
Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086). Shared holdings and outliers are excluded from the sample, as well as
holdings with an ecclesiastical non monastic landlord;
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median altitude, crop suitability,
ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.6: Holding value: Benedictine vs other landlords (excluding the King)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.095 ∗ ∗∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ 0.061 ∗ ∗∗ 0.093 ∗ ∗∗ 0.098 ∗ ∗∗ 0.051 ∗ ∗
(0.030) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.021)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 14572 14568 14572 14572 14572 14568
Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at lord level (1086). Shared holdings and outliers are excluded from the sample, as well as holdings
with the King as a landlord in 1086;
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median altitude, crop suitability, rugged-
ness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A4.7: Diff-in-Diff: same sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.098 ∗ ∗∗ 0.048 ∗ ∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ 0.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.039∗
(0.030) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.022)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15570 15570 15570 15570 15570 15570
Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at Lord86 level. The sample of Column 6 is usef for all the regressions. Shared holdings and
outliers are excluded from the sample.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median altitude, crop suitability,
ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Diff-in-diff: different clustering strategies
Table A4.8: Diff-in-Diff: Conley standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.098 ∗ ∗∗ 0.048 ∗ ∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗∗ 0.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.039∗
(0.030) (0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15574 15570 15574 15574 15574 15570
Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors calculated using Spatial HAC method. Shared holdings and outliers are excluded
from the sample.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median alti-
tude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements and
to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A4.9: Diff-in-Diff: clustering at Hundred level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.098 ∗ ∗∗ 0.048∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ 0.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.096 ∗ ∗∗ 0.039
(0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15574 15570 15574 15574 15574 15570
Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at hundred level. Shared holdings and outliers are excluded from
the sample.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude, latitude×longitude, median
altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability, animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast, London, nearest
borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to Roman settlements
and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4.10: Diff-in-Diff: clustering at County level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Benedictine 0.098∗ 0.048∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ 0.096∗ 0.096∗ 0.039∗
(0.055) (0.027) (0.025) (0.053) (0.055) (0.023)
Manor FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Time FE Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Geography*time ctrls1 No Y es No No No Y es
Market*time ctrls2 No No Y es No No Y es
History*time ctrls3 No No No Y es No Y es
Holding*time ctrls4 No No No No Y es Y es
Obs 15574 15570 15574 15574 15574 15570
Dependent variable: log of value. Standard errors clustered at county level. Shared holdings and outliers
are excluded from the sample.
1 Geography controls include geographic/agriculture related features, namely: latitude, longitude,
latitude×longitude, median altitude, crop suitability, ruggedness, pasture suitability, agricultural suitability,
animal husbandry suitability;
2 Market access controls include proxies for access to markets: (log of) distance (in km) to: rivers, coast,
London, nearest borough;
3 History controls include proxies for the ancientness of the settlement, namely: (log of) distance (in km) to
Roman settlements and to Roman roads;
4 Holding-specific controls include size, the number of holdings held by the same lord and holding dispersion.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Strömberg, D. (2004) Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public
Policy. Review of Economic Studies, 71(1): 265-284.
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